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This report forms the first phase of a project funded by HM Treasury, the 
Department for Work and Pensions, the Inland Revenue and the Economic 
and Social Research Council on the design and estimation of labour supply 
models. This phase – Part 1A of the project – aims to undertake a full review 
of the techniques and methods which have been developed by researchers to 
study labour supply and employment, unemployment and inactivity in the 
labour market. Progress in labour supply modelling in the last thirty years or 
so has been considerable. Firstly, the theory of labour supply has become 
much more sophisiticated; simple static-period models of the budget 
constraint and the hours decision have been augmented with new 
developments such as intertemporal optimisation, explicit treatment of the 
participation decision as distinct from the hours decision, and search theory. 
Secondly, the econometric techniques available to estimate these more 
advanced models on the data have expanded massively, along with increases 
in the amount and quality of data available and huge improvements in 
computing power. In this report we aim to provide a comprehensive survey of 
the state of the art in the field of labour supply estimation.  
 
Part 1 of this review presents the theory and estimation of labour supply 
models with the focus of attention on the individual’s choice of whether to 
work or not, and how many hours to work, given a ‘budget constraint’ which 
relates gross earnings to net disposable income. Broadly this type of models 
could be called ‘static’ as they refer to and rely on the assumption of 
equilibrium in the labour market. In Chapter 1 we show how these labour 
supply models are rooted in the concept of rational utility maximisation subject 
to constraints, and how they can be adapted to deal with labour supply 
decisions in a family context, and extended from a single-period analysis to an 
intertemporal optimisation framework. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of how 
these models are estimated, discussing the specification of the utility function 
in empirical work, dealing with non-convexities and kinks in the budget 
constraint, the selectivity issues raised by non-participation, accounting for 
fixed costs of work, modelling childcare costs, and the modelling of non-take 
up of benefits and tax credits. In Chapter 2 we look both at the estimation of 
both structural models described in Chapter 1 and at models which assume 
equilibrium in the labour market but are not underlined by any specific utility 
function, and can thus be called non- or semi-structural. The latter present an 
alternative way for evaluating the labour supply impact of policy reforms and 
include ‘difference-in-differences’ methods and methodologies based on 
random assignment. In Chapter 3 we look at some criticisms of the standard 
labour supply framework and ask how a theorist might respond to them.  
 
Part 2 is designed to complement the labour supply analysis of Part 1 by 
focusing explicitly on the dynamics of the labour market – transitions into and 
out of work, the theories which relate them to financial incentives and other 
factors, and the way in which the models are estimated on empirical data. We  
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begin in Chapter 4 with a detailed examination of the various economic 
theories of work entry and exit and wage growth; human capital – based 
explanations, search and matching models, and the literature on ‘deferred 
compensation’. Chapter 5 examines the empirical evidence on entry and exit 
wages, wage progression for those who move into work, the returns to 
experience and tenure, and the relationship between wages, quits and layoffs 
and the business cycle. Chapter 6 examines the empirical estimation of 
models which include an explicit role for labour market transitions in their 
analysis. These include hazard models, search models, dynamic 
programming models of schooling and career choice, and the entry-wage 
based analysis of Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999).  
 
In the second report from this project  (Report 2), we  discuss the significance 
of the theory and techniques which we have examined for the dynamic model 
of work entry and exit which we have designed in this project. The aim is to 
incorporate the best practice from current labour supply and transition 
modelling methodologies whilst recognising both the strength and the 





Part 1  Static Labour Supply Modelling 
 
Chapter 1. The theory of structural labour supply modelling 
 
We start the discussion of different approaches to labour supply modelling by 
outlining the basic theory of rational choice. The theory is a direct application 
of the results of demand theory, relies on the assumption of individual 
rationality and develops a structural model of labour supply, i.e. a model 
underlined by a specification of a utility function which individuals are 
assumed to maximise. We first describe the basic principles of the theory in 
the context of individual labour supply. Extensions to cover joint labour supply 
decisions of people in couples are presented in section 1.2. Two important 
features of the structural framework are (i) testability of theoretical predictions 
and (ii) integrability/identification of the problem, i.e. the possibility of 
recovering the underlying unique parameters of the utility function. We discuss 
these with respect to individual and family labour supply in the respective 
sections.  
The structural labour supply theory assumes that an individual’s choice of 
whether to work or not, and the number of hours to work, is a result of utility 
maximisation in the space of consumption and leisure. Usually the price of 
consumption is normalised to one, while the individual wage determines the 
price of leisure. Variation in wages and the number of hours worked among 
people, under certain assumptions, allows the econometrician to estimate the 
parameters of the utility function, and the resulting labour supply function, 




1.1  Individual choice on the individual budget constraint 
 
The first section presents the most straightforward decision process, where a 
single individual chooses his/her optimal combination of consumption and 
leisure. We discuss the interpretation of three different demand systems: 
Marshallian, Hicksian and Frisch. The first two are considered both in static 
and dynamic contexts (sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2), while the third applies only to 
choices involving dynamic optimisation (section 1.1.3).  
                                              






1.1.1  Model excluding inter-temporal decisions 
 
 
Rational choice and restrictions on demand functions 
 
In its simplest representation, the structural approach models individual 
decisions over hours of work under the assumption of utility maximisation at a 
point in time. This assumes away any inter-temporal optimisation but provides 
a useful starting point for the development of the theory. Individuals maximise 
a utility function over consumption and leisure at time t  (the  t  subscript is 
suppressed below for notional clarity): 
 
() i i i i x l c U , ,              ( 1 . 1 )  
 
subject to a budget constraint: 
 
) (T w y w l c i i i i i + = +         (1.2) 
 
where wi  is the individual wage, ci individual consumption, li leisure and yi 
unearned income. T is the total available time and xi is a vector of individual 
characteristics. The price of consumption is normalised to 1. The right hand 
side of the budget constraint is the so-called “full income” from which the 
individual purchases consumption and leisure. 
 







Figure 1.1 shows a graphical interpretation of the above problem. The 
individual wage determines the slope of the budget constraint  ) ( m TC , while 
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the “height” of the constraint at zero hours of work (T hours of leisure) is 
determined by yi  (in Figure 1.1, yi is zero).  * IC  – one of the individual’s 
indifference curves – represents a specific level of utility of the individual. This 
level of utility is achieved when the individual makes an optimal choice 
between leisure and consumption  *) *, ( l c  at point  A on the budget constraint. 


















,              (1.3) 
 
where  i λ  is the marginal utility of money, and the marginal rate of substitution 
is equivalent to individual wage rate: 
 
  i Li c l W MRS U U = = /       
 
Note, however, that these conditions necessarily hold only when the individual 
consumes less than T  hours of leisure, i.e. if he/she participates in the labour 


















,              (1.4) 
 
This is an important difficulty in modelling labour supply. Various results 
reported below refer to the case where an individual reports positive number 
of hours worked and thus where conditions (3) hold. We discuss the issue of 
non-participation in detail in sections (2.1.4 and 2.1.5). 
 
The two marginal conditions (1.3) together with the budget constraint allow 
derivation of demand equations for consumption and leisure for a specified 
functional form of the utility function. These demand functions, relating prices 
of consumption and leisure to the quantity demanded, can be specified under 
the assumption of either constant non-labour income (uncompensated, 
Marshallian demand) or constant utility (compensated, Hicksian demand). 
While Marshallian demands are those actually observed, i.e. the amounts of 
leisure and consumption individuals choose to enjoy, Hicksian demands play 
an important role in the process of estimation of the parameters of the utility 
function and in welfare analysis of price and wage changes.    
 
The axioms of consumer theory, which reflect the assumption of individual 
rationality, imply several requirements with regard to the two demand 
functions. These requirements are: 
 
1)  Marshallian demand functions are homogenous of degree 
zero in prices/wages and non-labour income (i.e. if price of 
consumption and wage change by factor k  and non-labour 
income changes also by factor k , then Marshallian demands 
do not change)  
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2)  Marshallian demand functions satisfy the ‘adding up’ property 
(i.e. the sum of “expenditure” on leisure and consumption 
equals the “full income”) 













. This results in the symmetry of the 
‘Slutsky matrix’ – a matrix of price derivatives of Hicksian 
demands)
2 
4)  The Slutsky matrix is negative semi-definite (which results 
from the fact that, given the axioms of consumer theory, for 
constant utility an increase in price never leads to higher 
demand)  
 
These four are the complete set of requirements following from the 
assumption of ‘rational’ decision making of individuals regarding their optimal 
choice. If we therefore estimate a demand system which satisfies them, we 
can say that observed demands have been generated from a ‘rational’ set of 
individual preferences. One can therefore choose a demand system to be 
estimated without necessarily specifying the underlying utility function. On the 
other hand if a utility function is specified (and it fulfils all requirements of a 
‘rational’ set of preferences, see MasColell (1995)) and we estimate a demand 
system which is implied by it, then failure to satisfy any of the four 
requirements might call into question either the assumptions which underlie 
our chosen functional form of the utility function or the ‘rationality’ of 
individuals as defined by the axioms of consumer theory. The four above 
requirements are thus extremely important in the choice of modelling strategy 





The aim of “structural” estimation is to find parameters of the demand and/or 
utility functions. Knowing either of these allows us to calculate elasticities of 
demand which in turn make predictions of individual responses to changes in 
the prices of consumption and leisure possible. Results of these estimations 
are in many cases supposed to assist in an ex-ante assessment of effects of 
changes in the budget constraint, either as a result of changes in out of 
work/unearned income or in net wages. Both of these are affected by the 
design of fiscal policy, and therefore the correct estimation and interpretation 
of the labour supply elasticities are of crucial importance for ex-ante 
evaluation of reforms of the tax and benefit system. 
 
Estimation of the demand function for leisure is based on the specification of 
an hours of work equation. The functional form of this equation is a direct 
consequence of utility maximisation, and precise specification of the hours 
                                              
2 Symmetry follows from the fact that price derivatives of Hicksian demands corresponds to the a matrix of second 
derivatives of the “expenditure function” in the dual representation of the optimisation problem (see: Deaton & 
Muellbauer, 1980)   
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equation is directly linked to a chosen specification of preferences. 
Alternatively we can interpret the hours equation as imposing restrictions on 
preferences
3. As we mentioned above, establishing a direct relationship 
between the hours equation and the utility function is not necessary to test 
whether a demand system is a consequence of rational optimisation. 
However, it is important to establish such a relationship to facilitate our 
interpretation of the results, and our understanding of the assumptions 
underlying the estimation.  
 
Given unearned incomes and wages, we can estimate the elasticity of labour 
supply. Taking the general representation of the hours equation to be:  
 
) , , ( i i i i x y w H H = , 
 










= ε  
 
This is the overall effect of the change in net wage wi on hours worked. 
Marshallian demands can be decomposed into income and substitution 
effects. This separation allows derivation of the basic tests of the underlying 
assumptions of individual rationality. At constant levels of utility, at which 
Hicksian demands are defined, because it is only the change in price that is 
taken into consideration, a relative price increase never leads to higher 
demand – in other words the substitution effects are always negative (thus the 
requirements placed on the Slutsky matrix, as shown above). In the labour 
supply example, an increase in the wage (i.e. increase in the price of leisure) 
should never lead to higher compensated (Hicksian) demand for leisure or 
lower supply of labour. Separation of the two effects of price changes gives us 














− = ε ε
          (1.5) 
 
The share  i i i y h w /  is the size of earnings relative to non-labour income. This 
is weighted by the responsiveness of hours to changes in unearned income. 
The second term on the right hand side of equation 1.5 is the income effect of 
the change in the price of leisure. If the observed hours choices are based on 
individual rationality, the matrix of compensated demand price elasticities 
should be negative semi-definite (because of the sign of Hicksian demand 
elasticities) and symmetric. Therefore, the empirical estimation of labour 
supply functions does not end with simply finding the values of coefficients. 
Having estimated them, and knowing the overall “Marshallian” wage elasticity 
and income elasticity, one can test the two implications of the theory 
(requirements 3 and 4 above) using (1.5). These tests have found ample 
                                              
3 We discuss the relationship between various utility functions and hours equation in section 1.3.  
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application in microeconomic theory both in the context of demand for goods 





If an estimated demand system fulfils the four requirements imposed by   
consumer theory, one can recover the preferences that generate it. We can 
therefore recover the parameters of the utility function which underlies 
individual choices. Individual optimisation can be represented either as the 
maximisation of utility subject to a budget constraint or alternatively as the 
minimisation of expenditure for a given utility level. It is the latter 
representation of the problem which allows us to recover the parameters of 
the utility function. Observed Marshallian demands correspond to the 
derivatives of the expenditure function with respect to prices/wages: 
 
) , , (
) , (
i i i



















 where  ) , ( i i U e p  is the expenditure function and p is the price vector 
(including the price of consumption and individual wage). This relationship, 
together with satisfaction of the four requirements on demand functions, 
allows recovery of the parameters of the expenditure and utility functions.  
 
Elasticities in the static framework 
 
One of the most common hours equation specifications is:  
 
i i i i v Q w h + + = β α ln ln         (1.6) 
 
where Qi is a vector of control variables including an income variable, while vi 
is a vector of unobserved random effects (for other specifications and utility 
functions they derive from, see section 2.1.1). Interpretation of the coefficient 
on log wages significantly depends on the variables included in Qi. The most 
basic static specification of the hours equation includes a set of “taste-shifting” 
variables and a measure of non-labour income, yi. In this context the α  is the 
uncompensated substitution elasticity given income yi.  
 
This interpretation is valid under the assumption of static optimisation where 
the individual makes no inter-temporal decisions. Thus the assumption is 
either that the individual is extremely myopic and optimises only in one period 
at a time, or that he/she is not allowed to make inter-temporal decisions as to 
the allocation of income, for example due to inability to lend and borrow. All 




Clearly in the context of labour supply, where inter-temporal optimisation is a 
natural way of thinking about people’s choices, such a specification has 
significant drawbacks. When deciding whether to work or not and how much, 
individuals are likely to take into account the effect of additional schooling, of 
experience and training on future earnings. Their choices are likely to depend 
on expected future non-labour income, on the rate of return on assets, liquidity 
constraints, and so on, and will include allocation of assets in addition to 
intertemporal leisure/work decisions. We turn to extensions of the static 
framework to account for these below. 
 
 
1.1.2 Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities of labour supply in 
dynamic context - the two-stage budgeting problem
4 
 
Many empirical applications of the structural model of labour supply have 
used the extended, more realistic version of the structural model which takes 
account of inter-temporal optimisation. Considering choices across time 
involves one fundamental assumption which makes the problem tractable and 
solvable. Only levels of utility at time t are assumed to have an impact on the 
allocation of leisure and consumption at time t+s. The combination of leisure 
and consumption which leads to a given utility level at time t is assumed to be 
irrelevant for the choice at time t+s. This assumption of intertemporal 
separability leads to the following life-time utility function
5: 
 








it x l c U x l c U x l c U U U + + +
+ =    (1.7) 
 
Apart from this assumption the simple structural dynamic model assumes 
away credit constraints, allowing the individual to borrow freely against future 
income. This allows the following specification of the inter-temporal budget 
constraint, represented by a time path of assets: 
 
), )( 1 ( ) 1 1 t t t t t t t C H W B A r A − + + + = + +       (1.8) 
where 
At+1 is the real value of assets at the beginning of period t+1,  
rt+1 is the real return on assets,  
Bt represents unearned-non-asset income. 
 
Because of the assumed separability of the utility function, the marginal 
conditions for utility maximisation are the same as in the static model (eq. 
(1.3) and (1.4)), and in case of participation the condition  
 
it Lit ct lt W MRS U U = = /         (1.9) 
                                              
4 This and the following section draw on Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). 
5 Dropping the assumption of intertemporal separability from the model would allow interaction between 
levels of leisure and consumption in different periods leading to a more general utility function: 





still holds.  
 
The solution follows from a two-stage process, where in the first stage 
individuals optimally allocate their full life-time income to each period and then 
maximise utility at each point as in the static case. The first stage allocation 
allows estimating the level of consumption and leisure at each point given the 
marginal condition (1.9).  
 
Full income in period t in this dynamic context is again equal to consumption 
in period t plus the value of leisure at time t. This however no longer needs to 
equal the total income received in period t. The difference in the definition of 
full income between the static case and the two-stage budgeting problem 
follows from allowing inter-temporal allocation of income. Full income Mt is the 
sum of consumption and leisure at time t, but this is now dependent on 
decisions concerning the allocation of assets over time:  
 
T w B A A r l w c M t t t t t t t t t + + ∆ + = + = − * * 1  
 
where  1 * − t t A r  is the real interest income available for expenditure on 
consumption at the beginning of period t and  t A* ∆ is the adjustment of the 
level of real assets by the end of period t.  
 
Because of inter-temporal decision making, consumption (and thus the 
allocation of assets in period t) will depend on all future (expected) values of 
wages and unearned income which influence the change in real assets  t A* ∆ . 
t M  will therefore be a function of: 
 
) , , , , , * ( 1 t t t t t t t Z x B w r A M M − =  
 
where  t Z  represents the future (known or expected) values of w,  B,  x, and 
r .  
 
Non-labour income in period t is now: 
 
t t t t
c B A A r y + ∆ + = − * * 1  
 
which is equivalent to:  
 
t t t
c h w c y − =           ( 1 . 1 0 )  
 
(1.10) can be calculated if we know consumption and hours of leisure/work. 
Note, however, that 
c y  will be a function of expectational variables  t Z , and 
some specification of these variables will be necessary to complete the model. 
 
Interpretation of the wage equation (1.6) in the two-stage budgeting case 
differs from that in the static framework. The wage elasticity coefficient is now  
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conditional on initial allocation of income and consequently on 
c y . It therefore 
captures the effect of anticipated changes in wages through time but does not 
capture unanticipated changes in the overall life-time wage profile. This is 
because changes in the wage profile will have an impact on hours worked 
also through changed allocation of 
c y .  
 
Note, also, that because 
c y  is a function of leisure it will be endogenous to 
hours and appropriate estimation will require the use of instrumental variable 
techniques. Because c is a function of future wages and unearned income it 
will no longer be exogenous, as it will respond to changes in wages via the 
first stage process of optimal allocation of income. 
 
 
1.1.3 Frisch labour supply function - dynamics assuming constant 
marginal utility of wealth.  
 
Apart from Marshallian and Hicksian demand functions for leisure, the third 
representation of the labour supply problem is in the form of Frisch functions. 
While Marshallian demand functions assume a constant level of non-labour 
income, and Hicksian demand functions keep utility at a constant level, Frisch 
functions take account of the dynamic nature of the problem by keeping 
constant the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
As in the two-stage model, the solution relies on the assumption of strong 
separability in preferences and availability of credit to facilitate optimal 
allocation of assets. In this model the marginal utility of wealth serves as the 
sufficient statistic which gives the solution of current-period’s maximisation 
problem.  
Individuals are assumed to maximise a value function: 
 
)] 1 , ( ) , , ( max[ ) , ( 1 + + = + t A V X L c U t A V t t t t t κ  
 
subject to the time path of assets (1.8). κ is the individual’s discount factor. 
The solution to this dynamic programming problem gives the usual first order 
conditions and an Euler equation for the marginal utility of wealth: 
 
1 1) 1 ( + + + = t t t r λ κ λ         ( 1 . 1 1 )  
 
The Euler equation reflects the optimal distribution of assets. The solution to 
this problem is a pair of demand equations for consumption and leisure which 
are functions of the wage and other usual control variables as well as  t λ . 
Future values of wages, other income, etc. affect consumption and labour 
supply only through their effect on the value of marginal utility of wealth. As 
we can see from equation (1.11) the path of  t λ  depends only on the individual 
discount factor and the interest rate, and is independent from wage.  t λ  will not 
change if the individual’s wage changes as expected. His/her labour supply on 
the other hand might respond to it. This means that the Frisch elasticity of  
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labour supply is the correct elasticity for analysing the impact of changes of 
wages through time.  
 
Empirical studies of labour supply look usually not at changes in individual 
wages through time, but at differences across individuals. Because of the lack 
of suitable panel data with a long enough time-series dimension in the UK in 
particular, in many cases the empirical studies do not observe specific wage 
profiles of individuals through time, but instead a cross-section of results of 
assumed individual optimisations which take these individual wage profiles 
into account. For each individual these profiles certainly influence the value of 
λ  which means that for the Frisch elasticity to have economic meaning we 





We can show that  t λ  can be represented as a combination of an individual-
specific fixed effect and a common time path. If we assume that interest rates 
and individual discount rates are the same across time, taking logs in eq. 
(1.11) we can specify λ  as:  
   
0 ln * ln λ λ + = t b t  
 
Using the hours equation specification (1.6), we can now condition wages on 
λ  in the following way. Assuming the utility function to be: 
 
σ ν ϕ ) ))( (exp( ) , ( t t t t t t h x x c G U − − =  
 
where  G  is an increasing function of c and  1 > σ  is a time invariant 
parameter common across consumers, equation (1.6) becomes: 
 
i t i i v x bt w h + − + + + = σ α λ α ϕ α ln ln ln ln 0      (1.12) 
 
Because the time path is common to everyone, this allows estimation of the 
demand equation in first differences. Equation (1.12) then becomes: 
  
i t i i v x b w h ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ = ∆ ϕ α ln ln        ( 1 . 1 3 )  
 
Equation (1.13) can be estimated to yield a value of α  - the Frisch elasticity 
which is interpreted as the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It represents 
the hours response to expected “evolutionary” changes in wages. 
 
In the example above we assumed perfect certainty about individual wage 
profile in the future. A similar analysis can be conducted in the case where 
future outcomes are uncertain, although in this case the interpretation of the 
error terms changes and additional assumptions on the utility function are 
needed (see Blundell & Walker (1986), Blundell & MaCurdy (1999)). The  
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introduction of uncertainty is undoubtedly crucial if we want to extend our 
analysis to include responses to unexpected shocks to wages or unexpected 
changes in whole wage profiles. One reason for changes in the latter are 
changes in the design of the tax and benefit system. Individuals’ responses to 
these changes are of obvious interest from the perspective of policy 
evaluation. To account for unanticipated changes in individual’s wage profiles 
we need an empirical specification for λ . This is also necessary for the Frisch 
elasticity to be interpretable as the effect of wage variation across individuals 
in a cross-sectional estimation.  
 
Responses to changes in wage profiles 
 
Let us specify an approximation for  0 ln λ  as: 
 
0 0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 ) (ln ln e A D w E
j
j j + + + =∑
=
θ δ φ λ
τ
     (1.14) 
 
where 
0 D - a vector of demographic characteristics observed or anticipated at time 0, 
e - an error term.  
The individual is assumed to know to work up to period τ . 
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, 0
0 0 0  
         ( 1 . 1 5 )  
 
This hours equation specification conditions wage responses on determinants 
of  λ . Estimation of (1.15) requires an appropriate specification of the 
individual’s expected future wages and initial wealth. Given these, it allows us 
to interpret the coefficient on wage  ) ( 0t αφ α +  as the response to an 
evolutionary change in the individual’s wage rate at period t  in a cross 
sectional analysis. The estimation also yields an estimate of the response to a 












α is the parameter of interest for the estimation of labour supply responses to 
tax and benefit policy changes. This estimation can be conducted in 
differences using panel data information, or on cross sectional data with 





1.1.4 The “wage elasticity” 
 
As we saw in the sections above “wage elasticity” is by no means a 
straightforward concept. Its value and interpretation will differ depending on 
what control variables we choose in the hours equation. Without an 
appropriate specification, the coefficient on wage may completely lack 
economic interpretation. The most important distinction in interpreting 
elasticities is that between within-period elasticities and life-cycle elasticities. 
The first group includes compensated and uncompensated elasticities in the 
static and two-stage budgeting models, while the second group comprises   
elasticities corresponding to responses to evolutionary and parametric wage 
shifts. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution measures responses to 
evolutionary changes along an individual wage profile. This differs 
fundamentally from responses to unexpected changes involving shifts in the 
entire wage profile. Analysis and interpretation of the coefficients on the 
‘wage’ in any labour supply model must thus be extremely careful and take 
into account the conditioning variables in the hours equation.  
 
 
1.2  Individual choice on the “joint” constraint – the labour 
supply of couples 
 
Modelling the labour supply of a couple introduces complexities absent from 
the application of the standard theory for single individuals presented in the 
previous section. Analysis of the labour supply decision of two people living 
together involves additional complexity, due to the question of the distribution 
of the arguments of the utility function – leisure and consumption – between 
the partners, with possible externalities in both arguments. The question who 
should pay for the provision of “public goods”, such as expenditure on 
children, the electricity bill, etc. further complicates the labour supply story.  
 
Below we start the discussion of family labour supply modelling by outlining a 
model which would be a natural extension of the methodology used for 
individual labour supply modelling. Following the discussion in section 1.1 we 
restate what requirements such an extension would have to satisfy. We 
describe the most general “collective” model that in principle could fulfil these 
requirements and then point to the difficulties which the theory is faced with 
when applied to the available data. 
 
Following this, we describe the traditional “unitary” approach to modelling 
family labour supply. In the unitary model, the household choice is presented 
as a result of maximisation of a single aggregate utility function. Next, we 
contrast the unitary model with recent developments in modelling labour 
supply of people in couples in a “collective” framework where the preferences 
of the individuals in the couple are treated individually rather than being  
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aggregated. We finish by presenting the implications and relative advantages 
of these two approaches to modelling the labour supply of couples. On the 
one hand we present the usual criticisms of the unitary model, and on the 
other the difficulties involved in applying the collective model to the available 
data. 
 
The dynamic issues surrounding family labour supply are far more complex 
than those surrounding individual labour supply, as they include decisions to 
marry, separate, timing of children, etc. Because of this the theory of family 
labour supply has so far only focused on the static case corresponding to 
section 1.1.1. Below we present an extensive summary of this literature. 
 
 
1.2.1 Labour supply of individuals in couples - the general 
framework 
 
Neoclassical labour supply theory is based primarily on the methodological 
principle of individual rationality. In extending the theory to the labour supply 
decisions of couples we would expect this principle to continue to hold. 
Further formal requirements we would expect the theory to fulfil are the same 
as those mentioned in reference to individual labour supply and refer to the 
ability of the models to generate testable predictions and to allow the recovery 
of preferences underlying the choices and determining the observed 
outcomes.  
 
We would therefore expect both partners to maximise their individual utility 
function, allowing for complementarities and substitutability in leisure and 
consumption between them, subject to the overall family budget constraint. 
Allowing for consumption of private (cm, cf) and public goods  ) (q  the individual 
utilities would be: 
 
( ) q l l c c U m f m f i , , , ,    , i = m, f       ( 1 . 1 6 )  
 
At this point it is important to stress that in the discussion which follows, the 
definition of types of goods is absolutely crucial. In specification (1.16) the 
distinction between private and public goods, along the usual lines, becomes 
almost superfluous. This is because person i's consumption of “private” goods 
(cm, cf) directly enters the utility function of person j. Below we introduce a 
different distinction between goods, the applicability of which will become 
clear when we discuss alternative specifications of preferences (see: 
Browning, et. al. 1994). 
 
Because in the general formulation of the household’s behaviour shown 
above we do not aggregate the preferences of each member of the couple 
into a single utility function of the couple, we have to account for the process 
that governs the allocation of leisure and consumption between them. That is, 
we have to identify what distinguishes two people living together from two 
separate single individuals. The outcomes of such a process could either be 
co-operative or non-co-operative. Several attempts have been made to derive  
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results in the non-co-operative game-theoretic framework, assuming in most 
cases Nash solutions to the bargaining process (e.g. Manser and Brown 
(1980), McElroy and Horney (1981)). Here, following Chiappori (1988, 1992) 
we focus on co-operative games, which are believed to be a more appropriate 
framework for modelling the decisions of people living in couples. This 
literature starts with the assumption that rational individuals living in long-term 
partnerships would arrive at Pareto efficient solutions to their bargaining 
process – that is, the outcome would be such that it would be impossible to 
make one person better off without making the other worse off
6. The 
assumption of Pareto efficiency does not impose any restrictions on the 
distribution of consumption between the individuals. Efficient outcomes can be 
fully egalitarian or extremely unequal.  
 
Let the household budget constraint be: 
 
  ) ( ) ( T w T w y y y w l w l c m f s m f m m f f + + + + = + +    (1.17) 
 
where c is total household consumption (the price of which is normalised to 1), 
wm,f are wages, T  is total available time, ym,f are individual non-labour incomes 
assignable to members of the couple, and ys is non-labour income which 
cannot be assigned to the members individually. Total household non-labour 
income is then: y = ys+ym+yf. 
 
If  λ  denotes the welfare weight of the woman in the couple and  ) 1 ( λ −  the 
weight of the man, then, if individual utility functions are strictly concave and if 
the household budget constraint is convex, by application of the second 
theorem of welfare economics we know that Pareto efficiency will be achieved 
as any solution to the following maximisation problem:
7 
 
Max        ) , , , , ( * ) 1 ( ) , , , , ( * q l l c c U q l l c c U m f m f
m
m f m f
f λ λ − +  (1.18) 
 
subject to (1.17).   
 
The determinants of the utility weights form a crucial part of this framework. 
Figure 1.2 shows an example of an optimal choice by a couple. The Pareto 
frontier is determined by the household unearned income, earnings and 
individual preference parameters. At each point of the frontier, one member of 
the couple maximises his/her utility given the utility level of the other partner. 
The welfare weight λ determines the slope of line V representing a certain 
welfare level of the household. It is the highest possible level of welfare 
achievable on the Pareto frontier and thus the point which is chosen as the 
solution to (1.18).  
                                              
6 Note that this would seem to rule out certain behaviour observed in couples where one member of the 
couple obviously becomes worse off while the other becomes no better off (e.g. domestic violence) 
unless we assume (distastefully) that the aggressor or the victim in the couple derives positive utility 
from such activities. 
7 Budget constraint non-convexities, which result from various social security programs and different 
forms of negative taxation, may lead to non-convex utility possibility set. This non-convexity is 
sometimes questioned on the ground that rational agents could ensure convexity by randomization 





Figure 1.2. Pareto efficient decisions of individuals in couples. 
 
 
Notes:  PF  – Pareto frontier, V  – household welfare function corresponding to λ. The Pareto 
frontier is determined by the household unearned income, earning potential and parameters 
of individual utility functions. Problem (1.18) corresponds to choosing an ‘optimal’ combination 
of  m U  and  f U . The ‘optimality’ is determined by λ.  
 
Interpretation, identification and testability of the theory relies on what enters 
the function λ. It is usually assumed that the distribution of the weights 
assigned to individual utilities is a function of their actual or potential wages, 
non-labour incomes, and the so-called “distribution factors”, z (Bourguignon, et 
al., 1994): 
 
    ) , , , , ( z y y w w g f m f m = λ        (1.19) 
 
The “distribution factors” are factors which determine the welfare weights 
within the household but do not have a direct effect on either preferences or 
the budget constraint.
8 If we consider a situation in which the budget 
constraint of the household changes, the new optimum may be determined 
not only by the resulting change in the Pareto frontier. If factors affecting the 
budget constraint also determine the distribution of resources between 
partners (λ), a change in the gross wage of one partner, or a reform affecting 
net wages, will shift the Pareto frontier and change the household welfare 
function V.  
 
Let’s consider an increase in wage of one of the members of the couple. As a 
result of this change, the utility possibility (Pareto) frontier shifts out since the 
“full income” of the couple increases. If wages do not affect the distribution of 
resources the welfare weights λ and (1- λ) of the two members are unaffected. 
The slope of the welfare function (the slope of line V  on Figure 1.2) in this 
                                              
8 Examples of distribution factors could be individual unearned incomes, divorce laws, alimony payment 
laws  - see Bourguignon, et. al, 1993, 1994. 
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situation therefore does not react to the change in wage. The optimal choice 
would be made at the point of the new Pareto frontier ( ' PF  on Figure 1.3), at 
the higher level of welfare represented by the point of tangency between  ' PF  
and  ' V  on Figure 1.3. In the world in which a change in wages alters the 
welfare weight λ  we would observe a change in the slope of the welfare 
function. The new solution is therefore made up of two effects: a change in the 
Pareto Frontier and a change in the distribution of welfare among the 
partners. On Figure 1.3 this is represented by the tangency of  ' PF  and line 
' ' V . Line  ' ' V  represents the new level of the couple’s welfare. 
 




1.2.2 Testable restrictions of the general collective framework 
 
In the formulation of the household utility function (1.18), wages enter not only 
as prices of leisure but also directly by determining the weights assigned to 
every member of the couple as shown in (1.19). As demonstrated by Pollak 
(1977), with such price dependent preferences the restrictions of classical 
demand theory are no longer implied by rational choice. The Slutsky matrix 
does not have to be either symmetric nor negative semidefinite, and thus the 
standard results which facilitate tests and allow integrability in the individual 
demand framework no longer apply.  
 
A crucial result which allows testability of this general framework has been 
developed by Browning and Chiappori (1998). Equivalent tests to the 
symmetry and negative-semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix
9 are derived 
regardless of the specification of the individual preferences, and regardless of 
how consumption and leisure enter the utility function. However, the tests can 
only be carried out for cases where we observe demand for more than four 
parameters in each of the utility functions (more than four goods in the case of 
demand modelling). This obviously presents difficulties for models of labour 
                                              
9 Browning and Chiappori (1998) demonstrate that in the collective setting the equivalent of the Slutsky 
matrix is a sum of a symmetric and negative semi-definite matrix and a matrix that has at most rank one.  
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supply, where we only observe demand for three “goods” – household 
consumption, male leisure and female leisure. 
  
Other tests of the most general collective framework rely on the “distribution 
factors” as defined above. They provide the possibility of testing the collective 
model without any additional restrictions on preferences or nature of “goods”, 
and unlike the tests in Browning and Chiappori (1998) they do not require 
observability of five demands. This is a significant advantage from the 
perspective of modelling family labour supply.  
 
Since the tests outlined above are tests of the most general formulation of the 
collective framework, first and foremost they allow rejection of the overall 
collective approach. Rejection of other tests in cases where more restrictions 
are made on preferences or “goods”, without rejection of “symmetry and rank 
one” (Browning and Chiappori, 1998) and/or “distribution factor proportionality” 
(Bourguignon, et al., 1994), would then question only the specific additional 
restrictions without necessarily casting doubt on the overall framework.   
 
Unfortunately, despite the possibility of testing the general framework of the 
collective model as outlined above, this set up does not allow us to recover 
the underlying parameters of the two utility functions. The difficulty lies in the 
already mentioned implication of this representation of preferences for the 
nature of “goods”. The “public” character of the consumption and leisure of 
both partners renders the identification of the model impossible. This is one of 
the principal reasons behind the formulation of the traditional “unitary” model 
of family behaviour and of the “sharing rule” interpretation of the “collective” 
approach (described below). Additional assumptions made in both of these 
allow recovery of the underlying preferences and formulation of testable 
restrictions of the theories. 
 
 
1.2.3 Families in the “unitary” framework 
 
The traditional framework of modelling demands (or labour supply) within 
couples assumes that the individual preferences of the two members of a 
couple are combined into a single utility function:  
 
( ) f m l l c u U , , =
,           ( 1 . 2 0 )  
 
A special case of the above model, in which consumption and leisure 
combinations of each partner are separable in the joint utility function, would 
be equivalent to assuming λ in (1.18) to be constant. Such a model, however, 
is unidentified because of lack of variation in λ. All known to us applications of 
the unitary model rely on the formulation of a single utility function.  
 
For obvious reasons the distinction between private and public goods no 




The arguments in this utility function are household consumption and the 
leisure of both partners. This ad hoc transformation of two individual utility 
functions into one family preference ordering finds no justification in economic 
theory and indeed has been a major reason for criticism of the unitary model. 
The model has also been criticised for departure from the methodological 
foundations of micro-economics in its departure from individual rationality, and 
attempts to justify such a departure (by for example Samuelson (1956) and 
Becker (1974))
10 have proved unsuccessful. 
 
The unitary framework treats the family as a “black box” – processes within 
the family are considered either irrelevant to the policy-maker or optimal 
relative to the policy-maker’s welfare function. Therefore welfare analysis can 
only be applied to inter-household distribution and intra-household processes 
are therefore absent from considerations on policy reform. Such an approach 
to family behaviour is also incapable of shedding light on such important 
issues as family formation and divorce.  
 
Of course the unitary model does have some advantages. The framework is 
very close to that used for modelling behaviour of individuals (see section 
1.1.1), and can hence be used to deal with problems of non-participation, 
fixed costs of work and non-linear budget constraints by simply re-using the 
econometric methods which already exist in the single-person case. A further 
methodological advantage of the unitary approach over the general framework 
(1.16) presented above is that it allows derivation of additional testable 
restrictions. Because prices no longer enter the utility function directly the 
standard Slutsky restrictions apply and can be tested empirically. Moreover, 
the model implies that the effect of increases in non-labour income on 
demand for leisure and consumption will be the same regardless from which 
of the partners receives it:  
 





















        ( 1 . 2 1 )  
 
This is referred to as the “income pooling” hypothesis.  
 
However, the advantage of testability of the “unitary” model tends to turn sour 
when confronted with the data, as the restrictions have been rejected in 
numerous studies which looked at labour supply of couples and in several 
studies of consumption demands. The “income pooling” implication has been 
tested by Lundberg, (1988), Schultz (1990), Thomas (1990), Bourguignon et 
al. (1993), Fortain and Lacroix (1997). It has been rejected in all of the above 
with the exception of Lundberg (1988) when applied to couples with pre-
                                              
10 Samuelson (1956) assumes that λ  depends on some factors independent of the environment (and 
so factors such as prices, wages and incomes), but this has generally been agreed to be unsatisfactory. 
According to Becker’s “rotten kid” theorem (1974), a joint household utility can be rationalised as a result 
of the existence of an altruistic member of a family who decides on the distribution of resources. 
However, this theorem applies only to instances where utilities are transferable between members of the 
household and therefore cannot be reconciled with the usual ordinal approach to preferences 




11. Some demand studies on household data provide further 
evidence of problems with the “unitary” approach. For example, Browning and 
Meghir (1991), and Blundell, Pachardes, and Weber (1993), Browning and 
Chiappori (1998) reject the symmetry of the Slutsky matrix implied by the 
theoretical framework. The fact that implications of the unitary model are 
rejected when tested on actual empirical data may lead us to doubt the 
predictions and recommendations made using simulations based on the 
unitary framework. A recent project comparing the predictions of the unitary 
and collective models on a generated data set with collective features 
(Laisney, ed., 2002) suggests that if data is generated as a result of a 
collective decision process and one estimates reforms using the unitary 
model, there may be important divergencies between simulated and actual 
response. On the other hand, though, simulations of the WFTC reform based 
on the unitary model (e.g. Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir, 2000) have 
been broadly correct in anticipating the effects of the reform in terms of the 
labour supply response. One possible explanation of this may be the fact that 
the reform in question affected only families with children. As already 
mentioned above Lundberg (1988) demonstrated using Swedish data that, 
although the income pooling hypothesis was rejected for people with older 




1.2.4 The “sharing rule” approach to the “collective” model 
 
Chiappori (1988, 1992) demonstrated that under several additional 
assumptions it is possible to derive more easily testable restrictions of the 
‘collective’ framework presented earlier in this section. These would moreover 
allow recovery of the underlying preferences and of the parameters of the 
distribution process (up to an additive constant). The crucial assumptions 
which make identification of two utility functions possible are (1) that of 
egoistic preferences (although the model easily extends to Beckerian caring 
individuals as outlined in Becker, 1974) and (2) that of dependence of the 
distribution process on individual wages and/or unearned income. The 
framework has been developed in the absence of public goods, and has so 
far failed to incorporate them into the theory. In the egoistic framework we can 
formulate the household’s problem as: 
  
)] , ( [ )] , ( )[ 1 max( f f f m m m l c u l c u λ λ + −         (1.22) 
subject to (1.17). 
 
where λ  is a function of individual wages and/or unearned income. 
 
In the Beckerian “caring agents” interpretation, the individual utility function 
becomes a weakly separable function of two “egoistic” utilities:  
 
; , )}, , ( ), , ( { m f i l c u l c u W m m m f f f i i = =ϖ      (1.23) 
                                              
11 The fact that income pooling hypothesis was not rejected when applied to couples with young children 




where ϖ is strictly increasing in both arguments. The maximisation problem of 
(1.22) then becomes: 
 
max.  )] , ( [ )] , ( )[ 1 ( m f f f m m u u u u ϖ λ ϖ λ + − , subject to (1.17)      
 
Individuals thus care about the level of utility of their partner but are indifferent 
as to what combination of consumption and leisure contributes to achieving 
this level. In the “caring agents” representation of the equivalent problem, as 
with the representation of equation (1.1.6) earlier, we can no longer 
distinguish between private and public goods in the usual fashion. Because 
the consumption level and leisure of person i indirectly enter the utility function 
of person j (through the level of i’s utility), individual consumption and leisure 
can both be interpreted as having some of the features of public goods. 
However, because of the separability of utility functions, it is possible to define 
goods as exclusive and non-exclusive. Exclusive goods enter only one utility 
function directly, and thus in representation (1.23) both male and female 
leisure and consumption are treated as exclusive
12. As all available 
information about family consumption is collected at family level and not at the 
individual level, the “sharing rule” interpretation of the “collective” model of 
family labour supply relies on making leisure an exclusive good. 
 
As demonstrated by Chiappori (1988, 1992), the household maximisation 
problem of (1.22) is equivalent to a two stage process, in which the partners 
first decide on the allocation of unearned income according to some “sharing 
rule”, and then maximise their own utility function subject to their individual 
budget constraints (here presented with “caring” rather than egoistic 
preferences): 
 
max.  )} , ( ), , ( { m m m f f f i l c u l c u ϖ , subject to:  
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The advantage of the “sharing rule” approach is that person i’s wage only has 
an income effect on the demands of person j through the process of sharing 
of unearned income, and conversely, person i’s wage, or otherwise the price 
of  i’s leisure, therefore has no direct effect on the choice between 
consumption and leisure of person j. It is this feature of the model which 
allows identification. This of course implies that there are no externalities in 
the consumption of leisure by the two partners. Leisure is enjoyed equally 
                                              
12 In terms of consumption, exclusiveness reflects the possibility of assigning specific consumption items 
or groups of goods to particular individuals. A term often used in the “collective” literature is 
“assignability”. For example if clothes can be assigned between partners, men’s clothes and women’s 
clothes are two “exclusive” goods. Note also, that “public” goods in general will not be exclusive, though 
it is possible to find examples where goods usually thought of as “public” could be assigned to specific 
individuals (e.g. telephone).  
 
29
whether consumed together or separately and there are no benefits to partner 
j from partner i’s non-working time. This excludes any joint benefits from 
household production, for example.  
 
Thus, assuming that family decisions are Pareto efficient, and allowing for 
leisure to be an exclusive good, it is possible to present the problem as two 
separate utility maximisations. Because person i’s wage only has an income 
effect on person j’s choice, changing i’s wage is equivalent to changing j’s 
unearned income. This allows identification of the sharing rule up to an 
additive constant (see for example Chiappori, 1988, 1992, or Browning et al. 
1994). Since now wages no longer enter the utility function directly, the 
standard Slutsky restrictions continue to hold and this makes possible the 
identification of preference parameters of both individual utility functions also 
up to an additive transformation). We therefore arrive at a model which not 
only fulfils the requirements of methodological individualism, but also provides 
relatively easily applicable tests. These on the one hand allow the theory to be 
validated by observed behaviour, and on the other make possible the 
identification of underlying preferences and the decision process.  
 
This means that, although if we know only the overall consumption of the 
household then we cannot learn about the distribution of consumption within 
the couple, we are nonetheless readily equipped to answer questions relating 
to the effect of changes in wages and the budget constraint on the original 
distribution
13. The framework therefore allows us to extend welfare analysis to 
include intra-household distributional issues. Although the model is still at its 
early stage and its weaknesses are far from trivial, it provides a base for the 
development of a consistent and applicable framework of family labour supply. 
Indeed since the early 1990s it has been extended in several important ways.  
 
 
1.2.5 Extending the sharing rule interpretation of the collective 
model 
 
Household production and public goods 
 
In the unitary representation of family labour supply decisions, an additional 
assumption of concavity of the household production function is sufficient to 
allow identification of the model in the usual way. This is regardless of 
whether the household produced good is private or public. However, because 
separability of non-market time is such a crucial assumption of the “sharing 
rule” representation of the collective model, introducing household production 
into the collective framework implies important limitations.  
 
If the household-produced good is exclusive, marketable and is observed, 
then the separability assumption still holds. Labelling the home-produced 
good as Gf and Gm, individuals then maximise: 
                                              
13 The sharing rule can only be recovered completely if we know the allocation of all non-public goods 




; , )}, , , ( ), , , ( { m f i G l c u G l c u W m m m m f f f f i i = =ϖ      (1.25) 
 
and we can recover individual preferences in the usual way. 
 
Identification of the model is no longer possible if either we cannot observe 
consumption levels Gf and Gm, or if the good is public. In the first case non-
observability of levels of consumption of the home-produced good in each 
sub-utility function upsets the assumption of separability if we have to specify 
the production function of Gf and Gm in terms of individual wages. In the latter 
case, when G is not exclusive, or in the standard terminology a public good, 
individual utility functions are: 
 
; , )}, , , ( ), , , ( { m f i G l c u G l c u W m m m f f f i i = =ϖ ,   
 
which creates the same problems as presence of any public (unassignable) 
good in the household. As mentioned earlier the theory has been derived 
under the assumption that there are no public goods. Strictly speaking it 
extends to include public goods, but only under the assumption of weak 
separability of public goods in each partner’s sub-utility function. Labelling the 
vector of public goods as Q, this implies the following form of the sub-utility 
function:  ui((ci,li),Q). A particular problem that the theory encounters is in 
modelling preferences and the sharing rule of couples with children. On the 
one hand we could think of spending (time and money) on children as public 
expenditure. This could be dealt with, though arguably in less than satisfactory 
fashion, by assuming separability. The additional complication that children 
introduce into the model is that they are likely not only to influence 
preferences, but also to affect the sharing process and thus should be 





Chapter 2. Empirical Estimation of Labour Supply Models 
 
In this section we relate empirical modelling strategies to the modelling 
framework outlined in Sections 1.1 and 1.2. We first deal with estimation 
methodologies developed for structural models but supplement the discussion 
with an outline of how non-structural or reduced form models, which do not 
rely on assumption of a specific utility function,  can be used to estimate 
determinants of behaviour on the labour market.  
 
The discussion of estimation methodologies focuses on models defined as 
‘static’ in the sense that they are looking to compare one equilibrium labour 
supply outcome for a population (e.g. the number of people in work before the 
Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in the UK) with an alternative 
outcome under a different budget constraint for workers and potential workers. 
The change in the budget constraint could be due to tax and benefit policy (for 
example an increase in generosity of in-work benefits, or a cut in income tax), 
or due to some other feature of the labour market (e.g. a change in wage 
levels). Whilst this much is common to all the methods of estimation of the 
models we look at in this section, there is a large variation in specific empirical 
strategies.  
 
To structure the discussion here, we have classified  labour supply models 
according to their function on one hand and according to their technical 
implementation on the other. The function can be of two sorts: 
 
•  Predictive models attempt to use existing data to produce predictions of 
what hypothetical (or future planned) changes to the budget constraint 
would do to labour supply. For example, if income tax were to drop by 2%, 
how much would employment and hours worked change? 
 
•  Evaluative  models attempt to use data on a specific policy which has 
already been implemented to assess the impact of the policy. Sometimes 
evaluative models use data specifically collected in the course of 
implementing a program (e.g. Card et al (1998)), whereas in other cases 
they simply use existing data sources (e.g. Eissa and Leibman (1996)).  
 
The two functions are not mutually exclusive and some studies (e.g. Bingley 
and Walker, 1997) combine elements of both. Focusing on the completely 
predictive approach versus the completely evaluative approach makes the 
exposition easier.  
 
The technical implementation can be of three main sorts: 
 
•  Structural models provide a direct implementation of the theory shown in 
Sections 1.1 and 1.2 (subject to what the data will allow). These constitute 
parametric or semiparametric models of labour supply incorporating 
maximisation of some utility function. Structural models are typically used  
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for either prediction or evaluation, although a structural approach lends 
itself particularly well to predictive analysis. 
 
•  ‘Reduced form’ models use less assumptions than the structural 
approach and do not attempt to uncover the parameters of the underlying 
utility function from the data. Instead, estimation methods designed to 
uncover the effect of a policy on labour supply which rely on the minimum 
of economic assumptions (such as ‘difference in differences’, explained 
later) are used. The inverted commas around ‘reduced form’ here are 
intentional, as whilst the approach is often called ‘reduced form’ estimation, 
this is misleading; a certain amount of structural assumptions are invariably 
necessary in practice to identify the econometric model or interpret the 
results, and perhaps ‘minimal structure’ estimation, or some similar term, 
would be more appropriate. These methods are most often used for 
evaluation, although in some cases it may be possible to produce 
predictions based on hypothetical scenarios.  
 
•  Experimental approaches are purely evaluative. These use ‘randomised 
trial’ methods to isolate the pure impact of a policy.  
 
We now provide details of the implementation of each type of model with 
reference to some recent well-known examples in each field. Each approach 
has strengths and weaknesses and in many cases the type of data which are 
available for empirical work will dictate the model that can be used, meaning 
that no one approach can be seen as ‘the best’ for every given task.  
 
 
2.1 Structural modelling 
2.1.1 From utility functions to hours equations 
 
This section presents the relationship between utility functions and hours 
equations derived from them. The latter are results of utility maximisation 
subject to the budget constraint. In some cases it is more convenient to use 
indirect utility functions rather than the usual direct representation. Indirect 
utility functions are expressed in terms of prices/wages and income rather 
than as direct functions of hours of leisure and consumption. Indirect utility 
functions are derived by substituting expressions for Marshallian demand for 
hours and consumption from the utility maximisation problem. Marshallian 
demands can be derived from indirect utility functions using Roy’s identity, 
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where v is the indirect utility function.  
 
The hours equation used in the sections above:   
 




corresponds to several utility functions. One of them is the additive 
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Table 2.1 below presents several corresponding utility functions and hours 
equations which will help to illustrate the restrictions that are imposed on 
labour supply elasticity and preferences. As we discussed in section 1.1, the 
interpretation of structural models relies on the conditioning variables used in 




Table 2.1. Examples of hours equations and utility functions. 
  
Hours equation:  Direct or indirect utility function: 
 
  
Constant elasticity labour supply   
 
 


















The sign and value of the wage response is restricted to be invariant with hours. The Marshallian 
wage elasticity of labour supply is thus constant. Income has a constant proportional effect on hours.  
 
Linear labour supply   
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The wage and income responses are assumed to be constant throughout the hours range. 
Marshallian wage elasticity always has positive sign. Income elasticity is restricted to have a constant 
sign as well.  
 
Semi-log labour supply   
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The Marshallian wage elasticity declines with hours but is constrained to be positive. Income 
response is constant throughout the hours range.  
  








γ β + − − = ) 1 (  
 
)] )(ln( 1 ( ) ln( [ ) , ( c h c h c h u γ β γ β − − + − =  
Allows positive and negative wage response, Marshallian wage elasticity can therefore be positive 
and negative. Income response is restricted to be have constant. Direct utility function is explicitly 
additive in hours and consumption. 
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 Notes:  π  – observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Table based on Blundell & 
MaCurdy (1999). 
2.1.2 Empirical estimation in the linear labour supply framework 
 
 
The aim of the straightforward ‘single-period’ model is to estimate labour 
supply responses to specific changes in the budget constraint facing 
individuals. This can be done either through estimation of an hours equation 
or by direct estimation of the utility function. The most straightforward situation 
to analyse, which would boil down the estimation to a simple linear regression 
of hours worked on explanatory variables including wages, would have to 
satisfy the following five conditions: 
 
1.  each individual commands a given hourly wage  i w   when in work. 
2.  full labour force participation (so that everyone is assumed to be in 
work, and the only choice variable is hours of work).  
3. linear income taxation and no (income-dependent) transfers to the 
household (i.e.linear budget constraint) 
4.  no fixed costs of work. 
5.  the individual’s choice set is defined only over a single period (i.e. there 
are no intertemporal effects).  
 
If these five conditions were met, the most important choice would involve the 
form of the hours equation bearing in mind the restrictions each of them 
imposes. In reality few of the above conditions are met. Below we discuss the 
ways in which modern research relaxes these restrictions. We begin the 
discussion with an account of how one should model wages if these are not 
observed. The analysis then focuses on the question of non-participation, 
non-linear and non-convex budget constraints, fixed costs of working, 
childcare costs, and partial take-up of benefits and tax credits. 
 
 
2.1.3 Imputing wages for non-workers 
 
Whether one models the hours equation or the utility function directly analysis 
is impossible without information on the price of leisure, i.e. individual wage. 
This presents a problem if, as is almost always the case, there are non-
participants in our sample, for whom we have no information on their wage. 
There are two main methods in the literature of dealing with this problem and 
imputing wages for non-participants. 
 
Heckman-style selectivity adjusted wage equations 
 
The most common technique relies on a procedure pioneered by Heckman 
(1974, 1979). First, assume that wages are related to observable 
characteristics such as age and educational attainment by a human capital 




i i i Q W ε α + = ' ln        ( 1 . 2 9 )  
 
we assume that wages are also affected by observable factors which may be 
correlated with skill so that  0 ) | ( ≠ Q E ε . This means that Ordinary Least 
Squares estimation of (1.29) yields biased estimates. The Heckman model 
amends the wage equation by adding an extra term 
 
  i i i i Q W ε βλ α + + = ' ln   ,      (1.30) 
 
where the additional term  ) ' ˆ (






γ φ λ Φ = , the predicted inverse of Mills’ 
ratio from a participation equation, specified as:  
 
) ' ( ) 1 Pr( i i i u Z P + Φ = = γ        ( 1 . 3 1 )  
 
(where  i Z  is a vector of observable factors determining participation) is the 
additional regressor. The Heckman model uses the additional λi term in the 
wage equation to control for correlation between unobservable factors in 
(1.30) and (1.31). If the decision to work or not is driven by the financial return 
to work, then, ceteris paribus, individuals with a low return to work will be less 
likely to be in work in the data we observe. If factors unobservable to the 
econometrician which help determine the choice of hours also help determine 
wages, then the predicted wage for a current non-participant with certain 
observable characteristics is likely to be lower than the predicted wage for a 
participant with similar characteristics. To put it another way, ui and εi are likely 
to be positively correlated. The Heckman procedure allows us to control for 
this correlation. The Heckman model can be estimated in two stages by 
running the participation equation, finding λi and including it in the wage 
equation (whilst adjusting the standard errors of the wage equation to take 
account of the fact that λi is a generated regressor). However, in practice 
maximum likelihood methods are normally used to estimate a model based on 
the two-equation system (1.30, 1.31) to obtain maximum efficiency in the 
estimation procedure.  
 
Whilst the two-equation system of (1.30) and (1.31) is technically identified 
due to differences in functional form between the two equations, for reliable 
identification it is desirable for there to be at least one variable in Z  which is 
not in Q. This variable is assumed to affect participation but not the wage 
conditional on participation. Examples of this instrument which have been 
used by various researchers include family demographics and the predicted 




Entry wage measures 
 
Another imputation method which has been tried in the literature is to use the 
‘entry wage’ - i.e. the wage at which individuals with certain characteristics Q 
first enter work. For this to be possible, data on entry wages has to be 
available. Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) used data on the wages of 
people who had entered work during the five-quarter UK labour force survey 
panel to derive a distribution of entry wages. Depending on their observable 
characteristics, unemployed and inactive individuals were assigned 
probabilities of receiving a wage offer at different decile points in the 
distribution according to an ordered probit on observable characteristics. So, 
for example, a person with high educational attainment had a better chance of 
receiving a wage offer from the high end of the entry wage distribution than a 
person with low educational attainment. The estimation procedure for the 
probability of moving into work over the five-quarter period used an ‘expected 
gain to work’ variable derived from the entry wage distribution and the budget 
constraint as a regressor (more details of this procedure are given in Section 
2.4.4).  
 
Which imputation method is best? 
 
Given that imputation via Heckman-style selectivity adjustment on one hand, 
and via entry wage information on the other, are very different techniques, it 
makes sense to ask which works better. The Heckman approach attempts to 
estimate an average wage measure from the entire distribution of wages in 
the economy, but subject to a (downwards) selectivity adjustment – i.e. a 
person of characteristics  X  who is not in work will be predicted to have a 
potential wage which is the same as a person of exactly the same 
(observable) characteristics but who is already in work. This method has at its 
heart a reservation wage condition (as discussed in section 2.2.2 on search 
models). The idea is that, controlling for all the observable factors which 
influence participation and wages, the reason that people who are observed 
to be out of work are not going into work is that their potential in-work wages 
are lower than comparable people who enter work.  
 
One can imagine circumstances under which the Heckman method would not 
provide an accurate estimate of what currently non-working people would be 
able to earn in work. For example, if there were large differences in 
reservation wages between people in work and out of work which were not 
picked up by anything observable in the data – for example, if out-of-work 
income was much larger for the out-of-work group and this was not properly 
controlled for – then the group of out-of-work people might be just as 
(potentially) productive as individuals who are already in work. One way of 
checking whether this is the case is to use a model where the income 
available to individuals or couples when out of work is used as the extra 
regressor in the participation equation (1.31) which is not in the wage equation 
(1.29). This is the method used by Blundell, Reed and Stoker (2003) in a 
wage equation based on Family Expenditure Survey data, and the model  
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seems to produce a significant and correctly signed selectivity adjustment 
term.  
 
The Heckman approach makes sense if we feel that an important factor which 
people take into account when deciding whether to enter work is the ‘average’ 
wage for someone of their characteristics (corrected for selection). By 
contrast, the prediction from an entry wage equation gives the average wage 
which individuals of certain characteristics actually earn when moving into 
work, and this corresponds directly to an accepted ‘offer wage’ in search 
theory (as explained in Chapter 2). As Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) and 
Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) show, the entry wage distribution has a much 
lower mean than the overall wage distribution. The former study shows that 
predicted entry wages are substantially lower than predicted wages from the 
FRS even after running a selectivity adjustment on the FRS wages. This 
means that focusing on the entry wage will result in estimated gains to 
working being significantly smaller than if Heckman-adjusted overall wages 
are used. 
 
A third possible wage measure is to use entry wages combined with a 
selectivity correction, on the basis that observed entrants are likely to have 
higher wages conditional on observed characteristics than people who 
currently stay unemployed. We discuss the use of this measure in Section 
2.4.4 which examines the Gregg-Johnson-Reed report in more detail. A 
selectivity corrected entry wage measure would presumably be even lower 
than the uncorrected entry wage measure.  
 
On the other hand, the entry wage measure can be criticised because it takes 
no account of wage progression. We discuss the growth of wages on the job 
and across jobs, and mobility in the wage distribution, in Chapter 2, but at this 
point it is just worth saying that to take account of wage progression we may 
want to try to estimate some measure of the ‘net present value’ of taking a job, 
which accounts for the estimated growth in wages over time for entrants of 
different types, along with the possibility of exiting the job or moving to a 
different job later on. The Heckman wage measure may capture some ‘long 
run’ equilibrium wage for a worker of a certain type, but it would be useful to 
have a more explicit treatment of wage progression. In particular, if entry jobs 
tend to be short-lived and offer little opportunity for wage progression, then the 
‘long-run’ wage may never be reached. In this situation, an entry wage 
measure would be more appropriate.  
 
Interestingly, the only attempt so far in the literature to compare the 
usefulness of Heckman-style wages and entry wages for evaluating labour 
supply estimates comes from Blundell et al (2000), who compared predicted 
labour supply responses to the introduction of the Working Families Tax 
Credit estimated using imputed entry wages with predictions from a selectivity 
adjusted model of the overall wage distribution. They found that the estimated 
employment effects of the WFTC were slightly bigger using the entry wage 
measures; for single parents, the WFTC was predicted to increase the 
participation of single parents by 3 percentage points using entry wages, 
compared with 2.2 points for Heckman-style wages (for other affected groups  
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the differences were much smaller). They rationalise the results on the 
grounds that ‘higher wages among those who have chosen not to work tend to 
imply less elastic preferences and less responsiveness to changes in incomes 
in work’. This would suggest that using entry wage measures combined with a 
selectivity adjustment would magnify the predicted employment effects even 
more. In later stages of this project we do some comparisons between the 
predicted employment effects in our model using each of the different wage 
assumptions that we have discussed in this subsection.  
 
2.1.4 Accounting for non-participation 
 
Once we have wages or wage estimates for all people observed in the sample 
we can move on to the estimation of the response of labour supply to changes 
in the budget constraint. Taking as an example one of the functional forms of 
the hours equation (see Table 1.1), one could try to estimate the following log-
linear specification: 
  
i i i i v bQ w a H + + = ln         ( 1 . 3 2 )  
 
where  i H  is hours worked by individual i,  i Q  is a vector of control variables 
and  i v  is a normally distributed error term. All variables are measured at time 
t; the t subscript is suppressed in our discussion of the single-period model 
for notational clarity. Log wages are typically used because the hourly wage 
distribution is roughly lognormal.  
 
A basic set of controls would normally comprise  
 
i i i Y X bQ θ ρ + =         ( 1 . 3 3 )  
 
where  i Y  is a measure of unearned income from all sources, and  i X   is a 
vector of other factors which determine the extent of work: e.g. age, region, 
family characteristics etc. 
 
Clearly, however, equation (1.32) has a censored dependent variable, in that 
hours of work cannot be negative. Therefore any estimation which simply 
takes zero as the number of observed hours for non-participants will result in 
biased coefficients. One could of course leave non-participants out when 
estimating the labour supply model, as is often done when participation is 
theoretically difficult to account for (e.g. Chaippori (1992)). This, however, also 
most likely biases the coefficients (as non-participation is not random with 
respect to the right-hand side variables) and omitting the non-participants also 
makes it impossible to say anything about whether changes in the budget 
constraint will increase or decrease the number of people who are in work. 
However, if alternatively we include non-participants in the analysis, we have 
to account for the possibility that there may be factors which affect the 
decision  whether to work or not but not the decision how much to work 
conditional on being in work (i.e. choice of  i H   given  0 > i H ). If we take the 
participation equation (1.31), it is likely that the vector of observable factors  
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determining participation, Z , will include factors that are not in  X . This would 
particularly be the case if there were tastes for work which did not depend on 
the amount of hours worked, or fixed costs of working, for example.  
 
Non-participation and the hours equation 
 
When modelling the hours equation, one can account for the participation 
choice by explicitly modelling the process of selection into the sample of 
working people. This can be done in a similar way to that described above 
regarding the wage equation. For example, Blundell & Walker (1986) in their 
(unitary) model of labour supply of couples account for female non-
participation by estimating the hours equation only for participants but 
correcting the selection bias on the coefficients. Only two-earner households 
are selected for the estimation of male and female hours equations, but the 
authors account for the female participation decision by correcting the 
estimates for the selection process.  
 
Non-participation and estimation of the utility function 
 
When a direct utility function estimation is conducted, one can relate the levels 
of consumption available given the number of hours worked to the number of 
hours of leisure. For example assuming a simple Linear Expenditure System 
we would have (as in Table 2.1): 
  
)] (ln( ) ln( [ ) , ( c h c h c h u γ β γ α − + − =  
 
One can then estimate the parameters of the utility function either assuming 
that the individuals only face the choice of whether to work (full-time) or not, or 
allowing for greater flexibility by increasing the possible choices of the number 
of hours worked. Focusing for the time being on the simple binary version of 
the model and allowing utility from working/not working to vary stochastically, 
one can specify a logit model of the following form: 
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= ≥     (1.34) 
 
where subscripts  j  and k  represent the choice of working or not working and 
(1.34) describes the probability of choosing  j . The model can allow for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Below we discuss this model in 
more detail. The individual’s choice set can of course be extended to allow for 
working at several levels of hours (for example 0, 20, 40, 60 per week). The 
simple version presented here has been used quite frequently, though, 
especially in modelling male labour supply where the choice is often 
presented as a binary one.
14 As we shall see below the model can be 
                                              
14 For example Blundell et. al. (2000) use this approach.  
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extremely useful for dealing with non-linear and non-convex budget 
constraints and fixed costs. 
 
2.1.5 The budget constraint 
 
Figure 1.3 below shows a typical budget constraint for a single parent in the 
1998-99 FRS data. The thin line shows gross earnings (£9.69 per hour in this 
case – a relatively high wage rate for a single parent). The dotted line 
represents earnings net of taxes and National Insurance contributions, i.e. the 
budget constraint in the absence of any government transfers and means-
tested support. The thick line is the actual budget constraint once all transfers 
are taken into account.  
 
The Figure shows that the tax system introduces important non-linearities, 
while the system of means-tested support on top of that makes the budget 
constraint non-convex. At the extreme left of the picture net income rises due 
to the earnings disregard in Income Support. Once the disregards are reached 
Income Support is withdrawn one for one with rises in earnings, meaning that 
the net income schedule is completely flat until around 14 hours of work, 
where IS entitlement is exhausted (loss of entitlement to free school meals, 
which count towards net income in the IFS tax-benefit model, creates a slight 
drop in net income here). At 16 hours, Working Families Tax Credit 
entitlement begins, leading to a discontinuity with a large rise in net income. In 
this example, the 55% net income taper on WFTC kicks in immediately at 16 
hours, meaning that the budget constraint is shallower until WFTC entitlement 
is exhausted, at which point the marginal rate falls to 32% (equal to the 
income tax rate plus the national insurance employee contribution rate). 
Another discontinuity arises at 30 hours due to the full-time bonus in WFTC. If 
the budget constraint were extended further out, or the hourly rate of pay were 
higher, we would see a reduction in the marginal rate to 22% above the upper 
earnings limit for national insurance contributions, followed by an increase to 



















































The budget constraint and the hours equation 
 
The above-mentioned features of the budget constraint introduce another 
difficulty to the estimation of the wage equation. Because the tax systems in 
almost all developed countries are non-linear, net wages can’t be calculated 
simply as (gross wage * (1-tax)). Depending on the level of earnings (and thus 
on the number of hours worked) the tax rate will be different and therefore the 
marginal wage which the individual gets for working an additional hour will 
differ also. For example, in the current UK system someone earning a gross 
wage of £12 per hour who works twenty hours a week would receive £8.16 
pounds for an extra hour of work. Increasing the hours to sixty changes the 
marginal net wage to £7.20. As a result the wage is endogenous to the 
number of hours worked which means that using a simple gross wage 
measure, or the net wage at a given hours point, in the estimation would lead 
to a biased estimate of individual wage response. 
 
Moreover non-convexities at least in theory allow more than one combination 
of consumption and leisure to give the same level of utility, and therefore 
make identification of preference parameters difficult. In the case of family 
labour supply non-convexity of the budget set implies a non-convex Pareto 
frontier. Because a “rational” couple in the “unitary” or in the co-operative 
“collective” framework would choose a point on the frontier, non-convexity 
again produces estimation difficulties 
 
One response to these problems is to use instrumental variables techniques 
to correct the bias. This involves finding an instrument which affects hours 
worked but not the wage conditional on hours worked. Similar concerns  
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regarding the validity of instruments arise here as with the Heckman 
participation model examined earlier (for a recent empirical study in this vein 
see Blundell, Duncan and Meghir, 1998). Another option for dealing with the 
endogeneity problem, which is more common in the recent literature, is to 
model the nonconvexities in the budget constraint explicitly. We discuss this 
approach in more detail below. 
 
Estimation of the utility function when modelling a non-convex 
budget constraint 
 
In direct estimation of the utility function it is absolutely crucial to use a fair 
representation of individuals’ alternative options from which they choose the 
one we actually observe. For example in our binary choice model discussed 
above we observe individuals either in work or out of work. In their observed 
situation we usually have information on their income, both earned and 
unearned. For their alternative choice, however, their income needs to be 
imputed. The imputed income will depend on their gross wage, income from 
investment and savings, and the tax and benefit system, which determines 
their net earnings and unearned income including various government 
transfers. The tax and benefit system often depends on age and family 
circumstances and all these factors will have to be taken into account when 
calculating income for the unobserved alternatives. To account for the 
complexity of the tax and benefit system one needs to use a microsimulation 
model (such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ TaxBen, or the Cambridge 
Microsimulation Unit’s Polimod) to generate budget constraints (or at least 
points along the budget constraints) for individuals using suitable microdata 
on income and family circumstances (such as the Family Resources survey) 




Below we present two methods for dealing with non-linear and non-convex 
budget constraints when the utility function is estimated directly: piece-wise 
linear estimation and hours discretisation. The latter is an extended version of 
the binary choice model mentioned above. 
 
                                              
15 Such calculations might sometimes also be necessary in cases of hours equation estimation. 
Because unearned income is a crucial explanatory variable in the wage equation, its appropriate level 
needs to be included in the estimation. When information on unearned income seems inadequate or is 




Piecewise Linear Estimation 
 
A piecewise linear approach takes a budget constraint such as that shown in 
Figure 1.5 below and constructs a constrained utility maximisation problem 
characterised as follows: 
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Estimation of the utility maximising point on this budget constraint proceeds in 
two stages:  
i.  The choice of h  given location on the line segments 
) , , , ( EF DE BC AB  is calculated.  
ii.  Utility is calculated for each of the points on the line segments 
chosen in (i) and also for the kink points  A (the lower limit), B,  C  
and E.  
The piecewise linear approach provides a means of estimating labour supply 
responses whilst taking into account the exact shape of the budget constraint 
and with a parameterised utility function, exact predictions of responses to 
changes in the budget constraint can be made. Estimation of the hours 
equation in this model has to be conducted using instrumental variables to 
account for the fact that marginal wages are endogenous to the choice of 
hours as a result of non-linear budget constraint. 
 
The precision of the piecewise-linear model results in some interpretational 
difficulties. As Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) point out, the piecewise linear 
methodology assumes that both the researcher and the individuals in the 
sample have exact knowledge of the entire budget constraint that is relevant 
for the worker in question. Errors are permitted neither in the worker’s 
perceptions or knowledge of the budget constraint, nor in the researcher’s 
construction of it. This is an extremely stringent criterion and one which it is 
probably impossible to meet in the real world. For example, if hours and 
wages are measured precisely and individuals maximise the utility function 
exactly, we should expect to see bunching of hours of work at kink points such 
as  C  in figure 1.5. However, for the overwhelming majority of data sources 
currently used in the literature, only a trivial number of individuals, if indeed 
any at all, report hours of work at interior kink points. So, measurement error 
in h needs to be introduced to avoid the model being rejected on the grounds 
that very few observations are reported at exact kink points. Adding a 
continuously distributed measurement error ε  to the model makes it 
consistent with a continuous hours distribution, but measurement error of 
hours of course implies measurement error in wages (since in many cases the 
hourly wage is calculated as reported weekly earnings divided by reported 
hours of work). This calls into question the piecewise linear approach’s 
original contention that the budget constraint is perfectly measured. Thus this 
approach to estimating labour supply equations is of somewhat fragile 
robustness.  
 
Discretisation of the hours choice 
 
A more robust, if less accurate, approach to accounting for non-linear budget 
constraints involves treating the labour supply decision as if individuals are 
choosing from a discrete set of hours points rather than optimising over a 
continuous distribution of hours. This was originally proposed by van Soest  
(1995) and has been applied for example by Bingley and Walker (1997), 
Duncan and Weeks (1997) and Blundell et al (2000). The model implies that 
peoples’ actual choices of hours (and their actual incomes) are in most cases  
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different from the points of estimation. Such an approach allows for 
optimisation errors by individuals in a more sensible manner than the 
piecewise linear approach presented earlier.  
 
As in the binary choice model presented in the discussion of non-participation, 
people are allocated to specified discrete “hours points” where the hours point 
corresponds to hours being observed in a certain “hours bracket” in the data. 
For example, in the simplest case we could specify a set of two hours points 
as [0,40], where [0] corresponds to a zero hours ‘bracket’, and [40] 
corresponds to positve hours. A more complex set of hours would be, for 
example, [0,10,20,30,40,50], corresponding to hours brackets such as (for 
example) [(0),(1-15),(16-24),(25-34),(35-44),(45 or more)]. Thus the 
continuous hours distribution is collapsed into a set of discrete points. Given 
people’s wages and their other characteristics, incomes are calculated for the 
set of hours points corresponding (via the hours brackets) to the hours 
actually observed for individuals in the data as well as for other hours points 
which are selected as possible options. Choices over the hours points can be 
made flexible by allowing utility from different hours choices to vary 
stochastically over individuals. In a Linear Expenditure System we would then 
have: 
  
i c ji ji h ji ji c h c h u ε γ β γ α + − + − = )] (ln( ) ln( [ ) , (        (1.36) 
 
where for every hours point  j  the individual i’s utility function is determined 
by the level of leisure   ) ( ji h h − γ  and consumption corresponding to income 
earned when working  j  hours and determined by the budget constraint. The 
model allows unobserved heterogeneity among individuals only through the 
random parameter  j ε . However, preferences can vary with observed 















         ( 1 . 3 7 )  
 
If the random disturbances  j ε  have an extreme value distribution then 
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where subscripts  j  and  k  represent discrete hours points. (1.38) describes 
the probability of choosing hours point  j (or in fact, the hours bracket 
corresponding to  j) as the actual hours worked.
16  
 
The multinomial logit model and the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives 
 
One of the major restrictions of the multinomial logit model is the fact that it 
imposes the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This 
means that the ratio of probabilities of any two events is independent of the 
alternatives which are not considered. For example, if we consider the 
following choice of the number of hours: [0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50], the ratio of the 
probability that 20 is chosen to the probability that 40 is chosen is assumed to 
be the same as in the case when we consider 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, and 60 
hours. This is a very strong and rather unrealistic assumption, and two 
methods of relaxing it have been developed in the literature: random 
parameter logit (McFadden and Train, 2000) and mass point estimation 
(Wiliamson-Hoynes, 2001). Both rely on allowing the parameters of the utility 
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0          ( 1 . 3 9 )  
 
Unobserved preference heterogeneity among individuals is represented by 
disturbances ν . These are random and assumed to be normally distributed 
with mean zero and different variances. This makes unobserved individual 
heterogeneity correlated with individual characteristics and thanks to  α ν  and  
β ν , the random parameter logit does not exhibit the IIA property. To account 
for the unobserved heterogeneity represented by the ν  terms, it is necessary 
to integrate over the range of the ν  variables. Simulation methods are 
necessary for this; a large number of draws, usually over 100, are taken over 
the two equations in (3.7), assuming a multivariate normal distribution for the 
ν  variables. This is used to construct a simulated likelihood for (1.36) which 




2.1.6 The problem of fixed costs  
 
The standard representation of the choice between consumption and leisure 
allows for non-participation because of people’s strong preference for leisure 
relative to their preference for consumption, or because their income while out 
of work is high enough to rationalise non-participation. Another interpretation 
of the optimality of non-participation is the fact that apart from financial gains 
                                              
16 Van Soest (1995) applies this model (although assuming a different form of the utility function) to 
estimate preferences of people in couples on Dutch data assuming the “unitary” process of intra-
household decision making. 
17 For further technical details of the simulated likelihood procedure in the context of labour supply, 
please see Duncan and Weeks (1997).   
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from work there may be certain financial costs of participation, the so called 
‘fixed costs’ - factors which influence participation and do not influence hours 
choice.  
 
Among many examples of fixed costs are expenditure on travel to work, work 
clothing, etc. The presence and size of these ‘fixed costs’ can seriously 
influence the decision whether to work or not, as shown in Figure 1.4 below. 
In the presence of fixed costs of size  AC , the budget constraint shifts from 
AB  to  ACD. In the absence of fixed costs, the individual prefers to work h 
hours, as shown by the tangency of  2 IC  to  AB  at  X . However, with fixed 
costs of  AC , the individual would prefer inactivity (a corner solution where  1 IC  
hits point  A). While in some cases we will have some information in the data 
on fixed costs for those who work, for non-participants this information will be 
absent. For this reason, as well as in the case where no information on fixed 
costs is available in the data, additional structure will need to be imposed on 























Discretisation of hours choices also allows us to include fixed costs in the 
model, as the level of income at every choice of positive hours can be 
assigned a specified fixed cost “penalty”. This is done for example in Blundell 
et al (2000) who model fixed costs as a one-off weekly cost and subtract them 
from net income for choices that involve work. If we have data on the size of 
the fixed cost then it is modelled as a simple deduction from net income. More 
often this is not possible, and so the fixed cost has to be modelled as 
conditional on observable factors and an unobservable heterogeneity variable 
as above. If we account for fixed costs, individual income is then: 
 
F Y − ,     if  0 > h  and  
 
Y ,           if  0 = h .          ( 1 . 4 0 )  
 
If  F  is not directly observed, the estimation of the labour supply function must 
explicitly consider two ‘regimes’: working and not working. As in the case of 
discrete hours points considered above, estimation proceeds by finding the 
maximum utility under each regime and then comparing these to determine 
which option will be chosen. The fixed cost variable is treated as an extra  
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parameter which is estimated along with the rest of the model. For example, in 
a model where the utility function in the absence of fixed costs is defined as  
 
) )), ( (( h Y Wh Y Wh U U + − + = τ        ( 1 . 4 1 )  
 
where W is gross hourly earnings, Y is unearned income, h is hours and τ is 
the average tax rate on total weekly income, introducing fixed costs can be 
done as shown: 
 
) ), ) ( (( h Y Wh Y Wh U U ν τ − + − + =        ( 1 . 4 2 )  
 
where ν  is the fixed cost parameter. In the ‘no-work’ regime, utility is given by 
) 0 ), ( ( Y Y U τ − ; in the ‘work’ regime, by  ) ), ) ( (( h Y Wh Y Wh U ν τ − + − + , where 
0 > h . The hours choice in the work regime has to be accounted for using 
either the piecewise-linear or hours discretisation methods detailed earlier but 
with the added complication of the parameter ν . Positive fixed costs mean 
that there is likely to be a ‘hole’ in the hours distribution between zero (not 
working) and some positive value of hours – we are unlikely to see individuals 
working small numbers of hours because the new gain from work is 




Important contributions to the empirical literature on estimation of labour 
supply models in the presence of fixed costs include Cogan (1981), Moffitt 
(1983) and Bourgignon and Magnac (1990).  It should be noted that all of 
these approaches treat fixed costs as essentially exogenous – i.e. they are a 
factor which the individual has no control over. For fixed costs like travel to 
work or the housing costs associated with location near to certain types of job, 
or costs associated with being at work such as clothing or equipment (if not 
paid for by the firm), the exogeneity assumption is probably valid in the short 
run. However in the long run we might expect agents to adjust their location or 
occupational choice to exploit the appropriate trade-off between the level of 
fixed costs and the wage or other benefits of the particular job they do. 
Accounting for this kind of long-run optimisation requires a much more life-
cycle, panel-data orientated approach to the labour supply decision which we 
discuss in detail in our review of dynamic models of labour supply in Chapter 
2 of this review. 
 
 
2.1.7 Modelling childcare costs and labour supply 
 
In addition to fixed costs of work, there can be costs which vary with the 
number of hours worked. An important example of a variable cost is childcare. 
Clearly, if childcare is paid for by the hour, then its cost will vary with the 
number of hours that the primary carer in the household (often the mother) is 
                                              
18 Note, however, that the fact that few people are observed working very small numbers of hours could 
also be caused by very high marginal deduction rates at low hours of work – for example, means-tested 
benefits for people working less than 16 hours a week in the UK are withdrawn pound for pound as 
earnings rise (bar a small earnings allowance), which gives no financial incentive to work at those hours 
levels, even before considering fixed costs of work.   
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working. Clearly a failure to take childcare costs into account is likely to lead 
to biased estimation and incorrect inferences being drawn from labour supply 
models. However accounting for childcare in labour supply models is 
complicated due to several factors: 
 
•  Families may use childcare for reasons unrelated to work, e.g. for 
babysitting, or simply to give the parents a break from caring for the child. 
Hence we cannot automatically assume that survey data on number of hours 
of childcare use actually corresponds to number of hours of paid childcare 
used for labour supply purposes unless the data specifically indicate this.  
•  The price of childcare can vary widely, either because of local market 
conditions, non-market childcare arrangements (such as care by relatives, 
where the childcare may be provided free of charge in many cases) or 
variations in the quality of childcare purchased.  
 
Strategies for modelling childcare costs in the labour supply 
model 
 
i) Joint modelling of childcare and labour supply  
 
These kinds of considerations suggest that, data permitting, the ideal 
approach to modelling childcare in a structural framework is to treat it as 
completely endogenous (a choice variable) and to estimate a joint model of 
labour supply and childcare use. Recent examples of this kind of model 
include Blau and Hagy (1998), Blau and Robins (1988), Hotz and Kilburn 
(1994) and Ribar (1992). We focus below on a recent model for the UK by 
Duncan, Paull and Taylor (2001).   
 
Duncan, Paull and Taylor (DPT hereafter) estimate a single-period model of 
the choice of formal childcare among women with at least one dependent 
child below school age. The following assumptions are made concerning 
childcare price and availability, and the structure of labour supply: 
 
1.  the price paid for formal childcare reflects heterogeneity in childcare 
quality. Mothers are confronted with a market-determined price for 
some ‘base quality’ of childcare, but can select differing quality levels 
over a range of prices. This assumption therefore rules out variation in 
the base price within the local childcare market (e.g. due to imperfect 
competition in the market), although prices can differ across localities.  
2.  Hours of work must be less than or equal to non-maternal childcare 
time. This reflects the requirement that there be somebody to look after 
the child(ren) when the mother is at work (conditional on the father also 
working of course). However, childcare time can be greater than hours 
worked in this model, which allows childcare to be used for non-work 
reasons.  
3.  The labour supply of the male partner in the household is taken as 
given. 
4.  The level of informal childcare (i.e. free care provided by close relatives 
or friends) is also taken as given (exogenous).   
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5. A single aggregate of formal care is modelled (rather than splitting 
formal care into different types, e.g. nursery, babysitter, etc.) This 
makes estimation of the model simpler but means that differences in 
families’ preferences over different types of care cannot be allowed for 
(which may be unduly restrictive).  
 
With the father’s labour supply treated as fixed, the mother in each houshold 
makes decisions over labour force participation and childcare so as to 
maximise the value of a preference function: 
 
) | , , ( 1 Z Q L C U U =          ( 1 . 4 3 )  
 
where C is private non-childcare consumption, L is time not in employment 
(‘leisure’),  Q is overall childcare quality and  1 Z  is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory characteristics. U is assumed increasing in all three arguments. 
Overall childcare quality is described by some ‘production process’ of the form 
 
) | , , ( 2 Z qK K K F Q F I M =         ( 1 . 4 4 )  
 
where  M K is the mother’s time devoted to the care of her children,  F K  is the 
time spent in formal care and  I K  is the time spent in informal care, and q is 
the quality of formal childcare, normalised at 1 for the ‘base quality’, with 
1 > q meaning better than base quality and  1 0 < < q meaning worse than base 
quality. The model includes a budget constraint:  
 
V pqK V H w T wH pqK C F f + − = + ) , , , (       (1.45) 
 
where p is the hourly price of the basic quality of childcare, w is the hourly 
wage of the mother and V represents exogenous household income, including 
the income of the partner. Hence, total expenditure on formal childcare 
) ( M pqK  depends on the exogenous base price and the chosen quantity and 
quality levels. There is also the time constraint that  M I F K K K T + + = , i.e. that 
the children are cared for at all times. Assumption 2 above implies additionally 
that 
 
H K K I F ≥ +           ( 1 . 4 6 )  
 
DPT estimate an econometric model of employment and childcare use which 
incorporates the quantity constraint in (1.46).  Underlying the model is the 
premise that observed choices of work ( w h ) and childcare ( c h ) are driven by a 
person’s underlying ‘propensities’ to work and to consume formal childcare 
(denoted 
*
w h  and 
*
c h  respectively). These propensities are assumed to depend 
on a series of factors  x and  z respectively (including price, wage and incomes 
variables, individual exogenous characteristics and demographics, and local 
childcare and labour market conditions), and take the following general form: 
 
w w w x h ε β + =
*   
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c c c z h ε β + =
*           ( 1 . 4 7 )  
 
where  w β  and  c β  are parameters, and  w ε  and  c ε represent factors influencing 
work and childcare which are not related to observables. We assume that the 
hours choice conditional on working divides into ‘full-time’ and ‘part-time’ 
hours. The constraint from assumption 2 means that households cannot use 
less than the required hours of childcare if working, leads to a six-state model 
of childcare use: 
 
Table 2.2. A six-state model of childcare use and labour supply 
Mother’s hours of work  Use more than required hours of formal childcare? 
 Yes  No 
Full-time  ) 30 ( ≥ w h  






































Part-time  ) 30 0 ( < < w h  
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No paid work ( 0 = w h ) 







































DPT estimate this model using data from the UK Family Resources Survey, 
which features the drawback that consistent childcare use information is only 
collected for households where mothers are working. Hence the two cells in 
the bottom row of Table 2.2 must be merged into one ‘childcare unspecified ‘ 
cell with just the conditions  1
* γ ≤ w h  and  w w xβ γ ε − ≤ 1 . For estimation,  w ε  and 
c ε  are treated as joint-normally distributed with unit variances and correlation 
ρ . To keep matters as simple as possible whilst capturing the essential 
features of the model, we present here the likelihood function for a three state 
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i I , 
wmc
i I  and 
wc
i I are indicator variables for the states of non-work, 
working with minimum childcare and working with more than minimum 
childcare respectively;  
• 
nw
i P , 
wmc
i P  and 
wc
i P are the probabilities of individual i being in each of 
the respective states; 
• Φ represents a univariate normal cumulative density function and  2 Φ a 
bivariate normal density function.  
 
Clearly a structural model which endogenises childcare use increases the 
complexity of the estimation process considerably. In addition, accurate data 
on the costs and quantity of childcare used by each household are needed. 
Duncan, Paull and Taylor (2001) estimate the baseline  childcare price using a  
approach which assumes that the price of a ‘baseline’ quality of childcare is 
fixed within a local market (UK local authority area in this case), and hence 
that differences in hourly childcare price within the local market reflects 
differences in quality. Such an assumption, although restrictive, is essential in 
the absence of direct survey information on childcare quality.  
 
ii) Including an estimated measure of childcare costs in the labour supply equation as 
a deduction from disposable income when working 
 
An alternative to estimating a full joint model of childcare choice and labour 
supply is to include an estimated childcare expenditure variable as an extra 
determinant of the budget constraint in the labour supply equation. Clearly, a 
positive cost of childcare when working will reduce the net financial incentive 
to work (on the assumption that childcare is used when working but not when 
out of work). However, in-work subsidies which include allowances for 
childcare costs (such as the childcare component of the UK Working Families 
Tax Credit) will mitigate this to some extent. Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and 
Meghir (2000) estimate a model which takes this approach in their work on the 
labour market impact of the Working Families Tax Credit in the UK. This 
strategy views childcare costs as simply an alteration to the budget constraint 
and is hence less flexible than the full joint model of childcare and labour 
supply which allows households to choose different amounts of childcare for a 
given amount of hours of work – here the childcare cost is treated as variable 
across the hours of work distribution, but as fixed for each level of hours of 
work. However this methodology is easier to estimate than the joint model and 
is usable even if the data on childcare use and cost are of poor quality or very 
aggregated. For example, it could be implemented (albeit crudely) using data 
on the average amounts of childcare used and the average cost of childcare 
for full-time and part-time workers. However, the Blundell et al. approach is 
more sophisticated than this as they use the Family Resources Survey data, 




2.1.8 Modelling take-up 
 
Much of the labour supply modelling literature assumes that benefits are fully 
taken up if households are eligible for them. This makes modelling the budget 
constraint easier but is very unrealistic. For example, research on the Working 
Families Tax Credit in the UK estimated that in 2001, only 78 percent of 
potential WFTC expenditure was actually taken up, and only 67 percent of 
eligible families actually claimed WFTC (McKay, 2001).  
 
By ‘non-take up’ we mean a situation where someone does not claim a benefit 
to which they are entitled. Empirical studies of non take-up typically compare 
data on receipt of benefits as recorded in household surveys (or matched 
administrative data sources) with data on entitlement to benefits produced by 
a microsimulation model operating on data on household characteristics from 
the same household survey. 
 
Why would someone not take up a benefit to which they are entitled? Possible 
explanations include: 
 
•  imperfect information on the part of the (potential) claimant about what 
benefits exist and/or what the eligibility criteria are; 
•  the ‘hassle’ costs of applying for benefits; 
•  stigma costs.  
 
Several labour supply studies have sought to model take-up simultaneously 
with labour supply behaviour, to improve the accuracy of labour supply 
estimation. These include Moffitt (1983), Hoynes (1996), Bingley and Walker 
(1997) and Keane and Moffitt (1998).  
 
Other features which econometricians are interested in are: 
•  allowing for modelling errors when estimating take-up; 
•  estimating a value (in some metric) of the stigma costs of receiving 
benefits. 
A standard framework for thinking about non take-up 
 
Duclos (1995) presents a commonly-used framework for thinking about how to 
model take-up of benefits, which we draw on in the following discussion. 
There are three agents involved in a study of non-take up: 
1. the  individual 
2.  the government agency which administers the benefit 
3. the  researcher 
The government agency has an information set  g Ω (information from the 
benefit application form and the agency’s knowledge of the benefit rules). The 
analyst has the information set  a Ω (data from a household survey).  
 
Define  * B  to be the true entitlement of a family as determined by the existing 
means-tested benefit rules. The actual level of benefit received by a family  
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could differ from this, either because the agency has failed to determine 
correctly all the variables necessary to calculate  * B  or because it has failed 
to apply the rules correctly. Call the actual benefit amount received 
g B  where:  
 
} | {
* g g B E B Ω =          ( 1 . 4 9 )  
 
In general,  * B  differs from 
g B  because the agency may have measured 
household characteristics with error, and/or the agency may make errors 
when interpreting the benefit rules laid down in legislation (as indicated by, 
e.g. successful appeals against WFTC decisions in tribunal cases).  
 
The analyst typically uses a microsimulation model and data from a household 
survey to produce an estimate of the entitlement 
a B . This will differ from  * B  
because of: 
•  measurement error or sampling defects leading to mismeasurement of 
household characteristics 
•  changes in circumstances between the time of the survey and the time 
when an individual’s benefit claim was last assessed (this is particularly 
important in the case of WFTC where claims are fixed for 6 months) 
•  errors by the analyst in interpreting the benefit rules laid down in legislation 
 
So:  
} | * {
a a B E B Ω =          ( 1 . 5 0 )  
 
As 
a g Ω ≠ Ω the analyst’s estimate is in general not the same as the agency’s.  
 
This implies that the population can be partitioned into four groups:  
•  eligible recipients 
•  eligible non-recipients (put off by stigma or ‘hassle’ or badly informed) 
•  non-eligible recipients (fraudsters or mistakes on the part of the agency) 
•  non-eligible non-recipients.  
 
Economic models of non take up 
 
The framework first outlined in Moffitt (1983) for analysing non take up 
suggests that people do not take up benefits if the disutility of claiming and 
receiving the benefit outweighs the utility gain of the extra income. Sources of 
disutility could include: information costs (awareness of the scheme, 
complexity of forms), process costs (time requirements), job-search costs (if 
search is mandatory whilst on the program), and/or outcome costs (stigma). A 
simple formulation of the take-up condition is: 
 
)] ; ( ) ; ( ) ); ; ( * ( Pr[ ) 1 Pr( X y U X y C X X y B y U T > − + = =      (1.51) 
 
where  y is income from other sources when not working,  X is a vector of 
family characteristics,  ) , ( X y C is the utility cost of claiming and receiving the 
benefit, and we assume that families costlessly know their entitlement and  
 
56
there are no errors (i.e. 
g B B =
* ). This leads to the following set of 
‘observation rules’:  
 
  Individual: no claim 
) 0 ( = T  
Individual: claim  
) 1 ( = T  
Not entitled 
) 0 * ( = = B B
g  
No award, not entitled  Never  happens  in  this 
framework 
Entitled 
) 0 * ( > = B B
g  
Would be an award, 




This model can be generalised along two further dimensions: 
 
-  allowing for errors in the agency’s calculation of entitlement: this 
means that  * B B
g ≠  is possible and introduces the possibility that 
someone may get an award if not truly entitled, and vice/versa 
(expanding the figure above to four rows instead of two).  
-  Allowing for errors on the analyst’s part: this introduces twice as 
many rows again, in that 
a B - the analyst’s assessment of whether an 
award is made – may diverge from 
g B .  
 
Allowing for these two extra dimensions gives a model with four dimensions of 
varation: 
 
1.  Is the benefit taken up? ( 0 = T  or  1 = T ) 
2. Is the individual truly entitled? (if all information were known by the 
agency), ( 0 * = B  or  0 * > B ) 
3.  Does the agency actually award the benefit?  ( 0 =
g B  or  0 >
g B ) 
4.  Does the analyst observe take-up? ( 0 =
a B  or  0 >
a B ) 
 
This gives a total of  16 2
4 =  possible states. In practice, the data available 
make it impossible to distinguish between these states accurately.  * B  is 
never observed and 
g B is only observed if there has been a successful claim. 
What appears to be non-take-up due to high stigma costs may look identical – 
given our data – to non-take up due to modelling errors or poor expectations.  
 
Modelling labour supply and take-up jointly 
 
The discussion above assumed that pre-transfer income  y  was exogenous, 
but in general, take-up needs to be modelled jointly with labour supply 
behaviour. This is because:  
 
1) entitlement to means-tested benefits will generally depend on labour 
supply behaviour, and labour supply incentives will be altered by the 
value of means-tested benefits. This simultaneity implies that, even if 
preferences for working and claiming benefits are uncorrelated, 
individuals working and claiming some in-work benefit will have lower  
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propensities to work than those working and not claiming, ceteris 
paribus. Conversely, it means that those observed not working must 
have relatively high stigma costs, ceteris paribus. The group of 
individuals observed working and claiming an in-work benefit have self-
selected themselves into that group, and so inferences based on them 
may not hold for the population. 
 
2)  Preferences for working and preferences for receiving benefits may be 
correlated (i.e. the marginal utilities of leisure, income and stigma may 
be correlated).  
 
The estimation strategy for joint modelling of labour supply and take-up 
employed by most researchers is to write down an observation rule as we did 
above, specify a utility function or a function for the net utility of receiving a 
benefit (some function of the terms  ) , ( X y U and/or  ) , ( X y C ) and perhaps the 
process of forming expectations about benefit levels, and then to use 
maximum likelihood techniques to estimate the parameters. Below we give 
examples in more detail. Throughout what follows, let  b I  be an indicator for 




This study looks at female-headed households in the US and take-up of 





h I B h y U φ
δ β




− − − =
)) ( (
) log( ) , , , ( log .  (1.52) 
 
This model allows income from AFDC to be valued differently from other 
income (through γ , with  1 < γ implying that benefits are not valued as highly 
as other income) and for there to be some fixed stigma, φ . Wages are 
modelled so that non-workers can be included. Having assumed or averaged 
away the non-linearities in the tax and welfare system, and assumed additive 
normal error terms in the (not shown) hours equation and take-up model, the 
model gives a simple form for hours h(Tobit) with endogenous take-up. The 
study finds  0 > φ and  1 > γ , the latter suggesting a mis-specification (such as 
omitting the value of food stamps).  
 
Bingley and Walker (1997) 
 
This study looked at lone parents in the UK, and the decision to take up 
Family Credit. The utility function as estimated is identified only relative to the 
utility of non-participation (in other words, they estimate the utility differences 
between part-time work and non-participation, part-time work, Family Credit 
and non-participation), which makes direct interpretation of the coefficients 
hard. The model allows for involuntary unemployment to prevent the stigma 
term on family credit from having to explain all observed unemployment/non-




Moffitt and Keane (1998) 
 
This study looks at female-headed households in the US and their decision to 
claim AFDC, Food Stamps and subsidised housing ( 3 , 2 , 1 = b ). The direct 
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     (1.53) 
 
where  b indexes the three benefits, and  }) { }, ({ b b I B y y = is income including 
whatever combination of benefits is claimed. This gives eight possible 
combinations of benefit take-up, combined with three choices of hours of 
work, and they are able to estimate the model by adding an extreme value 
error term to the direct utility function. Personal characteristics are allowed to 
affect preferences for work, income and take-up. Identification of the stigma 
term arises because some households are not eligible for these benefits. 
Blundell et al (2000) essentially use a similar utility function for a single benefit 
(WFTC) with stigma identified through non-eligibility.  
 
Valuing the stigma costs  
 
Any model of non-take-up that directly models the utility function is able to 
quantify in some way the magnitude of the stigma costs (models where the 
stigma costs vary with observable characteristics can also value the additional 
stigma costs arising through changes in observable characteristics).  
For example, if we write a general utility function (not separable in stigma 
costs) as :  ) ; , ( X I y U , where  y includes Bas appropriate and I indicates take-
up, then an obvious measure of the stigma costs in utility terms is  
) ; 1 , ( ) ; 0 , ( ) ( X I y U X I y U X C = − = =  at some  y . This can then be converted 
into a monetary metric using a compensating or equivalent variation approach 




2.2 ‘Reduced Form’ Models of Labour Supply Response 
 
2.2.1 Difference-in-differences models 
The ‘difference-in-differences’ approach to estimating labour supply 
responses imposes much less structure on the labour supply decision than 
the utility-maximisation models covered in the previous subsection. Whilst 
difference in differences (DID) is often called a ‘reduced form’ estimation 
procedure, this is somewhat misleading; some structural assumptions are 
maintained, as will be explained shortly. Also, whereas the fully structural  
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utility-maximising specification can be used to estimate labour supply 
responses to a broad range of changes in the labour market, DID is geared 
more towards a specific type of policy reform – one which affects a group of 
people with certain observable characteristics (e.g. single mothers) whilst not 
affecting a different group of people with reasonably similar observable 
characteristics (e.g. married mothers, or single women without children).  
 
The technical characterisation of DID is as follows: assume that a labour 
market policy reform (such as an increase in the Working Families Tax Credit, 
for example) occurs which affects one group (the ‘treatment’ group, known as 
τ ) but has no direct effects on another group (the ‘control’ group, known as 
c). The outcome variable which the researcher is interested in is some 
measure of labour supply (we will focus on the participation rate, denoted 
below by P, although hours of work is another possible outcome variable). 
The DID model works by comparing the outcome variable before and after the 
policy reform for both groups (for this reason, DID is sometimes known as a 
‘before-and-after’ estimator). The basic DID model makes two crucial 
assumptions:  
 
1.  Any ‘time effects’ on the outcome variable (e.g. macroeconomic shocks 
to labour demand, secular trends in labour market participation for 
subgroups of the population, and so on) are assumed to affect the 
control and treatment areas equally. 
 
2.  It is assumed that the composition of the control and treatment groups 
does not change substantially over the ‘before’ and ‘after’ periods. If the 
period between the data used for the ‘before’ regime and the data used 
for the ‘after’ regime is reasonably short, this assumption should be 
uncontroversial.  
 
Denoting the point in time before the reform at which snapshot labour market 
data are taken as  1 = t  and the point after the reform as  2 = t , with the 
proportion of employed people in subgroup τ  and  c at time t as 
τ
t P and 
c
t P respectively. The DID estimator of the effect of the policy is given by  
 
) ( ) ( ˆ
1 2 1 2
c c P P P P − − − =
τ τ τ δ         (1.54) 
 
The assumption of common macro trends can be relaxed if an earlier 
comparison period can be found in which the macro-economy behaved 
similarly to the period  1 = t  to  2 = t  (say a similar point in the cycle). Call the 
previous period “period ρ  to period  1 + ρ ”. The ‘trend adjusted’ difference-in-
differences’ estimator is given by 
 
)] ( ) [( ) ( ) ( ˆ






TA P P P P P P P P − − − − − − − = + +
τ τ τ τ τ δ  (1.55) 
 
The idea here is that any differential macro trends between the treatment 
group and the control group which have a tendency to occur at a particular 
point in the business cycle should be captured between time  ρ   and time  
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1 + ρ , before the treatment was given. This estimate of the differential trend is 
then netted off the standard DID estimate to give the trend-adjusted DID. 
Obviously the trend adjustment may be misleading if there have been large 
changes in the composition of the treatment and control groups between 
period p and the present period.  
 
The DID estimator is very popular in recent applied empirical work as an 
estimator which makes as few structural assumptions as possible. This 
simplicity is sometimes overstated; as Blundell and MacCurdy (1999) point 
out, the DID model basically decomposes the change in the outcome variable 
between periods 1 and 2 into a fixed effect (specific to the control or treatment 
group being looked at) and an effect common across both groups, with the 
differencing process stripping out the common effect. Looked at like this, it is 
identical to a stripped-down ‘structural’ model with fixed effects terms. 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that DID estimates a programme effect 
under the minimal (but very important) set of assumptions shown earlier.  
 
The strength of the DID approach is that there is nothing constraining the 
effects of a program to go in a certain direction. For example, we might expect 
a reduction in benefits for non-working people to have a positive impact on 
labour market participation. A structural analysis which stipulated that 
individuals maximised well-behaved utility functions derived from neoclassical 
labour supply theory might well estimate a model where the labour supply 
response to a benefit cut was compelled to be either zero or positive. In the 
DID model however, a negative labour supply response to a benefit cut is 
entirely possible. This would strike some researchers as odd, in that it is not 
predicted by the standard static model of labour supply. However, the 
predictions of more complex dynamic models such as the search-matching 
models considered in section 2.1 are much more ambiguous. From this 
perspective, the DID approach is likely to appeal to two main groups of 
researchers:  
 
(a) those who are sceptical about the extent to which the labour supply 
theory outlined in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 applies in the real world; 
(b)  those who believe that more complex theoretical models (e.g. 
search/matching) are correct) but that empirical structural models are 
currently too simplistic to capture the important features of the labour 
market.  
 
The weakness of the DID approach compared with the structural approach is 
that we have much less to go on when trying to interpret the results. In a 
model where structural parameters are estimated it is easy, for example, to 
decompose the effect of a policy which alters the budget constraint into 
income and substitution effects. With the DID model, there are no estimated 
structural parameters, so we are left in the dark as to what features of the 
economy led to the measured labour supply effects. The problem worsens 
when we consider attempting to predict labour supply effects in other 
circumstances. The structural approach gives researchers a set of estimated 
parameters which they can in principle apply to new situations and completely 
different samples. The DID results, by contrast, cannot be divorced from their  
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particular temporal and spatial setting. Hence the only way to get generalised 
results for the impact of labour market programs from the DID methodology is 
to do a separate evaluation of each programme. For this reason, DID sits 
squarely in the camp of ‘evaluative’ rather than ‘predictive’ labour supply 
models if we follow the schema used earlier.  
 
2.2.2 Grouping estimators 
 
We have focused heavily on the difference-in-differences technique in this 
section, reflecting its popularity as a technique for the evaluation of labour 
market policy. However, grouping estimators, which can be used to evaluate 
policy reforms when treatment and control groups are not as clear-cut as they 
are in the standard DID case, are also popular, and are very similar in terms 
of the methodology and the assumptions used. The grouping approach uses a 
discrete grouping variable or set of variables G  which allocates individuals 
into  J g ,..., 1 = groups of size  gt N in each period  T t ,..., 1 = . For an individual i in 
group g , the grouping model can be expressed as  
 
it t i g it it it m X y ε η θ β γδ + + + + + = '       (1.56) 
 
where  it y is the outcome variable of interest (e.g. labour market participation), 
it δ  in this case is a ‘treatment’ dummy variable for whether the policy being 
evaluated was administered to the group or not,  it X is a vector of control 
variables,  g θ is a group-specific fixed effect,  i η is an individual-specific fixed 
effect,  t m is a time specific ‘macro’ effect and  it ε a randomly distributed error 





y ∑ ∈ =  and do the same for the variables on the right hand side of 
(1.40)  we derive the grouped specification 
 
gt t g gt gt gt m X y ε θ δ γ + + + + =       (1.57) 
which can be estimated with a full set of time and group dummies. Effectively 
this is a fixed effects panel model with the group as the primary unit of 
observation.  
 
(1.57) represents a grouping estimator which is closest in spirit to the 
difference-in-difference model – where there is a clearly identifiable treatment 
it δ  which some groups are affected by and some not. However, similar 
specifications can also be used to examine labour supply responses when the 
‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups are not as clear cut. For example, Blundell et 
al (1996) work with a specification which is a modified version of (1.57) where 
gt y is the proportion of each group in work, the  gt δ  term is omitted, and an 
additional term  gt R , a function of the net return to working at various hours 
levels given an hourly wage imputed from a wage equation, is used instead.  
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This has the advantage that the  gt R variable can in principle be computed for 
out-of-sample data and hence the approach can be used for quantitative 
prediction in a way that is not usually possible in pure difference-of-difference 
studies. The grouping variables used are age bands, region of residence, the 
presence or absence of children in the household, and the level of educational 
attainment. Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) also work with a grouping 
estimator, which will be discussed further in section 2.3.4. If financial incentive 
variables are used in a grouped model the implicit assumption is that labour 
supply responses depend on quantitative work incentives in a systematic way, 
which begins to move us back towards the structural models shown in Section 
2.1.  
 
Grouping estimators are also popular as a means of controlling for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity which may be correlated with the 
outcome variable y. To the extent that such heterogeneity occurs within each 
group, the grouping procedure averages it out of the model. This is similar to 
an instrumental variables model where the within-group means of the 
variables are used as an instrument for the individual values. However, 




2.3 Experimental methods and the Random Assignment 
methodology 
 
A third type of empirical study relies on random assignment being 
incorporated in the design of a policy intervention. The theory behind random 
assignment works as follows: imagine an outcome variable Y  (e.g. labour 
market participation) which is distributed amongst the population according to 
an equation such as: 
) , ( i i i Z X f Y =          ( 1 . 5 8 )  
for individual i, where  i X  are factors observable to the econometrician and 
i Z  are unobservable factors such as motivation, innate ability, etc. Now 
imagine a labour market intervention q. Denote the outcome for individual i 
in the presence of the intervention as 
q
i Y and without the intervention as 
0
i Y . 
Under random assignment, a treatment group (τ ) is given the labour market 
intervention but a proportion ρ  is randomised out, i.e. they are placed in the 
control group (c). Under assumptions to be discussed below, the average 
treatment effect  ) (
0 Y Y
q − is given by simply comparing the average outcome 
for group τ  with the average outcome for group c. The assumptions are: 
 
1.  that assignment to the groups τ  and c is truly random, i.e. there is no 
correlation between the probability of being randomised out and any of 
the regressors  X  or Z .   
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2. that there is no contamination of the control group c, i.e. that their 
actions and labour market outcomes are unaltered from what they 
would have been in the absence of the policy being implemented.  
 
If these assumptions hold then random assignment can be seen as an 
idealised form of the difference-in-differences methodology where the 
treatment group are not just similar, but identical (on average) to the control 
group in all characteristics. This makes it a very powerful evaluative tool, but 
obviously it has the drawback that it can only be used for studies for which 
random assignment has specifically been built in to the design of the 
evaluation.  
 
2.4 How our model fits into the framework 
 
The model which we are planning to estimate in this project (outlined in detail 
in Section 3.2) is not a fully structural model in the sense that we are not 
planning to estimate the parameters of a utility function. However, it has more 
structure than a ‘pure’ difference-in-differences model in that we are planning 
to relate movements into and out of work to the financial incentives which 
people face. This procedure is useful because the labour supply effects of 
alternative reforms to the tax and benefit system can then be simulated by 
using a tax and benefit model to calculate the changed work incentives which 
individuals would face under a reformed system, then predicting the extent of 
movements into and out of work under the new system. To an extent, the 
source of identification of our model is similar to DID models in that we rely on 
labour market reforms over the sample period having an impact on groups 
who were affected by the reform whilst having no impact on groups who were 
not affected. Our model is in no sense an experimental model as we use data 
from the labour market as a whole, with no opportunity for random assignment 
to be used. In Chapter 3 we say more about the identification of our model 




Chapter 3. Criticisms of the standard labour supply theory 
 
The framework explained above attracts criticism from some economists, and 
indeed other social scientists, on several grounds. Rather than simply 
accepting the framework as a fait accompli, we feel it is important to examine 
criticisms, and where possible to formulate some response to them.  
 
 
3.1 Criticism of the rational utility-maximising framework 
 
Criticism is often directed at the whole framework of the rational utility-
maximising agent postulated in the neoclassical labour supply model (see, for 
example, [reference from intro to Backhouse (ed) New Directions in Economic 
Methodology, 1997]. Many observers from outside the economics profession 
(and indeed some from within the profession) are sceptical of the kind of 
intertemporal models which require individuals to maximise expected utility 
over an extremely long time horizon – 50 to 60 years into the future in the 
case of someone starting out in the labour market. In some cases this hostility 
to the utility-maximisation framework is based on a misapprehension. Most 
economists are very careful not to claim that people actually go round with 
‘utility generators’ in their heads. The utility function should be seen as a 
mathematical representation of the process of deciding whether to work or not 
and for what number of hours. In its most abstract theoretical form, economic 
theory does not prescribe what variables should enter the individual’s utility 
function. Whilst it is true that much of the economic labour supply literature 
starts with the assumption that individuals are self-interested, like leisure and 
do not like work, and prefer more income to less, in principle it would certainly 
be possible to formulate models in which individuals, for example, derived 
positive utility from work over a certain number of hours, whilst still being 
rational utility maximisers. We have seen above, for example, that labour 
supply functions for individuals in couples often take account of altruism 
between husband and wife. The framework is also capable of taking account 
of the limitations of human beings as decision makers. Rationality may be 
‘bounded’, and individual decisions may be made under deeply uncertain 
conditions. Thus a rejection of the entire utility-maximising framework as 
‘wrong’ seems too harsh, as the framework in itself is extremely flexible. 
Rather, critics are often objecting to a specific usage of the framework (e.g. a 
particular feature of the models we have been looking at in this chapter). We 
examine more specific criticisms below.  
 
 
3.2 Criticism of the way people are assumed to choose from 
the budget constraint 
 
The budget constraint is normally represented as a well-determined and 
unique, if complex, function for each individual which is fully known to the  
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individual. In other words the standard theory assumes that individuals looking 
to enter work know exactly what the net return to working a certain number of 
hours will be. A study by England et al. (1996) criticised this assumption on 
the grounds that interviews with people actually looking to enter work revealed 
that in many cases they did not even know what benefits they would be 
entitled to, let alone what the net gain from those benefits would be. If these 
findings are correct then one could argue they present a major problem for the 
economist’s view of the budget constraint. On the other hand, it may be the 
case that people ‘learn by doing’, i.e. if they are entering work for the first time 
or are re-entering the labour market after a long break then they may be 
initially unaware of what the net gain to work for them may be, or of what 
benefits they are entitled to. However, once they are in work and can see 
what their net gain is, they will presumably be able to make an informed 
choice about whether to stay in work or not. Thus while the economist’s model 
of the budget constraint under perfect information may not be applicable in the 
short run, it should be applicable in long-run equilibrium once the individual 
has acquired the necessary information. Also, whilst it is true that we do 
observe individuals who do not take up benefits they are entitiled to even in 
the long run, there are economic models which have been postulated to 
account for this, focusing on the stigma attached to benign on benefits, or the 
‘hassle factor’ involved in claiming (see for example Besley and Coate (1992), 
Fry and Stark (1992), and Bingley and Walker (1997)). And if benefits are not 
taken up, the budget constraint can be altered to account for this.  
 
A related criticism is that the budget constraint which economists use to 
evaluate people’s labour supply decisions misses out on too many factors 
which affect the ‘real’ return to work to be informative. Some costs and 
benefits which potentially affect the return to work are tangible but hard to 
measure, e.g. fixed costs of work due to travel, clothes or equipment, 
payments in kind and ‘perks of the job’, bonus payments, and so on. Some 
are intangible, e.g. on the positive side the gain in self-esteem from being in 
work, the access to social networks from being in touch with the workplace, 
and benefits from a comfortable working environment; and on the negative 
side, work-related stresses, the risk of industrial accidents, and poor working 
conditions. Certainly many of these are hard, perhaps impossible to measure. 
But fortunately, we are able to estimate econometric models which can allow 
for the presence of certain intangible costs in the estimation process (see 




3.3 Equilibrium and the market-clearing assumption 
 
One characteristic of the standard labour supply model is that it is rooted 
firmly in the notion of the labour market being in equilbrium (in the sense of 
the system being ‘at rest’ and not liable to change unless something external 
changes). In the static model of choice on the budget constraint at one point in 
time this is obviously the case. In an intertemporal setting, where the 
individual chooses an optimal path of consumption and labour supply over the  
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life cycle, this can certainly change over time but does so in a way that is fully 
planned from the start. If further ‘shocks’ to the economy occur then the 
individual’s plans may be altered, but the alteration to the new equilibrium is 
assumed to occur instantaneously and without a period of disequilibrium in 
between. Part of the reason for the focus on equilibrium models in the labour 
supply literature is probably that equilibrium is a much easier state of the 
world to describe than disequilibrium. By its very nature, disequilibrium is a 
process which is likely to be unstable and in flux, and by definiton, the set of 
restrictions which can be relied on to hold in equilbrium in order to generate a 
tractable theoretical model will not hold in disequilibrium. Nonetheless, or view 
as economists of phenomena such as unemployment is likely to differ very 
much according to whether we think they are an equilibrium or a 
disequilibrium phenomenon. There are a number of different responses to the 
criticism that standard labour supply is overly concerned with equilbrium. One 
is to assert that the labour market as a whole is always in equilibrium because 
if it were not then forces would come into motion which would restore 
equilibrium (for example, by changing the market wage). However, this seems 
to ignore the fact that in certain markets (for example the labour market) 
speeds of adjustment may be slow (because of there being imperfect 
information, or wages being set according to long-term contracts which do not 
instantly adjust to clear the spot market, for example). Clearly if markets do 
not adjust instantaneously then some way of characterising a labour market 
which is moving towards equilibrium, but not necessarily there yet, may be 
needed. This is part of the justificiation of our focus on models which explore 
the dynamics of the decision to move into work and separations from work 
(such as the search/matching framework shown in chapter 2). We woud argue 
that models which explicitly incorporate the dynamics of labour market 
transitions can account for a system which is not in equilibrium at each and 
every time in a way which the traditional static analysis may find difficult.  
 
 
3.4 Criticism of the idea that there is a free choice of whether 
to work or not, or the hours of work one works 
 
A criticism of standard theory often heard in the macroeconomic literature in 
particular is that it relies too heavily on the assumption that the labour market 
‘clears’. Here we take market clearing as the assumption that there is no 
‘involuntary unemployment’ in the sense that there are no unemployed 
individuals who would like to work but cannot secure a job at the ‘prevailing 
real wage’. The concept of involuntary unemployment is notoriously difficult to 
pin down, because it can always be argued that someone who cannot secure 
a job at a given wage level should nonetheless be able to secure work at a 
lower wage; some economists would argue that for this reason all 
unemployment can be viewed as voluntary.
19 However, constraints on 
                                              
19 In addition, the macroeconomic literature on voluntary versus involuntary unemployment has tended 
to suffer from the gross oversimplification of assuming that workers in the economy are paid at a uniform  
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available jobs can be crudely modelled in the static framework by setting the 
wage to zero. Also, as we will see in chapter 2, search theory explicitly 
describes a situation where individuals are involuntarily unemployed in the 
sense that they are actively seeking work and (given a certain wage) would 
rather be in work than unemployed. So we would argue that the validity of the 
mechanics of the labour supply model does not hinge on labour market 
clearing per se.  
 
Some researchers, whilst accepting that there may be a free choice between 
working and not working, have questioned the assumptions of the standard 
model over choice of hours. Whilst the distribution of hours worked for women 
is very wide in empirical data, the vast majority of men appear to work full-time 
(defined as 35 hours or more a week) – there are very few part-time male 
workers. Of course, in itself this fact does not prove that men face constraints 
on their hours choices. It may just be that men overwhelmingly prefer to work 
full-time or not at all. However, if constraints do exist (as, for example, Stewart 
and Swaffield (1997) suggest) then they can be incorporated in the model by 
replacing the continuous choice of hours on the budget constraint with a 
series of discrete points at the available hours levels. This dovetails neatly 
with the discrete-choice approach to structural labour supply estimation of van 
Soest (1995) and others, shown in section 1.3. 
 
 
3.5 Problems specific to family labour supply 
 
Apart from all the above there are some additional features of the structural 
model specific to the family labour supply estimation. In the discussion of the 
“unitary” model we already mentioned the consequences of assuming a single 
utility function for the couple. This is equivalent to treating family income from 
all sources as having the same effect on the labour supply of either of the 
partners. The model suggests that “who gets what” is irrelevant for decisions 
of allocation of spending and leisure. It neglects the within-household 
distribution of resources and makes the discussion of “wallet-to-purse” 
redistribution irrelevant. On the other hand at its current stage of development 
the “sharing rule” interpretation of the “collective model” includes features 
which might also seem very simplistic. Because it assumes “exclusiveness” of 
leisure and consumption the model rejects any possibility of extra utility as a 
result of spending time or consuming together. The assumption also implies, 
for example, that time spent on household production by one member of the 
couple has no direct effect on the utility of the other person.  
 
The additional difficulty of modelling couples’ behaviour is that it is hard to 
account for the dynamics of the decision making process. There are two 
dynamic issues one would wish to include in the model. First of all decisions 
concerning issues such as separation or divorce and decisions regarding 
having children, which undoubtedly influence labour market choices. Neither 
                                                                                                                                   
real wage level; whereas in fact there is a huge range of wage levels, even conditional on all observable 
factors (see Gosling, Machin and Meghir, 1999).   
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the “unitary” nor the “sharing-rule collective” model account for these issues. 
Secondly as in the case of modelling choices of individuals we would want to 
account for allocation of leisure and consumption over time, and therefore 
address the questions of saving and use of assets.  
 
All methods of accounting for allocation of leisure and consumption over time 
which we discussed in section 1.1 apply to the “unitary” model, since we 
model the family as if it were a single individual. This no longer applies for the 
“collective” set up, including the “sharing rule” interpretation of it. To account 
for accumulation and depletion of assets of couples in the “collective” model 
we would have to include the process of “sharing” of these assets over time. 
Questions as to who saves and who has access to assets become extremely 
important and there is no information to address such issues in the data. The 
collective model, in its current form at least, is therefore limited to modelling of 
“myopic” couples, or has to assume extreme limitations on allocation of 





Part 2  The dynamics of the labour market 
 
The theory of labour supply in a static setting outlined in Part 1 continues to 
be developed as a means of explaining participation and hours of work 
choices amongst the working age population, and is very useful in a number 
of contexts. But of course, individuals do not make a once-and-for-all choice 
whether to work or not; statistics for the UK and other industrialised countries 
show that large numbers of men and women move into and out of jobs every 
month. For example, according to ONS statistics, in October to December 
2000 there were around 15.2 million men aged 16 to 64, and around 12 
million women aged 16 to 59, in work. An estimate from Labour Force Survey 
data for the same period shows that around 1.7% of men and 2.3% of working 
age women left jobs and moved into unemployment or a state of non-
participation in these three months. This means that approximately 260,000 
men and 280,000 women left employment in autumn 2000. A similar exercise 
for transitions from unemployment shows that of a stock of 940,000 ILO 
unemployed men and 600,000 unemployed women in autumn 2000, about 
230,000 men and about 180,000 women moved into work by January 2001. 
There were also transitions of around 140,000 men and around 190,000 
women into work from inactivity. Clearly, the aggregate employment and 
unemployment levels used for policy analysis by many commentators in the 
media and elsewhere do not reveal the full extent of the transitions into and 
out of work which go on in the labour market.  
 
Any sensible theory of the operation of the UK labour market has to take into 
account the dynamic nature of the market. Whereas naïve interpretations of 
the static model might lead us to believe that the working age population is 
split between relatively static ‘blocks’ of employees and non-participants, with 
movement occurring only at the margins, in fact every year sees a huge 
amount of transitions into work, out of work, from non-work seeker to work 
seeker, and movements between jobs. The UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
provides the best source of data on short-term movements within and 




Gregg and Wadsworth (1999) use data from the LFS to describe the flows into 
and out of employment, unemployment and inactivity. They find that between 
1992 and 1998, the percentage of economically inactive working age people 
entering employment in a three month period was fairly constant at around 5 
percent. Over the same period outflows from unemployment (i.e. defined by 
the ILO as not in work but actively seeking and available to start work) 
                                              
20 The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) provides information over a number of years for each 
individual in the survey, whereas the LFS only runs on each survey member for 15 months. But the 
BHPS has a much smaller sample size. The New Earnings Survey (NES) provides annual panel data for 
a 1% sample of employees who pay National Insurance contributions, but it contains very little auxiliary 
information on participants to use for analysis.   
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increased from 9.8 percent to 14.5 percent. Total outflows from employment 
reduced from 3 percent to 2.6 percent over the period. 
 
Of course it is impossible to tell directly from these figures what the changes 
in the stock  of employment, unemployment and inactivity were over the 
1990s. A very small percentage increase in outflows to work from inactivity 
could result in a large increase in employment if the stock of inactive people 
was very large. In fact, we know from aggregate statistics that the year 
average employment rate increased from 70.4% of working age population to 
74.6% between 1993 and 2000, while unemployment fell from 10.7% to 5.7% 
and inactivity fell slightly from 21.2% to 20.9% over the same period.  
 
The theory of intertemporal optimisation introduced in chapters 1 and 2 
provides a dynamic element in the static theory of labour supply. In 
intertemporal labour supply models (for example, MacCurdy, 1983), 
individuals move in and out of work in response either to pre-planned ‘lifetime 
participation profiles’ designed to maximise discounted lifetime utility, or to 
shifts in those profiles caused by unforeseen changes in the wage distribution 
and other features of the labour market. However, in this chapter, we will take 
the dynamics as the starting point of the theory rather than as its final 
development. Introducing transitions and dynamics into the model leads to a 
whole new set of theoretical and empirical issues and problems which we will 
also be discussing in detail here.  
 
Part 2 of Report 1 begins with Chapter 4, which looks at different theories of 
the processes by which workers move in and out of jobs, and the related 
question of how and why wages change over time within and across jobs. We 
cover a number of different areas, including the human capital model of wage 
determination, search and matching models of the labour market, deferred 
compensation theories, and macroeconomic models of job creation and 
destruction. Chapter 5 covers the empirical evidence on wage and work 
dynamics, looking at wage mobility over time, the returns to experience and 
tenure, comparisons between entry wages, exit wages and overall wages, the 
penalty to labour market displacement, and patterns of labour turnover. 
Finally, Chapter 6 considers the empirical estimation of labour market models 
in a dynamic context, covering hazard or transition models, structural models 
of labour market search, general equilibrium search/matching models, life 
cycle models of the choice between work, schooling and other activities, and 





Chapter 4. Theories of labour market dynamics: work 
transitions and wage progression  
 
A simple static theoretical perspective views individuals as choosing whether 
to work or not at a given wage. If the labour market is perfectly competitive the 
wage will be equal to their ‘marginal revenue product’, i.e. the value of what 
they contribute to the productive process. We will say more about the 
importance of the competition assumption later but for the moment, let us 
assume that the market is competitive. In this case, if each individual entering 
work were paid a fixed wage which did not vary (in real terms) over the course 
of his or her working life, the static model would be completely adequate for 
capturing labour market dynamics.  
 
However, there is a good deal of evidence which indicates that individual 
wages do change. For example, in the UK Gosling, Johnson, McCrae and 
Paull (1997) report that for a sample of working-age men in the British 
Household Panel study between 1991 and 1994, whilst 35% were paid a 1994 
hourly wage that was within 10% of the 1991 figure, 29% had a wage increase 
of more than 20% over the period, whilst 12% saw a decrease of more than 
20%. For women the figures were roughly comparable although 33% saw 20-
percent-plus wage increases. Wage growth was significantly more likely for 
younger workers and for the relatively highly educated, conditional on other 
factors.  
 
The fact that wages can change on the job, and when moving between jobs, 
means that labour supply may depend not just on the immediate wage which 
an individual can earn on entering work, but on his/her expectation of future 
wage changes. This can lead to instances of observed behaviour which are 
extremely difficult to rationalise in the static model, but make sense when 
dynamics are taken into account. For example, suppose that someone takes a 
job at a wage which is so low that his in-work income is lower than his out of 
work income. In the static theory this could only be a rational decision if the 
job conveyed certain benefits (e.g. benefits-in-kind, psychological benefits 
such as increased self esteem etc.) which were enough to more than 
compensate for the loss of income from working. But if wages increase over 
time in a job, and the individual is forward-looking, this is no longer the case. If 
an individual takes a job where the present value of the (net) earnings stream 
from working is greater than the present value of remaining unemployed, then 
the initial observed wage may be completely uninformative. What matters is 
the potential for growth in the individual’s wage over time. Growth could occur 
by staying with the same firm or through switching jobs after a period in the 
initial job.  
 
There are a number of different economic theories aimed at explaining some 
or all of the dynamic aspects of the labour market - why wages change within 
jobs and between jobs, why workers enter and leave jobs, and what this does  
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to the aggregate distribution of wages and patterns of labour turnover in the 
economy. We survey the contribution of each theory below. Some of these 
are complementary while some are in direct opposition to each other. As we 
shall explain below, there is at present much room for coexistence of 
opposing theories as debate is still ongoing as to whether the empirical 
evidence justifies one theory or another.  
 
 
4.1 Human capital theory 
 
4.1.1 The human capital model of wages and skills  
 
Neoclassical models of wage determination almost invariably take as their 
starting point human capital theory, stated in its canonical form by Becker 
(1964)
21. The human capital approach starts with the assumption that wages 
are equal to (or at least closely linked to) a worker’s marginal productivity, and 
that productivity is largely determined by a worker’s skill level or ‘human 
capital’ to use the technical term. Human capital can be augmented by 
investment (e.g. in schooling and/or training), and an individual decision to 
invest in human capital is modelled in a way similar to the way economists 
model a firm’s decision to invest in physical capital. However, it would be 
naïve to suppose that only  schooling and training determine the level of 
wages. The human capital approach allows for other factors such as initial 
ability, motivation, physical fitness and so forth to play a role. The pure model 
assumes a perfectly competitive labour market with no mobility costs between 
jobs and perfect information, so that any two workers with the same human 
capital level are paid the same wage. These assumptions can be relaxed (for 
example, by postulating imperfect competition) with the result that human 
capital is no longer the sole determinant of wages, although it remains an 
important determinant.  
 
In a human capital model, wage growth on the job is caused by the 
accumulation of human capital whilst in the job. Becker (1964) suggested two 
different types of human capital, with different implications for wage growth 
when switching jobs: 
 
•  General human capital: In its purest form, general human capital is 
valued equally in alternative jobs as well as in the job the employee is 
currently in. If the human capital accumulated in a job were general, we 
should expect to see offered wages in alternative jobs rise by the same 
amount as the wage in the employee’s current job.  
•  Specific human capital, valued only in the current job the employee is 
in. If the human capital accumulated in a job were completely specific 
                                              
21 We use ‘neoclassical’ in a narrow sense here to mean methodologically individualist theories 
emphasizing individual rationality in a perfectly competitive equilibrium market environment. Of course, a 
wider definition of ‘neoclassical’ might well encompass most if not all of the alternative theories we 
discuss in this survey.  
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then we should expect to see no reflection of the accumulated capital in 
outside offer wages. Ceteris paribus, this would be expected to make 
staying in the same job for a long period more attractive than switching 
jobs, relative to a situation where all human capital was general.  
 
By Becker’s own admission, the dichotomy between general and specific 
human capital is a drastic simplification. In reality, many skills acquired during 
a job may have some specific elements, but also general elements. To use a 
homegrown example, the IFS’s tax and benefit microsimulation model 
(TAXBEN) is written in Borland’s Delphi programming language. Knowledge 
of the exact routines which comprise TAXBEN constitutes specific human 
capital in that no other organisation uses those routines. But knowledge of 
Delphi is a much more general skill. Stevens (1994) introduced the concept of 
‘transferability’ of skills to characterise this continuum between fully general 
and fully specific skills. The less specific a skill is to a single firm, the more 
transferable it is.  
 
The concept of generality of skills also requires elaboration. Whilst some skills 
(e.g. word processing) may be useful to a vast number of firms throughout the 
economy, other skills may be useful only within a particular industry – for 
example, making hamburgers is probably only of use to fast food firms. In 
industries which are oligopolistic (such as aircraft construction) we have a 
case where industry-specific skills might be described as ‘general, but only 
within an oligopolistic market’; as the literature on industrial organisation 
shows, this will probably be the hardest case to analyse.  
 
To the extent that skills are specific to a firm, it should be noted at this point 
that the fact that there is only one firm in which the skill will be rewarded 
moves us away from the competitive paradigm (because the firm is effectively 
a monopoly employer of the specific skill).
22 This gives rise to a scope for 
bargaining between the firm and the worker over to returns to specific human 
capital
23. If training is necessary for human capital to be accumulated, the 
question of who funds the training then becomes important. In the case of 
general training, we would expect the worker to pay the cost, as the training is 
fully portable between firms and so a firm which paid for general training and 
attempted to recoup the cost from the worker by the paying the worker less 
would create an incentive for the worker to ‘jump ship’ to another firm. In the 
case of specific training the worker’s outside wage options do not reflect the 
increase in the inside wage, and so there is scope for bargaining between the 
firm and the worker (see, for example, Hashimoto (1981) and Stevens (1994) 
for models of the distribution of returns between firm and worker when training 
is specific).    
 
                                              
22 It can be argued that markets are fully contestable this may not be the case, as a new entrant firm 
could employ the worker in the same skill. However this is unlikely in cases such as the IFS tax benefit 
model described earlier; for copyright reasons if nothing else, it is unlikely that a competitor firm would 
duplicate the TAXBEN modules exactly.  
23 There are many examples of theoretical models of the worker-firm bargain over returns to specific 
capital in the literature. Two good examples are Hashimoto (1981) and Harris and Felli (1996).   
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4.1.2 Implications of human capital theory for wage dynamics and 
labour supply 
 
If skills are transferable and the labour market is competitive then the 
implications of human capital theory for wage dynamics are straightforward. 
Wages grow in line with marginal product and we would expect outside wage 
offers to be in line with the employee’s current wage (although this may not 
necessarily hold in a model where there is comparative advantage to working 
in different sectors, e.g. Heckman and Sedlacek (1990); or where the 
employer has paid up front for general training but is recouping costs through 
the worker). If skills are specific to the job, outside offers will probably be less 
than the current wage and one would expect this to provide an incentive 
towards longer tenure in the current job compared with the case of purely 
transferable skills. The wage may also diverge from marginal product, 
although here there are no clear-cut theoretical predictions.  
 
The main implication of human capital theory for labour supply is that it is 
insufficient merely to take into account the starting wage when doing a 
budget-constraint based analysis of the labour supply decision. If there is 
scope for wage growth on the job through investment in human capital, then 
the starting wage is likely to provide an underestimate of the incentives to 
work. For example, a person might be willing to enter a low-paid job which 
provides zero or negative returns to work in the short run if they anticipate 
wage growth in the medium to long term.  
 
However, the human capital model on its own does not seem to provide a 
complete picture of the dynamic operation of the labour market unless it is 
augmented in some way. As explained so far, it fails to account for why we 
see downward changes in wages over time for some workers in the same job. 
This could be due to depreciation of existing human capital, changes in the 
returns to human capital or a divergence of wage from marginal product under 
imperfect competition (‘exploitation’) but most literature on estimation of 
human capital earnings functions does not consider these factors in any great 
detail. Nonetheless, wage movements in both directions exist in the data, and 
need to be accounted for. In the next section we look at an approach which 
considers labour market dynamics more explicitly.  
 
4.2 The search/matching approach 
4.2.1 The basic search model 
 
A class of models, which we label here the ‘search-matching approach’, 
departs from  the perfectly competitive paradigm which was used for early 
expositions of human capital theory. The key assumption which is dropped in 
the search model is that of costless information. In a search model an 
employee does not have immediate and costless access to the entire job offer  
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distribution. Instead, in the most basic search model, the environment for a 
jobseeker is characterised by the following: 
24 
 
1. the worker seeks to maximise expected present value of income, 
discounted to the present over an infinite horizon at rate r . 
 
2.  Whilst unemployed, the income flow net of any search costs is b  and it 
is constant over the duration of a given spell. 
 
3.  Offers are received while unemployed according to a Poisson process 
with parameter δ  (the arrival rate of offers). The probability of receiving 
at least one offer within a (short) time interval h is  ) (h o h+ δ , where 
) (h o is the probability of receiving more than one offer in the interval 
and  0 / ) ( → h h o  as  0 → h .In some models δ  is viewed as the ‘offer 
rate’, determined by employers, in other models as ‘search intensity’ 
determined by the jobseeker, or as a combination of the two. 
 
4.  A job offer is summarised by an entry wage rate w and a wage profile 
) (τ τ g w = where τ  is job tenure. In the simplest case  w w = τ  for all τ. 
 
5. Successive job offers received over the course of a spell of 
unemployment are independent realisations from a known wage offer 
distribution with finite mean and variance, cumulative distribution 
function  ) (w F  and density  ) (w f . 
 
6.  Once rejected, an offer cannot be recalled. 
 
7. When accepted, a job lasts until retirement, or until a layoff, where 
layoffs follow a Poisson process with separation rate φ .  
 
Most of assumptions 1 through 7 can be relaxed at the cost of greater 
computational complexity in empirical modelling. We will explain the effect of 
relaxing some of the assumptions in what follows below. The key divergences 
from the perfectly competitive costless information model are: 
 
•  Job offers do not occur instantaneously but only after a period of search. 
 
•  Job offers are not all the same for a person of given characteristics.  
 
This means in turn, that we would expect to see a certain amount of search 
(‘frictional’) unemployment in labour market equilibrium. 
 
The worker’s decision whether to accept a job or continue searching depends 
on an optimal stopping strategy, which maximises the expected value of the 
accepted job net of search costs. In the simplest continuous-time case, the 
                                              
24 The following framework is based on section 2 of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and chapter 2 of 
Devine and Kiefer (1991), both of which are excellent surveys of the field. It also incorporates recent 
advances in the literature detailed in van den Berg (1999).  
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instantaneous probability that a job offer will arrive at time t is denoted by the 
hazard function  ) (t λ . The associated survival function of the waiting time 
distribution (the probability that an offer will not arrive before time T ) is 
denoted by  ∫ − dt t
T
e
) ( 0 λ
 . The value of search at time t, 
u
t V , can be formulated as 
a  Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957): 
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where r  is the individual’s discount rate, b  is income flow received contingent 
on unemployment less any cost of searching for a job, and a represents the 
cost of search. The optimal strategy involves comparing the current offered 
wage 
t w   with the value of continued search 
u
T V  at timeT , when an offer 
arrives. If the former exceeds the latter then the search process stops. Thus 
r u
T w V = , the reservation wage (the smallest wage at which the searcher will 
move into employment) in this model. 
 
The path of the value of search over time depends on the distribution 
assumed for  ) (t λ . If  ) (t λ  is assumed constant, the waiting time distribution is 
exponential and the value of search is stationary, solving the equation 
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where  λ  is the Poisson offer arrival rate. If  ) (t λ varies with time the value of 
search will be non-stationary, and a differential equation can be obtained 
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Models derived from (2.3) can be empirically tested using data on 
unemployment spells and entry wages; we go into this in more detail in 
Chapter 6. Some predictions from the simple model are that: 
 
a)  The reservation wage increases if benefit income increases. 
 
b) The reservation wage decreases if the discount rate r  increases (because 
the value of continuing search goes down).  
 
c) The reservation wage increases if the rate of offers λ  increases (because 




It is useful to compare these predictions with those of the static labour supply 
model featured in Chapters 1 and 2. Taking (a) first, an increase in (out-of-
work) benefit income corresponds to a shift upwards on the vertical axis of the 
budget constraint. If the benefit is withdrawn when in work (as this basic 
search model assumes), individuals are unambiguously less likely to work. 
The static single-period model occurs in instantaneous time, and so tells us 
nothing regarding (b). Life-cycle optimisation models have a role for the 
discount rate r  but the impact of an increase in the discount rate is not 
straightforward in most models. As for the effect of the offer rate in (c), the 
static model normally assumes an infinite offer rate (or, at least, a certain offer 
in the instantaneous time period) at a given wage. So even this simple search 
model introduces concepts which are glossed over or simply not mentioned in 
the basic static model. As we show below, this process continues as we make 
the model more complex.  
 
4.2.2 Extending the basic search framework 
 
The search model described in detail above is merely a starting point for most 
current empirical work. In particular, many of the assumptions have been 
relaxed as follows: 
 
Varying the discount rate 
 
The discount rate r  can vary over time or across individuals as a function of 
other observable characteristics of the jobseeker. This complicates the 
equations (2.2) and (2.3) shown above but the model is still empirically 
tractable.  
 
Variance in benefit levels over time 
In many benefit systems the benefit level b  is not constant over time. For 
example, in the UK, contributory job-seekers allowance (C-JSA) lasts for only 
six months from the date of first claim, after which a jobseeker would suffer a 
drop in net income in most cases as he or she moved onto non-contributory 
JSA (if eligible). b   can be treated as time varying at the cost of a slight 
increase in computational complexity (see for example van den Berg, 1990).  
 
Variance in offer rates 
One might expect the offer rate to vary, either for reasons external to the 
individual jobseeker (e.g. macroeconomic variation) or reasons to do with 
changes in the jobseeker’s own characteristics (e.g. skill depreciation during 
extended periods of unemployment). This can be incorporated by making the 
parameter of the Poisson arrival process a function of time or other 
observable characteristics, which again increases computational complexity in 
estimating search models. Van Den Berg (1990) and Garcia-Perez (1998) 




Allowing for wage progression 
The function  τ w   can be amended to include possible wage growth after 
entering the job, resulting from returns to tenure and/or experience from 
human capital or some other model of the labour market. Later in this chapter 
we examine models which incorporate search with wage progression (e.g. 
Keane and Wolpin, 1997). 
 
 
Incorporating multiple transitions 
The basic search model considered above is merely a starting point for an 
analysis of labour market dynamics as it only deals with a single transition per 
worker, and in one direction – out-of-work to in-work – at that. The model has 
been extended in a number of directions to deal with multiple transitions and 
multiple states. We give more details on how these models work later in this 
chapter in section 6..1, when we look at the specifications of ‘hazard’ or 
transition models. The main types of models arising from these extensions 
are:  
 
i.  Repeated search models. In this class of models, the economic 
agent is allowed to search further for better jobs after a job has 
been found. The most straightforward implementation of this model 
is the on-the-job  search model (Mortensen, 1986; Arellano and 
Meghir, 1991) where workers in a job maximise the present value of 
search as given by the Bellman equation 
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where  c w  refers to the worker’s current wage and  o w is the offer 
wage . In this simple model the optimal strategy is that one accepts 
a job only if the offered wage exceeds the current wage. As it 
stands the offer rate and search costs are identical for workers 
compared with the unemployed, but the model can be easily altered 
to allow for differential search costs and offer rates for people in 
each labour market state.  
 
ii. competing-risks  models.  In these models there is a possibility of 
exit to more than one state for people starting off in a given state at 
time  0 = t . A natural extension of the search model to more than 
two final states would be to consider becoming inactive as another 
possible final state. Thus, an unemployed work seeker who fails to 
find work in a given period can carry on searching in the next 
period, or can give up. This might be reasonable as a model of the 
decision to take early retirement, or of job search amongst women 
deciding whether to return to the labour force after having children. 
As this model is only partially a search model we do not discuss it 




iii.  Successive durations models. These models consider events 
occurring after the initial transition which might return the employee 
to his or her initial unemployed state, or to some other state (such 
as inactivity or full-time education). Obviously, to generate a 
situation where employees are returned to unemployment, there 
has to be some ‘job-termination’ process going on in the model 
(either something causing the worker to quit, or the firm to lay the 
worker off). We say more about possible job termination processes 
below. Successive durations models are of varying complexity. At 
the simpler end there are models such as Mealli and Pudney (1996) 
and Ham and Rea (1987) which look at multiple transitions between 
unemployment and employment. The most complex approach 
currently taken is that of papers such as Keane and Wolpin (1997) 
who model multiple labour market transitions as the outcome of far-
sighted and dynamically optimising individuals in a life cycle 
framework. This approach draws in concepts from the intertemporal 
labour supply literature studied in Chapter 1 and we discuss it in 
detail in Section 6.4 below. Of course, the greater the number of 
transitions covered in an empirical model, the more stringent are the 
data requirements for that model to be estimable. Thus many 
researchers are unable to exploit successive-duration modelling to 
its full extent because the data will not support it in each individual 
case. We return to this later in this chapter when we look at different 
types of empirical models.  
 
4.2.3 Two-sided search: matching firms and workers 
 
The basic search model gives a characterisation of how workers respond to 
job offers. Matching models, first developed in the 1980s, extend this 
framework to include search by employers on the demand side of the labour 
market. An analogue of equation (2.2) can be derived for the expected value 














      (2.5) 
 
where 
Π V represents the value to the firm of holding a vacancy open, c is the 
cost of recruiting a worker to fill a vacancy, η is the frequency with which an 
employer encounters workers seeking employment,  J  is the value of filling 
the job (i.e. productivity), and G  represents the cumulative distribution of  J  
over the workforce. Once again r  is the discount rate.  
 
  In matching models, a successful match commands quasi-rents ex post 
because it is costly in time and resources for either the firm or the worker to 
seek another match. The implication of this is that the ‘market wage’ is not 
unique and therefore some mechanism needs to be specified for the division 
of the gains from the match between worker and firm. To satisfy individual  
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rationality, the share of the quasi-rents distributed to each partner must be at 
least as large as the forgone option of continued search. 
 
 In search equilibrium models, a matching function  ) , ( v u M  is specified which 
relates the aggregate rate at which new matches are formed to the number of 
unemployed workers u  and the number of vacancies v. A full definition of 
search equilibrium specifies the measures of search participants u  and v as 
well as 
u V and 
Π V . Much of the literature assumes a constant supply of 
(potential) workers with an unlimited number of (potential) vacancies. This 
seems to ignore any general equilibrium considerations, in that in a general 
equilibrium framework, we might expect feedback from changes in labour 
supply and demand to the overall distribution of wages (as modelled by, e.g., 
Creedy and Duncan, 2001). On a deeper philosophical level, the 
search/matching model itself means that the coherency of a single ‘aggregate 
labour supply schedule’ (or indeed a labour demand schedule) is called into 
question. We examine attempts to incorporate general equilibrium effects into 
empirical search matching models in Section 6.3 below.  
 
4.2.4 Exits from employment in the matching model 
 
Obviously, unless job matches are terminated at some point, then with 
positive inflows into work unemployment would decrease to zero in long-run 
equilibrium. Pissarides (1990) examines an ‘equilibrium unemployment’ model 
where on the job creation side,  ) , ( v u m  is increasing, concave and 
homogenous of degree 1. All jobs have the same productivity. Employer and 
worker negotiate a wage by generalised Nash bargaining when they meet and 
subsequently produce until an idiosyncratic shock destroys the job match. 
Thus job destruction in this case is assumed completely exogenous. The 
model generates a negative relationship between vacancies and 
unemployment, known as the ‘Beveridge curve’. As firms are behaving as 
competitive profit-maximisers, aggregate employment is determined by the 
condition that the value of a new vacancy should be zero in equilibrium, i.e. 
there should be no unexploited rents arising from vacancy creation. It should 
be noted, however, that whilst this framework provides a means of allowing for 
exits from employment, it doesn’t really explain those exits as the process is 
treated as completely exogenous (a situation analogous to the treatment of 
the growth mechanism in growth models before the invention of endogenous 
growth theory, for example).  
 
Some basic predictions for the relationship between economic variables from 
this simple matching model are:  
 
•  Increases in benefit income increase equilibrium unemployment. The 
average wage for those in work also increases.  
 
•  Increases in the worker’s share of the quasi-rents from job matching 




•  Increases in the productivity from successful matches reduce 
unemployment and increase wages.  
 
•  An increase in the rate of job destruction reduces wages and increases 
unemployment.  
 
The model can be increased in complexity in several ways, such as 
introducing heterogeneity of workers (e.g. by differential human capital 
endowments), allowing for more complex job destruction processes (such as 
the model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where match productivity 
evolves according to a Markov process) and introducing specific rules for the 
division of the match surplus between workers and firms (e.g. bargaining 
models such as insider-outsider or efficiency wage models, or competitive 
pricing models where third-party ‘market makers’ ensure that wage is equal to 
marginal product by exploiting all opportunities for gains from trade). However 
in many of the extended models the straightforward predictions given above 
do not necessarily hold, because there are often different effects of changes 
in parameters such as out-of-work income, entry wages and wage growth on 
the job creation and job destruction rates. In general, the comparative static 
results from different theoretical models in this vein can vary widely according 
to the specific assumptions made in each model. What this shows is that 
making policy predictions from the search-matching literature taken as a 
whole can be a somewhat hit-and-miss affair. Thus in what follows we confine 
ourselves to some fairly basic predictions about what may happen to wages 
and job entry and exit in this framework.  
 
 
4.2.5 Implications of the search model for wage growth 
 
For the moment, let us assume that there is no human capital accumulation 
on the job, and that instead, the labour market is described by a 
search/matching model
25. The implication of such a model is not  that 
everyone of a certain schooling level gets the same wage ad infinitum. 
Because of the assumption of a non-degenerate offer distribution, some 
workers receive better job offers than others, despite having the same 
characteristics. The better a job match is, the higher the wage, and so the 
greater the incentive to stay in work. Even with a Poisson layoff process 
present in the model, it can be shown that the attractiveness of well-matched 
job offers generates a positive relationship between the wage and tenure in 
the job in cross-sectional data. This is due to selectivity bias – the set of jobs 
with high tenure is a selected sample of well-matched jobs. A simple 
regression of wages on tenure would find a positive relationship even if wage 
growth on the job were zero! Furthermore, if we assume that job offers can 
arrive even when a person is already in work (thus allowing ‘on the job search’ 
in the model)
26 then we would expect to see a positive relationship between 
                                              
25 This is the framework described by Manning (2001b).  
26 an assumption is often made that on-the-job search is less effective (e.g. produces fewer offers per 
time period) than off-the-job search because an unemployed individual can engage in search as a full-
time activity whereas an employed person has to search part-time. But this is not strictly necessary; for 
example, it might be easier for a working person to find contacts for new job offers.   
 
82
age and earnings purely because an older person is more likely to have 
received a well-matched job offer at some point. In this case there is a positive 
relationship between age and earnings but no growth in earnings on the job – 
wage growth is secured by changing jobs. This is the explanation of job 
changes offered by Topel and Ward (1992) among others.  
 
 
Thus the search model indicates that for an individual worker, we would 
expect to see returns to experience which are positive, but returns to tenure 
which are zero. Furthermore, the returns to experience should come from 
switching jobs (to a better matched job). We would also expect that a person 
who is laid off from a well-matched job would be likely to suffer a substantial 
pay reduction in his or next job as it is unlikely that he or she would be able to 
find another job as well-matched straight off. For a person in a badly matched 
job this kind of loss to changing jobs should not occur.  
 
 
4.2.6 Implications of the search/matching model for labour supply 
 
The fact that the search/matching class of models makes the dynamics of the 
labour market much more explicit is all well and good, but how much do these 
models tell us about labour supply responses which the models examined in 
Chapters 1 and 2 do not? The most obvious innovation is that the search 
model provides a possible explanation for unemployment in a way which the 
static labour supply model does not. Unemployment and non-participation are 
clearly behaviourally distinct states in the search/matching model, whereas in 
the analysis of chapter 1, there was no functional distinction to be made 
between them.  
 
The concept of ‘match quality’ of a job also provides a rationale for wage 
dispersion amongst observationally identical workers in jobs; if correct it 
suggests that the focus of the static model on a fixed wage w for each worker 
may be misplaced. Instead workers are offered a wage from a distribution 
) | ( X w f , where  X  are observable characteristics. Changes in match 
productivity over time may also be able to account for why workers exit jobs 
and move back to unemployment. Later on we will examine the reasons for 
job exit more closely. 
 
Recent work by Alan Manning (2001a, 2003) has argued that the implications 
of search theory for labour supply are more fundamental than anything we 
have alluded to so far, and indeed that they may make some of the standard 
results of static labour supply models invalid. Manning notes firstly that ‘there 
is a curious dichotomy in which analysis of unemployment insurance generally 
uses a search framework while analysis of tax changes uses a labour supply 
framework even though both sets of papers are about the impact of changing 
incentives to work’. He analyses a case where individuals have no flexibility in 
choosing hours levels within a job, so in effect, the choice is a dichotomous 
one between working at the designated hours point or not working at all. 
Within this framework he analyses the impact of a change in marginal and 




In the standard framework as outlined in chapter 1, in a single-period analysis 
an increase in the average tax rate leaving marginal rates unchanged, through 
(for example) a poll tax, can only induce an individual who was previously not 
working to start working; nobody who is already working will become inactive 
if the utility function is increasing in both consumption and leisure.  In the 
Manning framework whether this holds depends on the effectiveness of off-
the-job search compared with on-the-job search. If both are equally effective, 
or off-the-job search is more effective, then the standard result (or something 
close to it) holds. However, if on-the-job search is more effective, and workers 
are risk-averse, it is possible that an increase in average tax rates can 
increase  the probability of employment. This is because the extra 
effectiveness of on-the-job search increases the attractiveness of working 
relative to not working even though the financial returns to work have 
decreased.  The Manning (2001a) paper also analyses the impact of a change 
in marginal rates although here it is difficult to draw a straight comparison with 
the standard model as, because of the fact that there is a distribution of offer 
wages ) (w F  rather than a single market wage for each individual, there is no 
single in-work income level to which a currently non-working individual can be 
assigned. His results are that an increase in marginal rates in the standard 
model holding total tax revenue constant (i.e. increasing marginal rates but 
reducing average tax rates, perhaps through a lump sum subsidy) has an 
ambiguous effect on labour supply in the standard model but unambiguously 
increases incentives to work in the search model.  
 
Although Manning discusses a very specific class of model (where hours are 
completely fixed within a job) which is probably unrealistic, the standard 
neoclassical model where hours are perfectly flexible is also probably 
unrealistic and so his model can be viewed as an attempt to test the sensitivity 
of the standard model outlined in Chapter 1 to varying the assumptions 
slightly. His results seem to suggest that if assumptions over flexibility of 
hours choices do not hold then some of the predictions of the standard (static) 
labour supply model do not go through. This suggests that there may be 
serious problems in relying on the assumptions of simple labour supply 




4.3 Deferred compensation models 
 
4.3.1 The Lazear model 
 
Another type of theory which predicts a rising wage profile over time within the 
job is the ‘deferred compensation’ model, exemplified by Lazear (1981). This 
model departs from the perfectly competitive paradigm in that the worker’s 
wage diverges from his or her marginal productivity for much of his or her 
employment duration, although in the Lazear version, the sum of lifetime  
wages is still equal to the sum of productivity over the duration of the job.  In  
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the simplest version of the model, the worker’s marginal product is constant 
over the duration of the job, as in the search/matching models described 
earlier. However, the firm faces a principal-agent problem in inducing the 
worker not to ‘shirk’ because it is assumed that monitoring the worker’s 
activity so that the worker puts in the required effort is a costly process.  The 
optimal solution is for the firm to ‘backload’ wage payments towards later in 
the worker’s career. In the early part of the worker’s tenure with the firm, 
he/she is paid less than marginal product; later on, wages rise above marginal 
product. The promise of higher wages later on in the duration of the job is an 
incentive mechanism to encourage greater effort earlier in the job than would 
be the case if the wage tracked marginal productivity throughout the duration 
of the job.  
 
The Lazear model assumes that the labour market is competitive, which 
raises the question of how the firms are able to offer a wage less than 
marginal product to workers early on in the job – why do the workers not move 
to other firms paying them the value of marginal product? Lazear’s view is 
that, because the deferred compensation contract is the profit-maximising 
solution to the problem of imperfect monitoring, only firms which offer deferred 
compensation contracts will be able to survive in equilibrium.
27 Other writers 
have taken more of an ‘internal labour market’ view of the wage-tenure 
relationship along the lines of Doeringer and Piore (1971). In these closely 
related models, firms are able to offer wages which diverge from marginal 
product because of imperfect competition in the labour market – in particular, 
the cost to the worker of moving from job to job.  
 
4.3.2 Deferred compensation, the returns to tenure and experience 
and labour supply 
 
In the pure deferred compensation model, we would expect positive returns to 
job tenure, but no returns to experience. People leaving jobs unexpectedly in 
the latter phase of their tenure with the company, when wage is above 
marginal product (e.g. being laid off, or fired due to shirking) would expect to 
see a reduction in wages on return to work. The model as it stands is rather 
incomplete, as it does not specify what the wage structure should be when 
returning to work after being laid off from a previous job. The analysis tends to 
be couched in terms of a ‘job for life’ and so has little to say regarding job to 
job moves. It is thus unlikely to be appropriate for workers who expect to 
move from job to job during their working life. Nonetheless the deferred 
compensation model is often offered as a possible explanation of returns to 
tenure in ‘stable’ employment, (e.g. in the professions, or many public sector 
jobs). If the model is correct, the implcations for labour supply modelling would 
appear to be: 
 
•  as with human capital theory, we can expect to see wage growth on the 
job, although for different reasons. Thus, it may be worthwhile for a rational 
farsighted individual to take a job which offers zero or even negative net 
                                              
27 An apparently unaddressed issue is what happens to workers who get laid off unexpectedly (e.g. due 
to firm level negative demand shocks). A layoff would appear to generate large costs for the employee 
as on resuming work, he or she would lose any payoff to seniority accumulated in the previous job.   
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gain to work in the short run, because wages are likely to rise later in the 
job. 
•  in the later phases of the worker’s tenure with a single employer, wage 
levels are likely to outstrip outside offers because of the backloading of 
pay over the contract period. Thus the model makes voluntary separations 
less likely than a human capital model where the spot wage is equalised 
with marginal product and skills are transferable. (If skills are specific to 
the firm then the implications of both models are similar).  
 
 
4.4 Summary: the implications of different wage growth 
models for returns to tenure and experience 
 
The following table summarises the discussion above by showing what   
different theories of the evolution of wages within and across jobs would 
predict for the returns to tenure and experience, as well as for whether there is 









      
Human capital (general)  0  +  No 
Human capital (specific)  +  0  Yes 
Search/matching 0  +  Possibly 
Deferred compensation  +  0  Yes 
      
 
Table 4.1 shows that the implications of models of wage growth through 
specific  human capital and deferred compensation appear to be broadly 
similar, implying a positive return to tenure but no separate return to 
experience. On the other hand, the search/matching approach and general 
human capital models deliver the opposite result: zero returns to tenure, but 
positive returns to experience. It should be made clear however that the 
theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It is quite possible to imagine 
a world where there were returns to both general and specific human capital, 
but where wages were also affected by labour marker search and the quality 
of the employee-employer match, and where deferred compensation played a 
role in wage setting over the employee’s career. If this were the case we 






4.5 Theories of labour turnover and job separation 
 
4.5.1 Introducing job exit 
 
The search/matching theory explained above gives a lot of attention to the 
process by which people move into work, but doesn’t by itself explain why 
people move out of work, i.e. the process of job exit. Of course in an economy 
with finitely lived agents, there are bound to be at least a certain number of job 
exits due to retirement (just as there are bound to be at least a certain number 
of entries into work due to new cohorts entering the labour market). However 
in this section we are more concerned with job exits over and above this (i.e. 
prior to compulsory retirement age).  In this section we analyse theories of 
what causes job separations and how the process of job exit might interact 
with job entry. This will be important for Stage 1B of the project when we 
develop models of job entry and job exit.  
 
In some ways the analysis of transitions from work to unemployment (or 
inactivity) is more complicated than the analysis of work entry because 
whereas the decision by a formerly unemployed worker to enter work is 
presumably always a voluntary decision initiated by the worker, an exit from 
work may or may not be voluntary in the same sense. Defining a job exit as a 
move from work into non-work (unemployment or inactivity), rather than a 
move from one job to another, we can distinguish three exit scenarios, from 
the most voluntary to the least voluntary: 
 
1.  quits: a ‘quit’ occurs when an employee decides to leave his or her job 
despite having the option of continuing in the job.  
 
2.  layoffs:  a layoff occurs when the firm decides to terminate the 
employee’s contract.  
 
3.  plant closures: a closure occurs when a firm has to shut down 
completely and hence all workers in the plant (or the firm) are laid off.  
 
As we explain in Section 5.4 below, distinguishing between quits and layoffs in 
an empirical context can be very difficult. Here, we confine ourselves to a 
purely theoretical discussion.  
 
4.5.2 Economic explanations of why job separations occur 
 
Deterioration in match-specific productivity 
 
This was discussed to an extent in section 4.2.3 earlier. The simplest search-
matching model assumes that match productivity is constant within a 
particular job match. Given a constant external environment, the job continues  
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indefinitely. However, in more complex models such as Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994) match productivity can decline over time. This means that 
other match options for the firm and/or worker become more attractive and 
means that there is a positive probability of job separation. The question why 
match productivity might decline over time is not usually explicitly addressed 
by microeconomic matching models, but of course this is the really crucial 
question – particularly as declining wages in a job (i.e. negative returns to job 
tenure) seem to go against the thrust of the human capital model shown 
earlier, where workers can enhance their wages on the job by on-the-job 
learning or training. Macroeconomic models have more to say about why 





Even in the absence of changes in match-specific productivity, job separations 
can be optimal in a search model. There are two particular situations where 
we might expect to see job exit: 
 
(i)  if a person moves from one job to another job with higher wages via 
on-the-job search. This is a job-to-job move with no intervening 
period of unemployment.  
(ii)  If off-the-job search is more effective than on-the-job search a 
person might need to leave his or her current job before searching 
for a higher paid job. This is a very different scenario from that 
considered in single period static labour supply models as the initial 
return to leaving the first job is negative; it is only after finding a new 
job at higher wages that any gain is realised.  
 
If other features of the labour market change (for example, if the wage offer 
distribution is shifted due to changes in the returns to skill, or tax and benefit 
changes) then we may see job exit in a variety of scenarios. Some of these 
are considered by Manning (2001b), discussed earlier.  
 
Changes in individual attributes 
 
There are a number of situations where an individual might choose to leave 
work, either temporarily or permanently, due to a change in some aspect of 
his or her observable characteristics. Examples include: 
 
•  Ageing (e.g. retirement); 
•  Poor health; 
•  Women leaving the labour force to have children; 
•  Geographical relocation. 
 
These kind of changes are often modelled as exogenous to the individual in 
empirical work although in some cases they may be factors which the 
household has some choice over (e.g. location, or childbirth); this is mainly  
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due to the difficulties of endogenising these choices in empirical models. The 
life-cycle framework of Keane and Wolpin (1997) among others, discussed in 
Section 2.3.4, seems probably the most promising model in which to 
endogenise decisions such as whether to have children or not, and whether to 
retire, but as discussed later, at present this can only be done under strong 
assumptions about the structure of individual preferences, individual 
rationality, and the way the labour market works.  
 
 
Intertemporal substitution of labour supply 
 
The intertemporal labour supply literature, discussed to some extent in 
chapter 1, places labour supply decisions within a life-cycle context. In a world 
with perfect foresight and rational optimising agents, we would expect 
individual decisions about the trade-off between work and leisure to be made 
on a lifetime basis. Individuals would decide the percentages of their time to 
allocate to human capital investment (schooling/training), work and non-
market activities (leisure, child-rearing, etc) during their lives. We would be 
bound to see pre-planned job exits at various points during the life-cycle in 
this framework. For example, early retirement might be built into an 
individual’s lifetime labour supply ‘plan’, if he or she knew that his or her 
earnings capacity would diminish even before compulsory retirement age.  
 
To stand any change of being relevant to the real world, the intertemporal 
model needs to be amended to introduce uncertainty about productivity at 
different points in the life-cycle. Introducing uncertainty gives rise to the 
possibility that we might see unplanned exits from employment (or entry to 
employment) as the returns to work change and work becomes more or less 
worthwhile at a given time. Essentially agents update their optimal life-time 
labour supply plan in each time period as new information on wage rates 
becomes available. The possibility that unemployment in certain time periods 
might reflect such intertemporal substitution in labour supply was first 
formalised by Lucas and Rapping (1969). One of the first syntheses of the 
intertemporal model in a full life cycle setting was MaCurdy (1981, 1983). 
Recent empirical applications include Low (1999) and Keane and Wolpin 
(1997). There is a lot of debate as to how realistic this branch of the literature 
is in a real-world context, given that to be empirically tractable the models 
normally have to make sweeping assumptions (e.g. perfect competition in the 
labour market) – for a sceptical view see Card (1994). However if valid then it 
does provide an explanation for job exit at some point(s) during the life-cycle. 
 
Business cycle explanations 
 
The intertemporal labour supply literature has been influential in contemporary 
macroeconomics, particularly as a part of theories which attempt to explain 
why economies exhibit business cycles. The business cycle literature – both 
‘real’ and ‘monetary’ is vast, and a full discussion is outside the scope of this 
paper; but our main focus here is on the fact that macroeconomic business  
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cycle theories can provide an explanation for the changes in match-specific 
productivity which microeconomic matching models normally take as 
exogenous.  
 
The exact mechanism by which jobs are created and destroyed in the 
business cycle varies according to the source of economic fluctuations. In the 
real business cycle approach of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and 
Plosser (1983), fluctuations in the rate of technological change are 
‘propogated’ throughout the economy, leading to different levels of optimal 
employment in different periods in an economy with perfect foresight and far-
sighted rational agents. Andolfatto (1996) combines the real business cycle 
framework with a search model of the labour market to generate a model 
which appears to correspond better to observed data on output and 
employment correlations than do the traditional RBC models.  Other 
macroeconomic models of employment reallocation and job entry and exit 
include the ‘sectoral shift’ hypothesis of Lilien (1982) and Hosios (1994), 
where unemployment fluctuates due to the costly reallocation of labour 
between sectors, and the ‘creative destruction’ model of Caballero and 
Hammour (1994), where production units in the economy are of different 
vintages, with different productivity levels, and the timing of the gradual 
replacement of older plants by newer plants gives rise to employment 
fluctuations.  
 
The key message from these macroeconomic models for our purposes is that 
there are a number of reasons why the productivity of a job match might vary 
over time, and these provide a theoretical underpinning for the job exit 
process in matching models, and bring an extra realism into our discussion of 
labour market dynamics. In section 5.4 below we examine the empirical 
evidence on the distribution of job changes and employment fluctuations  over 
time.  
 
4.5.3 Assymetries in the treatment of work exit and work entry in 
labour market models 
 
There is an interesting dichotomy in the relationship between labour market 
transitions and the theoretical explanations for those transitions. In the case of 
work entry, this tends to be much more related to the budget constraint and to 
labour supply theory than does work exit, which is much more associated with 
labour demand theory. This has to do with the fact that it makes a lot more 
sense to treat layoffs as being initiated by the firm in the framework of labour 
demand adjustment than it does to treat them as labour supply responses. In 
the case of quits however, work incentives may still have a role to play. 
Clearly, in most circumstances quitting a job and moving into unemployment 
involves a loss of net income. The role of the benefit system here is 
sometimes overstated, as under current UK rules, former employees who 
leave their job ‘voluntarily’ are not entitled to Jobseekers Allowance or other 
out-of-work benefits for a period of six months from the quit point.
28 
Nonetheless factors such as the rate of tax on earned income affect the net 
                                              
28 This of course creates an incentive on the employee’s part for quits to be disguised as layoffs.   
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income loss associated with quitting and so one would expect changes in the 
tax system to influence the quit rate. Changes in the generosity of the tax and 
benefit system for those in work vis-à-vis those out of work also affect the net 
costs of on-the-job search versus off-the-job search and so one would expect 









Having covered the appropriate theoretical ground in chapter 4, this section 
discusses what empirical evidence there is in favour of, or against, the various 
theories of dynamics which we have examined. We begin by looking at 
evidence on the returns to experience and tenure.  
 
5.1 Evidence on the returns to experience and tenure 
 
A large amount of empirical work on the returns to experience and tenure has 
been undertaken in the last fifteen years or so. This remains a contentious 
area in which a firm consensus has not yet been reached. In this section we 
look at three recent papers in the field, each of which uses state-of-the-art 
empirical techniques, yet which achieve very different estimates of the returns 
to experience and tenure.   
 
5.1.1 Topel (1991) 
 
During the 1980s many studies reported that there were positive and 
substantial returns to experience, but that the returns to tenure were minor; for 
example Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and Shakotko (1987), and 
Marshall and Zarkin (1987). Topel uses data from the US Panel Survey of 
Income Dynamics for the period 1968 to 1983. He estimates the returns to 
tenure and experience in two stages. The first stage is a wage growth 
equation which just looks at wage growth in all jobs, not distinguishing 
between returns to experience and returns to tenure. In stage 2, the returns to 
experience are estimated by a comparison of workers who started new jobs at 
different points in their careers (and hence who have zero tenure to start off 
with, but differing levels of experience). The returns to tenure can then be 
identified as total wage growth minus the returns to experience.  
 
Topel finds that the returns to tenure are large and statistically significant – “of 
the order that one would obtain from a simple OLS regression”. The first year 
of tenure in a job gives a 5% increase in the wage on average conditional on 
other factors. Over 10 years the returns to tenure are estimated at 2.8% per 
year. Meanwhile the return to experience is estimated at around 7% per year 
on average. These results lead Topel to conclude that theories that 
emphasise the role of job-specific human capital, and/or deferred 
compensation mechanisms in wage setting, are empirically important.  
 
5.1.2 Altonji and Williams (1997) 
 
Altonji and Williams conduct a very detailed examination of the methodologies 
used in the studies by Abraham and Farber (1997), Altonji and Shakotko  
 
92
(1987) and Topel (1991), all of whom estimated returns to tenure from the US 
PSID data. They identify some issues concerning Topel’s methodology which 
may have caused him to overestimate the returns to tenure: 
 
•  Discrepancies between the wage index measure which Topel uses to 
control for aggregate wage growth in the economy and the growth in 
wages in the PSID data. 
•  Topel uses wages measured over the year prior to interview in PSID 
and tenure at interview whereas Altonji and Williams recommend using 
wages measured over the year after interview.  
•  A number of other minor discrepancies in the way Topel handles the 
data.  
 
Altonji and Williams find that after correcting for these problems, the estimate 
of the returns to tenure over a ten-year period is around 11% - larger than the 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) estimate of 7%, but below Topel’s estimate of 
28%. Positive and significant returns to experience are also found, although 
the estimation methodology means that no single percentage number can be 
quoted here. 
 
5.1.3 Dustmann and Meghir (2001) 
 
Dustmann and Meghir use data from Germany to look at the returns to 
experience and tenure. They argue that the research from the PSID suffered 
from inaccurate measurements of labour market experience and job tenure 
prior to the start of the surveys, and additionally that the data are substantially 
prone to measurement error in experience, tenure and wages. They use 
administrative data from Germany, with full labour market histories since 
leaving full time education for each individual, to address the measurement 
error problem. A first stage random coefficients wage equation is estimated, 
with the control variables including the number of periods the individual has 
worked (overall labour market experience), the time spent in the sector (sector 
tenure) and the time spent in the firm (job tenure). This methodology takes 
account of the findings of Neal (1995) that returns to time spent in a specific 
industry may be important
29.  Dustmann and Meghir criticise Topel’s method 
of identifying returns to tenure using the entire sample of workers in new jobs 
at a given wave of the panel, because this will be a mixture of workers who 
are improving on the old offer, workers fired from an ongoing firm and victims 
of plant closure. By contrast, here a sample of people made redundant due to 
the closure of their plant is used, the argument being that this represents an 
exogenous job termination and so the return to new jobs started following 
plant closure has a much cleaner interpretation.  
 
The main identification assumption of the model is that conditional on 
experience, potential experience (years since leaving full time education) and 
educational attainment, age does not affect wages for young workers. This 
                                              
29 Neal (1995) examines industry stayers and industry changers using the PSID data. He finds that 
the value of tenure before and after a dislocation is about the same, consistent with a small return 




means that age is not featured as a regressor in the wage equation. In the first 
stage, reduced form equations for overall experience and labour market 
participation are estimated. In each case the variable is regressed on age 
dummies, potential experience, the interaction of age and potential 
experience, year indicators and the education level. In the second stage, the 
wage is regressed on experience, potential experience, sector-specific tenure, 
education and the interaction of the first stage residuals with the experience 
terms. This allows estimates of the returns to experience, sector-specific 
tenure and job tenure.  
 
Dustmann and Meghir find that the returns to experience have a different 
pattern for skilled workers and unskilled workers. The returns are non-linear 
for both groups; for the unskilled, the average return is 9% to the first year of 
experience, 7% to the second year, 1% to the third year and insignificantly 
different from zero thereafter. For skilled workers the pattern is closer to 
linear, with average returns of 6% per year for the first two years and around 
4% per year thereafter. Hence there appear to be substantially greater 
benefits to experience over the medium to long term for skilled workers than 
for unskilled workers. The returns to tenure also seem to differ between 
groups; they are estimated at around 1% per year for unskilled workers – 
close to the Altonji/Williams estimate – but at around 2% per year for skilled 
workers, around midway between the Altonji/Williams and Topel results. It 
should be noted in addition that these are ‘pure’ returns to tenure after 
exogenous plant closure, whereas the results from other studies come from a 
more heterogenous set of job starts. A return to sector tenure of around 0.5 to 
1.0% per year is also found (this is not estimated as a separate component in 
the earlier studies and so would presumably be subsumed into the 
‘experience’ term).  
 
5.1.4 Myck and Paull (2001) 
 
Myck and Paull construct a grouped panel data set from 20 years of the 
Family Expenditure Survey cross-sections to generate average values of 
experience for groups of individuals born after 1961. The groups are defined 
by sex, age, year-of-birth, education and the number and age of children. 
They calculate average employment rates for the groups in the cross sections 
and then match “past” employment data with current observations on wages 
to find how labour market history influences the observed wage levels. 
Because of the grouped panel method it is impossible to distinguish between 
experience and tenure and the measured returns combine both of them. The 
“return to experience” measure they use also captures the effect of job 
matching which goes on while on the job. 
 
The authors use the artificial panel structure of the data to estimate a fixed 
effects model of the returns to labour market experience. This approach 
allows them to control for group specific unobserved characteristics which 
could influence the estimates of returns, such as ability or motivation. Ignoring 




Labour market experience is demonstrated to have an important effect on 
wages in the first six years of its accumulation. Men see their wages rise by 
over 16% in the first two years of accumulating labour market experience, and 
returns then fall to around 5-6% for the following four years. After that there is 
no statistically significant effect of experience on wages. Returns are shown to 
be lower for women in the first two years, but are still positive at 13% and 
10%.  
 
Regressions are then run separately for people in different education groups 
and returns to labour market experience are shown to be highest among the 
least educated people. There is no statistically significant effect of 
accumulating labour market experience for the highest educated groups which 
is surprising given the findings in other studies. 
 
5.1.5 Conclusions: the returns to experience and tenure 
 
The three studies we have examined in detail reach very different conclusions 
on the relative size of the returns to experience and tenure. All three studies 
find that there are significant and substantial returns to labour market 
experience, although the Dustmann-Meghir results suggest that this only 
applies to the first few years of experience for unskilled workers. Returns to 
tenure are estimated at anything between 1.1% and 2.8% per year for the 
overall sample. The Dustmann and Meghir results give ‘clean’ returns to 
tenure for new jobs started after an exogenous job separation. This has the 
benefit of being easy to interpret but on the other hand these jobs are only a 
small proportion of new jobs. Can we expect large returns to tenure in new 
jobs started in other circumstances (e.g. after a voluntary move to a new job)? 
One thing that we should also remember about the deferred compensation 
literature in particular is that it is probably not a model which is applicable to 
the whole of the economy. It is more likely to be applicable in stable industries 
where company lifetimes and job tenures are relatively long than in volatile 
industries where companies come and go, where there is substantial use of 
short-term and contract-based working. Myck and Paull show that first years 
of labour market experience are crucial in terms of increases in wages. 
However, their approach fails to distinguish between experience accumulated 
in different periods of working life. It also fails to differentiate between general 
experience and tenure. It has to be said that the magnitude of experience and 
tenure effects on wages is far from a settled matter empirically, and further 
work is needed in this area. 
 
 
5.2 Evidence on entry wages 
 
How do ‘entry wages’ compare with the overall distribution of wages in the 
economy? Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) use data from the UK Labour Force 
Survey and General Household Survey to analyse the distribution of entry 
wages compared with three other wage measures: 
 
1.  wages in all jobs  
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2.  wages in jobs newly entered from other jobs (‘job-to-job moves’) 
3.  wages in ‘continuing’ jobs (all jobs which were not entry jobs or job-to-
job moves).  
 
Using LFS data from 1997-98, Gregg and Wadsworth find that median hourly 
entry wage pay, at around £4.40 per hour, was around 65 percent of the 
median hourly wage for all jobs. This put median entry jobs at the 20
th 
percentile of the overall wage distribution. A regression of hourly wages on 
dummies for entry jobs and job-to-job movers shows that the raw hourly wage 
gap between continuing jobs and entry jobs was 41 log points. Around a 
quarter of this gap could be explained by including controls for age, education, 
gender and region. Adding current job tenure controls to the regression 
showed that the gap between entry jobs and jobs with 3-12 months’ tenure 
was around 20 log points. Adding further controls for industry, firm size and 
the public sector shrank the hourly wage gap to 15 points. This suggests that 
around 35% of the wage gap between entrants and other workers was 
unaccountable for by any observable  characteristic in the data. This 
interpretation should be viewed as suggestive only however, as the controls 
for job characteristics and tenure are potentially individual choice variables 
and hence may be endogenous to the wage. Adding dummies to the model 
for the length of time spent out of work before entering a job gives the result 
that people out of work for 7 to 12 months face an average wage gap of 27 
log points, rising to 39 points for a spell of two to three years out of work. A 
possible human capital explanation of this is that the long-term unemployed 
face a depreciation of work-related skills which leads to a wage penalty 
through lower human capital stocks on the return to work. An alternative 
explanation is that the results are picking up unobserved heterogeneity – 
individuals who spend long times of periods out of the labour market may 
simply be poorer workers to begin with, but the correlation between time out of 
work and lower wages is not causal. However this would not explain why 
wages before separation were so high. Gregg and Wadsworth argue that the 
results show that ‘simply using individual characteristics observable in the 
cross-section for both the working and non-working populations will be 
misleading.’  
 
Another result of the analysis was that workers often leave short tenured job 
matches. Half of job-to-job and exit moves came from workers with less than 
one year’s job tenure. This suggests that the entry wage distribution reflects a 
lot of ‘cycling’ between employment and unemployment.  
 
Gregg and Wadsworth also present some evidence on the evolution of entry 
wages over the last twenty years vis-à-vis the wage distribution as a whole. 
Data from the General Household Survey between 1980 and 1990 suggest 
that median overall wages grew by about 25% (adjusted for price inflation) 
whereas median entry wages grew not at all. However, the regression-
adjusted entry wage gap shows no clear trend over the period 1980-1997 in 
GHS and LFS data; the gap is estimated at anything between 17 and 31 
percentage points. A decomposition of the rise in the raw wage gap between 
entry jobs and continuing jobs indicates that about one-third of the rise is due 
to job entrants being increasingly less well educated and having less  
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experience relative to other workers. Much of the rest of the rise appears to be 




5.3 Wage mobility  
 
The studies reported in section 5.1 suggested that the most important 
increases in wages take place in the first few years of employment and 
experience accumulation. Given that working lives span about 40 to 50 years 
for most people, this means that over most of this period wages change little 
in real terms. This is to some extent surprising. Yet, explanation of what we 
observe in the data may be two-fold. We might observe little effect of 
experience on changes in wage levels because: 
 
   productivity (human capital) - and wages as a result - does not 
increase after the first few years of employment  
   people experience both increases as well as falls in wages over 
their working lives so that “on average” wages seem to stagnate 
 
Wages may fall as a result of depreciation of human capital or as a 
consequence of changes in technology, which make some skills obsolete. A 
spell of unemployment cause an individual to suffer more severely from these 
effects. Also, when beginning a new job, employees may have to finance job-
specific training if it is funded ‘upfront’ by their employer; this might be 
reflected in lower wages during or after the training. Temporary falls in wages 
may also be a result of agreements between employers and employees aimed 
at minimising the level of job losses at the time of a recession.  
 
Cross-sectional data on experience and wages will not be able to distinguish 
between the two hypotheses and will assign an average value of the wage to 
an average value of labour market experience. To be able to make a 
distinction between the two explanations we need to follow individuals over 
time and see what happens to their wages as their labour market history 
develops. Two studies reported below have done precisely this using two 
different data-sets, the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the 
National Earnings Survey.  
 
Gosling, Johnson, McCrae and Paull (1997) use the first four waves of the 
BHPS (1991-1994) and look at wage changes within and between jobs. Wage 
fluctuations occur both in terms of absolute wage levels as well as on a 
relative scale (there are movements between different points in the wage 
distribution). The authors report that even looking at changes in wages over a 
period as long as three years, a substantial number of people experience 
wage reductions.  
 
Absolute wage reductions are more pronounced for people who experience a 
spell of unemployment over this period, but are relatively common also among 
those who don’t. 18% of men who did not spend any time out of work between  
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1991 and 1994 experienced wage reductions of over 10%. For men who did 
experience spells of unemployment in this period wages fell by more than 
10% in 44% of cases. At the same time around 29% of men (both among 
those who did and did not become unemployed) saw their wage increase by 
over 20%.  
 
The BHPS data suggests that there is a large degree of relative wage mobility 
as well. Gosling et al. look at relative position of people in the wage 
distribution by quartile. They find that by 1994 about 52% of men and women 
were in the same wage quartile as in 1991, though during the three years 
some people moved in and out of these quartiles as well experiencing both 
increases and falls in wages. People from the higher end of the income 
distribution were less likely to change their relative wage position and least 
likely to find themselves out of work after the three years.  
 
Dickens (1999) confirms the above findings using the New Earnings Survey. 
The degree of reported wage mobility is slightly higher than that found for the 
BHPS. Dickens finds that 48% of men and 44% of women in the lowest wage 
decile (the bottom 10% of wage earners) were still there after a year. Relative 
wage mobility seemed to be highest among those in the middle of the wage 
distribution and as found in Gosling et al. it was lowest among those at the top 
of the distribution. Over 70% of men and 65% of women from the top wage 
decile were still there after twelve months.  
 
 
5.4 Patterns of Job Displacement 
 
In this section we examine the empirical evidence on job separations and job 
exits. Empirical labour market data often contain information on quits and 
layoffs but there are often problems distinguishing between these cases. One 
can think of several examples where a quit might appear as a layoff in 
empirical data or vice versa: 
 
•  an employee might quit in preference to being sacked to avoid the 
negative labour market signal attached to dismissal. This would show 
up as a quit in empirical data, but is really a pre-empted layoff.  
 
•  In countries with substantial employment protection legislation (such as 
France and Germany as analysed by Bender et al (1999)) layoffs are 
time-consuming and require substantial expenditure on the part of the 
firm to meet all the legal requirements for consultation with the 
workforce, a statutory minimum notice period, and so on. A firm may 
agree to compensate employees who quit rather than being laid off if 
by doing so they bypass the costs imposed by the legislation.  
 
•  A firm might terminate the contract of a worker who would have left of 




Even if the data are reliable in distinguishing quits from layoffs, the reason for 
layoffs may vary widely. Some might be because productivity on a job has 
declined for exogenous reasons (such as macroeconomic factors); this is the 
scenario which causes job separations in the model of Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994), for example. On the other hand, the layoff might be for 
reasons endogenous to the worker or firm (for example, poor effort on the 
job). A plant closure is the scenario most likely to be exogenous to the worker 
and can probably be regarded as an extreme example of a layoff for 
exogenous reasons.  
 
The upshot of all this is that any model of work exit which is flexible enough to 
accommodate the various reasons why somebody might leave a job has to 
take account of the fact that the data may misclassify the various scenarios if 
it is to be empirically estimable. We return to the appropriate specification for 
an exit equation in Report 2. In the remainder of this section, we examine 
empirical work which has looked at the rate of job exit and worker 
displacement in various countries, the relationship between exit wages and 
overall wages, and the wages earned on re-entry into the labour market. 
 
Empirical studies tend to agree that worker displacement (defined by van den 
Berg et al (1999) as ‘permanent job separations
30 initiated by an employer 
because of adverse economic conditions’) are counter-cyclical (i.e. 
displacement is more likely in a recession). This is found by van den Berg 
(1999) for the US and the Netherlands, Kletzer (1998) for the US, and Bender 
et al  (1999) for France and Germany. By contrast, quits appear to be pro-
cyclical in empirical work (e.g. McLaughlin, 1991). This makes sense if 
individuals are more confident about the prospects for securing a better job if 
the economy is doing well.  
 
Do the observed patterns of worker turnover support any particular 
macroeconomic theory of employment dynamics over the business cycle? 
Most empirical studies find that sectoral shifts in employment over time are a 
much  less  important component of job reallocation than simultaneous job 
destruction and creation within  each sector, perhaps corresponding to the 




Comparisons between different countries appear to indicate that more loosely 
regulated labour markets such as the US and the UK have higher job exit 
rates but also higher job entry rates than more heavily regulated labour 
markets such as France and Germany. The obvious explanation for this is that 
the extra ‘hiring and firing’ costs associated with employment protection 
legislation make employment adjustment more costly in the more regulated 
                                              
30 The stress on ‘permanent’ here allows us to distinguish between permanent job separations and 
temporary layoffs, which are an important feature of certain sections of the US labour market.  
31 See Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) and Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) for more details.   
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5.5 Exit wages and overall wages 
 
What is the relationship between ‘exit wages’ and overall wages in the 
economy? Empirical work on this question by Jacobson, LaLonde and 
Sullivan (1993), using detailed US panel data, found that it was important to 
make a distinction between workers who were laid off for reasons exogenous 
to the individual worker and workers who quit their jobs. Jacobson et al 
constructed a ‘mass-layoff’ sample of individuals who were laid off by firms 
who suffered aggregate employment reductions of 30 per cent or more in the 
5 years previous to the survey. For these workers, average quarterly earnings 
began to diverge from the sample-wide average for workers of similar 
characteristics up to three years prior to separation. Immediately before 
separation, the earnings of workers in the separating sample were around 
10% lower on average than the sample mean as a whole. By contrast, there 
appeared to be little or no wage ‘dip’ prior to separation for workers who 
claimed to have left their jobs voluntarily.  
 
These empirical findings, which are largely confirmed by more recent work for 
the US and the Netherlands by Abbring et al (1999), show that the reason for 
job exit appears to be vital. In the case of layoffs, the finding of a wage ‘dip’ 
prior to separation appears to tally with the prediction of the matching models 
shown earlier, which imply that exit wages will tend to be lower than wages in 
ongoing jobs conditional on the characteristics of the worker, as it is the poorly 
matched (and hence low-productivity) jobs which terminate. The business 
cycle models considered earlier, which stress the role of reallocation of labour 
from low-productivity jobs to high-productivity jobs (given worker attributes), 
would also draw us towards this conclusion. 
 
On the other hand, where the worker initiates the separation because he or 
she is moving to (or searching for) a higher paid job, the relationship between 
the separation wage and the average level of wages in general is much less 
clear. In a simple search model where the wage within each job is static over 
time, the most we can say is that the wage in the new job should be higher 
than the wage in the old job; but this does not necessarily imply that the wage 
in the old job is low compared with average wages for someone of those given 
characteristics. In the case of the intertemporal labour supply theory 
considered earlier,  there are (at least) two possible scenarios. If it is the case 
that returns to work in the labour market as a whole reduce at a point in time 
which drives temporary exit from the labour market (for example, if there is a 
negative shock to the returns to skill), this tells us nothing about what exit 
wages look like relative to overall wages at that point in time. But on the other 
hand, if someone is dropping out of the labour market due to a perception that 
                                              
32 Of course, the fact that inflows and outflows are smaller does not in itself mean that unemployment 
will be higher in the more regulated countries. Some commentators have argued to this conclusion (e.g. 
Siebert (1997)) but this is by no means a universally accepted  hypothesis (see, e.g. Nickell  (1997)).   
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his or her returns to work are relatively low at that point in the life-cycle (e.g. 
the decision to retire early), and the age-earnings profile is relatively smooth, 
then we might expect to find that wages decline prior to job exit. 
 
To sum up this section, it appears that the relationship between exit wages 
and the overall sample of wages is not at all obvious, being the outcome of 
the interplay between a number of factors. This has direct relevance for the 
exit equations which we are planning to estimate in our model (discussed in 
the Report 2). The estimation of our dynamic model in Report 3  takes into 
account the comparison of the exit wage information in the UK Labour Force 
Survey with the overall wage distribution in the Family Resources Survey and 
examines whether exit wages are lower conditional on observed 
characteristics.  
 
5.6 Re-entry wages for displaced workers 
 
There are conflicting findings on the question of whether displaced workers 
suffer a wage penalty on re-employment. Ruhm (1991) finds that 
displacement leads to a average wage loss of 14 to 18 percent based on data 
from the US Displaced Workers Survey. However, van den Berg et al (2000) 
appear to show no significant wage penalty using more recent data for the US 
and a positive effect of displacement using data for the Netherlands. Bender 
et al (1999) similarly find only small earnings losses in France and Germany. 
For the UK, Gregory and Jukes (1997) find a re-entry penalty of around 10%,   
whilst Gregg, Knight and Wadsworth (1999) find a penalty of around 9% for 
workers who are displaced from a full-time job and re-enter work in another 
full-time job. The existence of a re-entry penalty would tally with the findings 
that entry wages are on average lower than the average of the overall wage 
distribution, although an alternative hypothesis would be that individuals who 
leave work and return quickly get wages which were similar to those in their 
previous job, whereas those who have been away for a longer period earn 
much less on average. Even if the entry wage distribution were a mixture of 
these two types of workers it could still have a much lower mean than the 




Chapter 6. Empirical estimation of dynamic models 
 
In this section we examine empirical models which explicitly address the 
dynamics of the labour market discussed in chapter 5. These models fall into 
four main groups: 
 
i.  models of the transition into work (the ‘hazard modelling’ literature).  
ii.  Structural models of labour market search, entry wages and the 
reservation wage. 
iii.  General equilibrium search/matching models. 
iv.  Life cycle models of work and schooling choice in an intertemporal 
context under uncertainty. 
 
We also devote a section to analysing the model of work entry and the tax 
benefit system devised by Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999), as the model 
which we develop in the Report 2 of this project is a direct descendent of that 
approach in many ways.  
 
In each case the data requirements of the approach are discussed, as are 
some basic results from the recent literature. The sensitivity of the results to 
identifying assumptions and the robustness of the results will also be placed 
under the spotlight. 
 
 
6.1 Hazard modelling 
 
6.1.1 The basic hazard model 
 
In hazard, or duration, analysis, the dependent variable is the time that an 
individual takes to transit from an initial state to an end state. Hazard 
modelling was first used in labour economics for analysing the time taken to 
exit from unemployment into work. Early papers using this methodology 
include Nickell (1979), Lancaster (1979) and Atkinson et al (1984) for the UK, 
and Meyer (1990) for the US.  
 
The basic idea of the hazard approach is to specify a function for the hazard 
rate out of unemployment in terms of explanatory variables that produce 
variation in the reservation wage  ) (
r w , the offer distribution  ) (w F  and the 
arrival rate  ) (δ . A straightforward specification often used in the empirical 
literature is the proportional hazards model,  
 
)) ( ( ) ( ) ), ( ( 0 t x t t t x Φ = λ ω        (2.6) 
where  0 λ is referred to as the baseline hazard.  ) (t x  contains a vector of 
exogenous controls. In the proportional hazards specification, conditional on 
certain values of the regressors x any variation in the hazard over time is  
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captured entirely in the baseline hazard; regressors just shift the level of the 
hazard around according to some functional form. In many cases, the 
regressors in the  x vector are time-invariant factors such as age at start of 
sample period, region of residence, and educational attainment. The 
specification can be made more flexible however by including time varying 
regressors in x (for example, to take account of macroeconomic conditions, 
or changes in the local labour market). Common choices for the regressor 
function  Φ include the exponential specification 
β ' ) (
x e x = Φ  and the more 





α αt e x ,  0 > α . The model can be made 
more flexible still by estimating the baseline hazard  0 λ  using  semiparametric 
or nonparametric techniques as shown in Lancaster (1990).  
 
 
6.1.2 Multiple end states: the competing risks framework  
 
Although early hazard models in labour economics concentrated on the 
transition from unemployment into work, more recently the approach has been 
extended to deal with more than one initial state and end state (the 
‘competing-risks’ approach). In the competing risks framework, there are (at 
least) two hazards:  
 
)) ( ( ) ( ) ), ( ( 1 0 , 1 1 t x t t t x Φ = λ ω  
 
)) ( ( ) ( ) ), ( ( 2 0 , 2 2 t x t t t x Φ = λ ω         (2.7) 
 
1 ) ( ) ( 2 1 ≤ + t t ω ω for  all t. 
The hazard functions describe the conditional probability of exit to the 
mutually exclusive final states 1 and 2 (for example, the initial state could be 
unemployment, final state 1 employment, and state 2 inactivity). The model is 
called a competing-risk model as the individual has two options or ‘risks’ to 
leave the current state, and the realisation of one option is necessary and 
sufficient for leaving the state. The particular formulation in equations (2.7) 
above is what Van Den Berg (2001) labels the ‘Multiple Mixed Proportional 
Hazards’ model (MMPH), where each individual hazard is proportional. 
Examples of labour market transition analysis in the competing-risks 
framework include Narendrenathan and Stewart (1990) for the UK. Also, the 
hazard framework shown above only accommodates a single transition; but 
the framework can be extended to allow multiple transitions. Van den Berg 
(2001) surveys recent empirical developments in this direction.  
 
 
6.1.3 Models with multiple start and end states and multiple 
transitions 
 
The competing-risks model shown above only accommodates a single start 
state and single transition to an end state. However, many researchers have 
estimated models which allow for multiple initial states and multiple 
transitions. Honoré (1993) gives details of the MMPH model with multiple  
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transitions. Examples of models which use data on multiple transitions from 
unemployment to employment and back again, and multiple unemployment 
durations, are Nielsen et al (1992), Bonnal et al (1997) and Gonul and 
Srinivasan (1993).  
 
6.1.4 Data requirements and identification of the hazard model 
 
The data requirements of the hazard approach are quite stringent. In a single-
transition model, for each individual in a sample, estimation ideally requires 
 
(i) the time at which the individual entered the initial state,  
(ii) the time at which the individual made the transition to the end state, and 
(iii) the other covariates included in  x.  
 
Right-censored data, where (i) is known but (ii) is unknown in some cases, 
can be accommodated in the estimation procedure without great difficulty. 
Left-censored data, where (i) is unknown, can also be controlled for, but is 
more problematic.  
 
A major problem in hazard modelling is unobserved heterogeneity – 
differences between individuals in the sample which cannot be controlled for 
by observed variables. Because the composition of the sample effectively 
alters over time in the duration analysis (as people transit from the start state 
to the end state), without further assumptions about how the unobservables 
are distributed it is impossible to say whether a hazard is declining over time 
because being in the initial state for a longer period diminishes the probability 
of exit (state-dependence) or because the people who are more likely to exit 
conditional on observable factors do so early on, leaving behind other 
individuals who have always  been less likely to exit (unobserved 
heterogeneity). Elbers and Ridder (1982) and Heckman and Singer (1984) 
discuss estimation of hazard models in the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. It turns out that if a model is specified as follows: 
 
 
v t x t v x t )). ( ( ) ( ) , | ( 0 Φ = λ ω         (2.8) 
 
where  0 , , , λ ω x t  and Φ are defined as in equation (2.7) and v denotes an 
unobserved heterogeneity term (assumed uncorrelated with  x)
33, then it can 
be shown that failing to take account of unobserved heterogeneity biases the 
results from estimating the model.
34 Heckman and Singer (1984) show that it 
is possible to estimate the model consistently if unobserved heterogeneity 
) (v G follows a Gamma distribution. However, there has been some sensitivity 
analysis done on the effects of misspecifying the functional form of 
unobserved heterogeneity which indicates that the single-spell model is quite 
susceptible to estimation biases arising from misspecification. As van den 
                                              
33 This model is known as the Mixed Proportional Hazards model (see van den Berg, 2001).  
34 Specifically, if the elements of x are positively correlated with the hazard then the neglect of 
unobserved heterogeneity leads to results that are biased in favour of negative duration dependence (i.e 
it looks as if the hazard decreases for each person with time). See Lancaster (1979) for proof.   
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Berg (2001) puts it, ‘in the absence of strong prior information on the 
determinants of the MPH model, single-spell data do not enable a robust 
assessment of the relative importance of these determinants as explanations 
of random variation in the observed durations… Estimation results from single 
spell data are sensitive to misspecification of the functional forms associated 
with these determinants. Therefore, the interpretation of such results in terms 
of the shape of the individual hazard are often unstable and should be viewed 
with extreme caution.’ 
 
Using multiple-spell models mitigates some of the above problems. If data are 
available on multiple spells then duration analysis becomes more akin to 
standard panel data analysis where the data can be used to separate ‘fixed 
effects’ (including individual unobserved heterogeneity, if this is assumed to 
be fixed over time) from other factors. Also the assumption on the distribution 
of the unobserved heterogeneity can be done away with (see Lancaster, 
1998, for example). However, the data requirements for multiple spell analysis  
are obviously far more stringent. Panel data are required, with reasonably 
accurate timing information on state transitions. The number of available data 
sets with accurate information on multiple spells in labour market states is 
much smaller than the number of available data sets with single spell 
information (indeed many surveys are designed as single spell surveys). And 
of course, using panel data gives rise to additional sample selection problems 
(due to attrition and reduced response rates in general).  
 
6.1.5 Choice and construction of regressors in hazard modelling 
 
The regressors included in the control variable set x in a hazard model 
usually comprise age, family status, some measures of health status, and a 
financial incentive variable or variables to take account of the financial gains 
to moving into work. In early work such as Nickell (1979) and Lancaster 
(1979), a replacement rate variable – the ratio of out-of-work benefits to in-
work net income – was often used. Atkinson et al (1984) showed that the 
exact approach taken to measuring both the numerator and denominator of 
the replacement rate could result in widely differing estimates of the effect of 
replacement ratios on unemployment durations, indicating that the early 
hazard model studies were not very robust to measurement error in benefit or 
net wage levels.  
 
6.1.6 The limitations of the hazard approach 
 
Techniques for modelling both out-of-work income and post-tax wages have 
fortunately improved a lot over the 1980s and 1990s (see for example Meyer, 
1990). However, the hazard approach still seems lacking in its treatment of 
the hours decision element of labour supply in particular (as opposed to the 
participation decision, which is modelled very exactly). Labour market 
transitions in this framework tend to just look at ‘the move into work’ as 
opposed to ‘the move into work at a given hours level and wage’. Thus, for the 
purposes of modelling work incentives in a dynamic labour market framework, 
the hazard methodology as it stands only seems to be useful up to a point.     
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In the next section, we consider more structural approaches to empirical 
estimation of search and matching models.  
 
 
6.2 Structural models of labour market search, entry wages 
and the reservation wage 
 
The data requirements for structural estimation of a search model such as that 
shown in section 2.2.2 are onerous. The reservation wage 
r w  – the lowest 
wage at which an unemployed worker will take a job – is not normally 
observable in empirical data. Although a number of studies attempt to derive 
reservation wage information from survey questions asking “what is the lowest 
wage you would be willing to accept?” or similar questions, there are very few 
surveys where this question is asked more than once of the same individual to 
enable researchers to look at the path of the reservation wage through time. 
Additionally, many economist are wary of relying on self-reported measures of 
economic variables like the reservation wage, preferring to deduce them from 
actual market actions and outcomes.  
 
In a fully structural model the reservation wage can be determined from other 
data through the search equation, but the data requirements are quite 
stringent. Even in the simplest case outlined in section 4.2.1, for direct 
estimation the following variables would be needed; 
 
•  Out of work income b  
•  Search costs a 
•  The discount rate r  
•  The conditional offer wage distribution  x w F | ) ( , where  x is a variable 
of characteristics that we would normally put in a wage equation.  
•  The rate of arrival of offers δ . 




− + − =
r w
r r w dF w w r a b w ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( δ      (2.9) 
 
Data on out-of-work income b  are often available, either directly from survey 
data or by imputation using simulation models of the benefit system. The cost 
of search a is problematic as although some data sets contain information on 
methods used to look for work (e.g. the Labour Force Survey) the information 
on search intensity necessary to translate this into monetary-equivalent costs 
is lacking. The discount rate r  is unobservable directly although a sensible 
guess on its magnitude can be made in many cases. The rate of offer arrivals 
δ  is also problematic, as few data sets contain information on job offers (as 
opposed to accepted jobs). Given these limitations, assumptions have to be 
made about the distribution of δ  and  a in the same way that assumptions 
were made about the distribution of (for example) fixed costs in estimation of 
the static labour supply model in Chapter 1. A parametric (or semi-parametric) 
assumption on the shape of the offer distribution  ) (w F  can be made, but even  
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so, it is often hard to derive a closed form expression for the reservation wage 
as a function of observed data. Some approximation to equation (2.9) through 
expansion of the integrand term is often made, before estimation proceeds by 
maximum likelihood. Examples of papers which follow this approach include 
Narendrenathan and Nickell (1985), Devine (1988) and Neumann (1997).  
 
This approach to estimation of the dynamics of the labour market has 
powerful predictive power if we believe the model which is being used as a 
starting point. It can be used to give precise estimates of the response of work 
entry rates to changes in out of work income b  or a reduction in search costs 
a resulting from government support to jobseekers through institutions such 
as Jobcentre Plus (for example). However the tightness of the structural 
specification means that the model is vulnerable to misspecification. 
Advocates of the budget-constraint approach presented in chapters 1 and 2 
can point to a number of omissions from the search model; for example, fixed 
costs of work are not accounted for in equation (2.9), and once again there is 
no treatment of hours of work. Refinements and extensions exist that take 
account of both of these, but there is an additional criticism; these partial 
equilibrium models are only looking at a transition from unemployment into 
employment (saying nothing about job exit or destruction), and also the 
employer side of the labour market is not covered. For an empirical estimation 
strategy which estimates a full set of search equilibrium conditions taking 
employee/employer matching and job entry and exit into account, we have to 




6.3 General equilibrium search/matching models 
 
We focus here on studies which attempt to estimate empirical versions of 
search/matching models relying at least to some extent on microeconomic 




Once again the models considered here are highly structural. Kiefer and 
Neumann (1993) and Ridder and van den Berg (1998) both estimate a simple 
version of the Burdett-Mortensen model described in section 5.2, with the 
simplification that workers and employers are homogenous. Even this simple 
version is consistent with a number of stylised facts: wage offers are in 
general higher than reservation wages, there are positive returns to 
experience and tenure, larger firms offer higher wage rates, and exit rates are 
negatively correlated with wage rates in the cross section. However, the 
predicted wage distribution differs markedly from any known real-world wage 
distribution unless worker and employer heterogeneity are built into the model. 
To get around this, both of the studies mentioned above assume a labour 
market which is completely segmented by education, experience, occupation 
                                              
35 recent empirical papers analyzing the effects of labour market policy in a general equilibrium search 
framework using aggregate data include Coe and Snower (1996), Mortensen and Pissarides (1997) and 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998)  
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and industry subgroups, so that the simplified Burdett-Mortensen model holds 
within subgroups but not across them. The estimated models do provide an 
accurate fit to unemployment duration and cross-sectional wage data, but they 
underestimate the returns to experience observed in the panel.  
 
Bontemps et al (1999) assume that there is heterogeneity in employer 
productivity over a continuous distribution of employer types. In their model, 
profit maximisation implies that there will be a one-to-one correspondence 
between the distribution of wage offers and the distribution of employer 
productivity. They obtain joint estimates of the offer arrival rate and separation 
rate parameters and a non-parametric estimate of the distribution of employer 
labour productivity using unemployment and job duration data and earnings 
data drawn from a French panel survey on individual worker histories. After 
stratifying the data by industry, the model appears to fit well, even though 
workers in each industry are assumed equally productive. Interestingly, the 
empirical results suggest that the most productive employers have monopoly 
power which they use to pay wages below marginal product. 
 
These models seem to do fairly well in fitting observed data on wages, even 
though they incorporate assumptions which are unlikely to hold in the real 
world (e.g. that workers within each industry are equally productive). However, 
whilst it has made large strides in the last few years this literature is still in its 
early stages in terms of producing truly realistic models of the entire labour 
market. Further progress may be retarded by the available data: there are few 
data sets in existence in either Europe or the US which match employer and 
employee data, and none currently available for Britain. Certainly, the Labour 
Force Survey and Family Resources Survey, which we are using for our 
labour supply model, would not allow one to estimate a structural model of this 
type. However, in Report 2 we discuss more fully the implications from search 
and matching models that we can use in our model.  
 
6.4 Combining human capital and transition modelling: life-
cycle labour supply and wage progression in a dynamic 
framework 
 
6.4.1 The Keane/Wolpin model 
 
The basic search model surveyed in the previous section deals only with a 
single transition into work, while transitions out of work in the 
Mortensen/Pissarides framework are treated as exogenous shocks, after 
which the job search process starts again. Can we extend the search model to 
treat the range of transitions from non-participation to unemployment to work 
(perhaps moving from job to job while employed), and indeed into and out of 
full-time education, as the result of life-cycle optimisation by rational and far-
sighted economic agents? This has been attempted by Keane and Wolpin 
(1997) using an econometric framework developed by Keane and Wolpin 
(1994). They combine the human capital methodology discussed in Section 
5.1 with the search approach of 5.2 to estimate a model of how individuals  
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make the decision to leave school, and thereafter, when to work and not to 
work. The model is of course only valid under stringent assumptions 
concerning individual rationality and the structure of the wage offer distribution 
and employment creation and reduction, but once estimated, it can be used to 
derive powerful predictions of how changes to wage levels (through tax and 
benefit reforms, for example) might affect work profiles. 
 
The model which Keane and Wolpin use views individuals as having a finite 
time horizon beginning at age 16 and ending at age A. At each age a, an 
individual chooses among four mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives:  
 
1.  work in a ‘blue-collar’ occupation 
2.  work in a ‘white-collar’ occupation 
3.  attend full-time education 
4.  ‘home production ‘ (i.e. non-participation in the labour market).  
 
The payoff per period at any age a is given by  
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where  ) (a Rm is the reward per period associated with the 
th m  alternative. In 
alternatives 1 and 2, the payoff (i.e. the wage) is determined by human 
capital; it thus depends on the number of years schooling  ) (a g   and work 
experience in the occupation  ) (a xm . The model allows for work in blue-collar 
and white-collar occupations to attract differentiated human capital in the 
manner first suggested by Roy (1951)
36. Alternative 3 (full-time education) 
incurs tuition and ‘effort’ costs. Alternative 4 (non-participation) allows the 
individual to consume leisure, which is assumed to have a value equal to the 
return to a skill endowment at age 16 plus a component which fluctuates 
randomly with age. This implies that the  structure of rewards is given by: 
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Each alternative m contains a productivity ‘shock’ term  m ε . The productivity 
shocks are assumed to be jointly normally distributed and uncorrelated.  
 
The individual’s choice problem is to maximise the expected present value of 
remaining lifetime payoffs. This is done through a dynamic programming 
formulation (Bellman, 1957). Defining  ) ), ( ( a a S V , the value function, to be the 
maximum expected present value of lifetime rewards at age a  given the 
individual’s state S(a) and discount factor δ , the problem is formulated as: 
                                              
36 The original Keane and Wolpin model also includes the military as a separate occupation and 
includes a quadratic in experience in the human capital earnings function as well as splitting the tuition 
costs variable tc into costs associated with grad school and costs associated with college. Here we 
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The individual’s decision process is described as follows: beginning at age 16, 
given endowments at age 16, the individual draws four random shocks from 
the joint  ) 16 ( ε distribution, then uses them to calculate the realised current 
rewards and the four alternative-specific value functions, and then chooses 
the alternative that yields the highest value. The state space is then updated 
according to the alternative chosen and the process is repeated. The solution 
of the optimisation problem does not have a closed-form representation. The 
problem has to be solved numerically using backward recursion using the 
approximation methods developed in Keane and Wolpin (1994). Estimation 
involves an iterative process. Assuming that shocks are serially independent 
the probability of any sequence of choices and rewards can be written as: 
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where  ) (a c is the set of choices available and the rewards from making each 
given choice at age aand  ) (a S denotes the ‘predetermined’ elements of the 
‘state-space’, i.e. endowments at age 16, plus the work experience and 
human capital at future ages which individuals would choose if there were 
zero shocks in all periods. The sample likelihood is the product of the 
probabilities in (the equation given above) over the  N  individuals in the 
sample used for the empirical estimation. The dynamic programming problem 
is solved numerically for given parameter values. The likelihood function is 
then computed, and new parameter values entered into the dynamic 
programming problem, iteratively until the likelihood is maximised. Because 
the likelihood function involves the calculation of multivariate integrals, 
estimation is conducted using simulated maximum likelihood as described in 
Keane and Wolpin (1994). Keane and Wolpin (1997) also extend the model to 
allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the endowments at age 16 due to 
comparative advantages for different individuals in different sectors (for 
example, some individuals might be better at acquiring schooling due to 
higher innate ability than others).  
 
Keane and Wolpin estimate a version of the model shown above on data for 
the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for around 13,000 men who 
were aged 14-21 in 1979. The results indicate that although the basic model 
fails to fit the observed data very well, an extended version which incorporates 
skill depreciation, job search and mobility costs, and nonpecuniary aspects to 




6.4.2 An assessment of the life-cycle work and schooling choice 
model 
 
If we believe the assumptions underlying the life-cycle work and schooling 
choice model as implemented by Keane and Wolpin, then it is clearly an 
extremely powerful way of modelling labour market transitions. This is 
because the solution to the model provides a way to relate the entire observed 
lifetime labour market decisions of the individuals in a data set to the observed 
features of the labour market – wage rates and the costs of and returns to 
schooling – available at the time. The model can then be used for various 
simulation exercises which have great potential to inform policy analysis, for 
example: 
 
•  forward extrapolation of the model to examine how assumptions about 
what will happen to overall wage growth and the returns to schooling in 
the future might affect aggregate employment rates for people of 
different ages as they grow earlier, and the likely pattern of labour 
market transitions for individuals as they head towards retirement. This 
can be a valuable tool in assisting with the design of pensions policy, 
for example (see Phelan and Rust, 1997, and Kenc and Perraudin, 
1997).  
•  Estimates of the impact of policy interventions which affect the 
exogenous parameters in the model – wages and/or schooling costs in 
this case. For example, Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999) use a 
dynamic programming approach to study the impact of tuition subsidies 
on the long-run accumulation of human capital in the US labour market. 
Trostel (1994) looks at the effect of a proportional income tax on 
human capital formation in a life-cycle model and finds that the 
estimated elasticity of labour supply with respect to the post-tax wage 
appears to be substantially greater in a life-cycle framework than in a 
traditional static framework.  
 
If successful, these simulation exercises would appear to be more general in 
their application, and powerful in their predictions, than many of the other 
modelling approaches we have looked at in Chapters 4-6. Are there any 
drawbacks to the life-cycle choice model? On the face of it there appear to be 
three, which we discuss below. The first two can definitely be overcome (or 
indeed may already have been overcome), while the third may face more 
problems. 
 
1. data  requirements.  Obviously the estimation of a life-cycle model of 
labour market choices requires a different type of data than models which rely 
on single labour market transitions or even multiple spells over a short time 
period.  The ideal sources of data for this kind of analysis are long-running 
panel data sets with labour market status in each time period (e.g. every year) 
for each individual, as well as individual schooling histories and data on any 
training or adult education undertaken. This needs to be combined with 
information on the wage distribution, the returns to skill, experience and 
tenure for the period which the data covers. These can be spliced in from  
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other data sets, although it is useful to have wage data for the working 
individuals in the panel itself to calibrate the model properly. In the US, such 
data sets are readily available (e.g. the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Labour Market Experience, or the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics). In the 
UK the current situation is not as promising. The British Household Panel 
Survey would seem to be an ideal candidate for this kind of analysis, but it is 
still relatively young compared with the US surveys, having been running only 
since 1991. In future years it will certainly possible to use the BHPS for this 
kind of analysis.  
 
2. computational complexity. The dynamic programming aspect of the 
model solution involves the approximation of multi-dimensional integrals using 
a simulation method originally developed by McFadden (1989) and adapted to 
the current context by Keane and Wolpin (1994). Even using the 
approximation technique, the method involves a huge number of 
computations to solve the model, a problem which was sufficient to debar it 
from widespread use until the mid-1990s. However, with computing power 
increasing exponentially with each new generation of processors, this problem 
will become smaller and smaller over time.  
 
3.  realism of the assumptions. At present, this kind of dynamic life-cycle 
choice model has only been implemented under quite restrictive assumptions. 
For example: 
•  individual agents are assumed to be fully rational and far-sighted in 
that they are able to behave as if they are computing the expected 
return from a vast number of alternative patterns of labour market 
choices, maximising this function, and then re-computing the function 
in each subsequent time period as new information becomes 
available. This relates back to one of the criticisms of standard labour 
supply theory which we encountered in chapter 3, i.e. that the rational 
utility maximising individuals encountered in microeconomic theory 
are so unlike any real-world person that the theory is misconceived. 
We relate the reader back to the discussion in chapter 1 for more on 
this point. 
•  The labour market is assumed to be perfectly competitive. This is 
necessary so that the returns to work can be described as solely a 
function of an individual’s skill attributes (plus unobserved ‘ability’), 
and simplifies the model considerably. Under imperfect competition it 
might well be the case that jobs in different industries or sectors 
attracted different returns due to rents, for example. This would mean 
that the choice problem of the individual would be of increased 
complexity as the work decision would have to consider choice of 
occupation as well as choice over whether to work or not. As 
explained in the last section, with current computing power the choice 
problem in each time period has to be kept as simple as possible to 
make the model tractable.  
•  Markets are in equilibrium and clear continuously. This is necessary 
so that the individual can have an unconstrained choice of whether to 
work or not to work in each time period. Deviating from this 
assumption would lead to huge additional complexity.  
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•  In many models of this form, credit markets are assumed to be 
perfect, so that individuals can borrow against future earnings at the 
market interest rate (subject to the constraint of not being in debt at 
time of death). This assumption is obviously questionable as many 
theorists have pointed out that the moral hazard problems involved in 
borrowing against future earnings may lead to credit rationing (e.g. 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) However, this assumption can be relaxed at 
relatively minor cost.  
•  The models become much more complex if other ‘life-choices’ such 
as family formation (marriage and childbirth), geographical location, 
and choice of housing tenure are considered. Some of these choices 
have been considered in similar dynamic programming frameworks 
(e.g. Rosenzwieg and Wolpin (1995) look at the effect of teenage 
child-bearing on the human  capital formation of children who were 
born to these families). But a model which incorporates all  major 
choices which an individual or household could face in its working life 
still looks to be some way off.  
 
In summary, the life-cycle approach to a dynamic analysis of labour market 
transitions and labour supply decisions is both controversial in its application 
and extremely demanding in the computational apparatus needed to make it 
viable. However, if we believe the assumptions then it provides an extremely 
powerful tool for policy analysis – one that will surely grow in importance in the 
future as the technological constraints on its implementation diminish. 
Hopefully there will also be future work on what the implications of the model 
under less restrictive assumptions about individual rationality and the state of 




6.5 Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999) 
 
6.5.1 The modelling strategy 
 
In their 1999 report, Paul Gregg, Paul Johnson and Howard Reed (GJR) 
estimated a model which is a direct antecedent  of the methodology which we 
use in Report 3 of the project. The GJR model used data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) and Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the tax year 
1994-95. The model related the information from the LFS on who moved into 
work to the increases in disposable income that people expected to receive 
from moving into work. To get an accurate assessment of how the tax and 
benefit system affects the financial gains from working, the IFS’s tax and 
benefit microsimulation model TAXBEN was used to evaluate post-tax 
incomes in and out of work for unemployed and economically inactive people 
in the FRS in the same period as the LFS data. An ordered probit regression 
was used to estimate the probability of moving into work at the deciles of the 
entry wage distribution in the LFS. The ordered probit controlled for the 
individual’s sex, age group, region, education (degree, A level or equivalent, O 
level or equivalent, other education, no education), age-education  
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interactions, length of previous unemployment or inactivity, and being made 
redundant within the quarter prior to the start of the LFS panel. 
 
An hours equation was used to relate the probability of entering work at full-
time hours (over 30 hours) versus part-time hours (less than 30 hours) to a 
vector of controls (family status, homeownership, region, education, age 
group, and age of youngest child). This gave a vector of probabilities for each 
person of entering work at various deciles of the entry wage distribution and at 
part-time or full-time hours level. TAXBEN was run 20 times (i.e. once at each 
wage and hours combination) to give the financial gains from working at these 
wage and hours points.  
 
The data from each dataset were averaged into ‘cells’, where a cell comprised 
all individuals of a given sex, age, educational attainment, region and family 
status.  This made it possible to combine the information on gains from 
working in the FRS and the wage information and data on who moves into 
work in the LFS, using cell averages. For each individual j in cell g, the vector 
of gains from work,  j Γ , was averaged over the cell to give the cell-level vector 
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The final ‘moving-into-work’ equation had the following format: 
 
 
) ' ( ) Pr( g g g g X M ε δ β φ + Γ + =       (2.15) 
 
where Mg is the cell-based probability of moving into work in quarter 5 based 
on being unemployed or inactive in quarter 1,  g Γ  is a within-cell average of 
gains to work derived form the TaxBen run on the vector of wage and hours 
points for each person;  g X is a vector of extra regressors that control for other 
factor affecting the probability of moving into work, and  g ε a normally 
distributed error term. A variety of different specifications were used for  g X . 
Table 6.1, which is a reprint of a results summary table from the Gregg, 
Johnson and Reed report, shows four of the different specifications, with the 
predicted impacts on work probabilities of increases in out-of-work income 






Specification number  A B    C D
Impact of £10 increase in predicted out 
of work income on probability of moving 
into work (% pts.): men 
-0.1 0.9 **  0.7 ** 0.0
            : women  -0.3 ** -0.2  **  -0.1 -0.3 **
Impact of £10 increase in expected 
gains from working on probability of 
moving into work (% pts.): men 
1.2 ** 1.3 **  0.9 ** 0.0
             : women 
 
2.5 ** 2.5 **  1.9 ** 0.6
CONTROLS:    
male/female YES YES    YES YES
age   NO YES   YES YES
redundancy in last 3 months  NO NO    YES YES
level of unemployment (by 
education/region) 
NO NO   YES YES
age of youngest child (women only)  NO NO    YES YES
sick and disabled people  NO NO    NO YES
home ownership  NO NO    NO YES
family status (single, living with parents, 
married, working partner) 
NO NO   NO YES
    
 
The main results were that: 
 
•  There was a positive relationship between what the GJR model 
predicted was the financial return from working for men and women 
who were unemployed or economically inactive and their propensity to 
move into work, controlling for age, redundancy and the level of 
unemployment. 
•  The relationship appeared to be stronger for women than for men. 
•  The relationship was not  robust to controlling for family type in the 
model.  
•  Some spline regression of the ‘gains to work’ variable was done to 
examine the effect of increases in financial incentives for men and 
women who gained little financially from working in the first place. 
When the total (initial) expected gain from working was less than £100, 
increases in work incentives appeared to have a greater impact on the 
probability of moving into work.  
•  The elasticity of ‘work entry’ (the percentage increase in the work entry 
rate arising from a 1% increase in the expected gain to work) was 
calculated at about 0.08 for men and 0.12 for women.  
 
6.5.2 Policy simulation 
 
The results of the moving into work equation were used to predict the effects 
of various policies which were then (1999) scheduled to be introduced by the 
government. These included the 10p starting rate of income tax, the Working  
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Families Tax Credit, and the reforms to employee National Insurance 
Contributions. Two estimates of the employment effects were provided: 
 
•  The short-run estimate (over one year). This was arrived at by running 
a modified version of the TAXBEN model on each person in the FRS 
data to produce a new vector of out-of-work income and gains to work. 
These new incentive variables were then combined with the original 
coefficients of the moving-into-work equation to produce estimates of 
the increase in labour market entry for each cell over one year. These 
were then grossed up to give employment changes over one year. 
•  The  long-run  estimate. This was arrived at by exploiting the 
accounting identity that if the rate of labour market exit in each period 
were unchanged as a result of a change to the tax and benefit system, 
the increase (decrease) in the entry rate arising from a tax  and benefit 
reform would lead to an increase (decrease) in the long run equilbrium 
stocks of employed and unemployed people in the economy.  
 
GJR predicted that the WFTC (minus its childcare credit component, which 
they did not model) would lead to a net employment increase of around 
12,000 in its first year, and 33,000 in the long run. The introduction of the 10p 
starting rate of tax was predicted to lead to an increase of 14,000 in its first 
year, and 52,000 in the long run.
37  
 
6.5.3 Limitations of the GJR approach 
 
Whilst the GJR report was a useful contribution to the labour supply modelling 
literature, and was the first British empirical study to use entry wages for 
modelling, there were a number of weaknesses in the approach, which we 
discuss below on a point-by-point basis. 
 
Failure to model labour market exit 
 
GJR only modelled entry into work – there was no equation for job exit. This is 
probably a reasonable starting point for looking at the impact of labour market 
reforms on people who are currently unemployed or inactive – the target 
group for ‘welfare to work’ policies. However, it is a poor methodology for 
evaluating the overall employment impact of labour market policy because 
GJR were unable to say anything about how tax and benefit reforms might 
affect exit from work. Hence the predictions of the employment effects of the 
various reforms relied on the ad hoc assumption that the exit rate would be 
unaffected by the reforms.  
 
                                              
37 the numbers quoted here are from  Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999b) which differed from the original 
IFS report in that the assumption on the exit side of the labour market was that the exit rate would 
remain unchanged rather than that the number of people exiting each period would remain unchanged. 
If the number of people exiting each period remained unchanged, the exit rate would effectively fall if an 
increase in the entry rate increased employment in the short run. The constant exit rate assumption was 
held to be more realistic after some discussion of the original results (which showed higher long run 
effects).   
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Lack of time series variation 
 
The GJR study only used data from a single year’s FRS and LFS – the FRS 
data for the 1994/95 financial year and the four quarterly LFS panels which 
ended between March 1994 and February 1995. This meant that there was 
little or no time-series variation in the tax and benefit system and the 
distribution of wages which would have been useful for identifying the model. 
In the end, as explained in Chapter 4 of the GJR report, there was a serious 
identification problem with the model: in the specification of the moving-into-
work equation which controlled for age group, previous redundancy, regional 
unemployment, age of youngest child, owner-occupiers, sick and disabled 
people and family type, there was little systematic variation in work incentives 
across groups left with which to identify any incentive effects which might 
have existed. This was largely due to the absence of time-series variation in 
the data.  
 
Modelling of entry wages 
 
The wage modelling strategy used by GJR was innovative in that previous 
labour supply studies had not used entry wages, relying instead on predictions 
from the wage distribution as a whole (often adjusted for non-random 
selection into employment). The entry wage model controlled for differences in 
the mean and shape of the entry wage distribution for job entrants with 
different observable characteristics by using the ordered probit method 
discussed earlier. However, it could be argued that this method was still 
lacking in (at least) two respects: 
 
1.  There was no allowance for wage progression in work. If individuals are 
forward looking then we would expect them to take the possibility of 
wage progression into account when calculating a ‘long run’ return to 
work, or some implicit measure of the ‘net present value’ of taking a 
job. We have seen from the evidence presented in Chapter 5 that there 
do seem to be returns to tenure and experience on average even for 
low-skilled workers, and that there is substantial mobility in the wage 
distribution over time. If the expected growth in wages for people 
entering work is large (and if they take this into account when deciding 
whether to work or not) then focusing merely on the entry wage could 
lead to an underestimate of the financial benefits to moving into work.  
2.  There was no allowance for self-selection into work entry (as opposed 
to selection into employment). A priori, if we believe the Heckman 
selectivity model of wages whereby people who are currently not in 
work will tend to earn lower wages on average, conditional on 
observable characteristics, then people who are already in work, then 
an analogous argument is likely to hold for people who enter work from 
unemployment in the LFS sample compared with people who stay 
unemployed over the LFS sample period. In other words the GJR entry 
wage modelling process may overstate  entry wages for the 
unemployed or inactive who would be predicted to move into work if 
work incentives increased. How serious this selectivity effect is will  
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depend on the characteristics of current job entrants compared with 
potential job entrants. If current job entrants are mainly composed of 
people who were ‘accidentally’ displaced from employment and return 
quickly (e.g. people made redundant from previous jobs for reasons 
exogenous to their own performance in the job) then they are likely to 
be very different from the long-term unemployed and inactive people 
who are the primary target of welfare-to-work policies. If, on the other 
hand, current entrants are mainly people who were previously long-
term unemployed and inactive, then these are people who are probably 
from the lower end of the distribution of unobservable determinants of 
wages already, and the selectivity effect for these entrants vis-à-vis the 
people who are still unemployed is likely to be smaller than the effect 
for the average employed person in the entire distribution of employed 
people vis-à-vis the unemployed. GJR did control for previous 
redundancy in their moving-into-work equations, which should reduce 
the selectivity problem to some extent.  
 
Modelling of couples 
 
The GJR approach to modelling couples’ labour supply was as follows: when 
looking at the labour supply decision of one member of a couple (the 
husband, for example), the wife’s labour supply was treated as fixed and her 
net income was treated as a component of the husband’s unearned income. 
Similarly, when modelling the wife’s labour supply, the husband’s income was 
treated as fixed. This is a common simplification of the labour supply 
framework, but seems in the end rather unsatisfactory. Ideally we would like a 
modelling strategy that allows for the fact that the labour supply decision of 
one member of a couple can interact with the other partner’s decisions. In 
Chapter 4 (?) of Report 2 we examine our preferred strategy for modelling 
couples, which aims to model these interactions by treating the couple as the 
basic unit of observation and using a multi-state framework.  
 
6.5.4  Moving forward from Gregg-Johnson-Reed 
 
As we have seen there are serious criticisms one can make of the Gregg, 
Johnson and Reed report. Many of the improvements which we hope to 
achieve in the modelling strategy for the current project arise in response to 
problems with the GJR study. However, we have also sought to learn from a 
much wider set of theoretical and empirical research on labour supply and 
labour market dynamics in the build-up to this project – which is the very 
reason for this paper. This is explained in detail in Reports 2 and 3.  
 